Don’t Fight the Last War: Lessons from the Battlefields of Risk Management

Our brains are not calibrated to deal with the unexpected. Most of us believe we are good risk managers but in reality we are not. Most of us trust that risk can always be quantified and expressed through some fancy modelling whereas, often, it cannot. The world is not normal, yet universities continue to teach our young students the wisdom of Markowitz and Sharpe which brought us modern portfolio theory and, more specifically, the capital asset pricing model. Garbage In, Garbage Out, as they say. One of the fundamental assumptions behind modern portfolio theory is that asset returns are normally distributed random variables. The return profile of US equities fairly closely matches that of a normal distribution with the exception of large negative returns. They have come about more frequently than one would or should expect

What is this “Financial Instability Hypothesis” by Hyman Minsky really about?

In his publications in the 1950s through the mid 1960s, Minsky gradually developed his analysis of the cycles. First, he argued that institutions, and in particular financial institutions, matter. This was a reaction against the growing dominance of a particular version of Keynesian economics best represented in the ISLM model. At the same time, he examined financial innovation, arguing that normal profit seeking by financial institutions continually subverted attempts by the authorities to constrain money supply growth. This is one of the main reasons why he rejected the LM curve’s presumption of a fixed money supply. With his 1975 book, Minsky provided an alternative analysis of Keynes’s theory. This provides his most detailed presentation of the “financial theory of investment and investment theory of the cycle”. Minsky continually developed his financial instability hypothesis to incorporate the extensions made to his investment theory over the course of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. The Kalecki equation was added; the two-price system was incorporated; and a more complex treatment of sectoral balances was included. Minsky also continued to improve his approach to banks, recognizing the futility of Fed attempts to control the money supply

Minskian Perspective on Instability in Financial Markets

Yesterday, we highlighted the talk that Steve Keen gave at the INET conference as our only post. Today, we present the full and in-depth version including his written analysis via Steve Keen’s DebtWatch website. Steve ends with two innovative solutions to this and future debt crises

Keen: Instability in Financial Markets

Steve Keen’s talk at INET is now up on the web (hat tip BT). His talk is billed as a primer on Hyman Minsky. In it, Steve argues that one cannot model Minsky using a New Keynesian or traditional neoclassical approach because of the reliance of these modelling approaches on the economic equilibrium assumption. Keen sees this assumption as the major flaw that cannot be remedied using standard modelling approaches

More on why Minsky matters

In Paul Krugman’s view, banks are not very important since all they do is to intermediate between savers and investors, taking in deposits and packaging them into loans. Now, I know that Krugman’s own specialty is not money and banking, so one would not expect him to have a deep understanding of all the technical details. However, he is an important columnist and textbook writer, so if he is going to expound upon “what banks do”, he should at least have the basics more-or-less correct. But he doesn’t. we need Minsky—whose views even from the 1950s are far more relevant to today’s real world banks than are Krugman’s

Ludwig von Mises on Austrian Business Cycle Theory

Yesterday, John Carney at CNBC had a nice little post comparing Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis with some of the thinking by Friedrich von Hayek behind Austrian Business Cycle Theory. John rightly points to this passage as “a theory about banking as an endogenous destabilizer of the economy.” And this certainly fits with the Minsky view of the world. von Mises takes the view that it is in having “bank notes without gold backing or current accounts which are not entirely backed by gold reserves, the banks are in a position to expand credit considerably”. Nevertheless, whether you believe the genesis of the credit expansion is Federal Reserve interest rate policy, animal spirits, fiat currency or fractional-reserve banking, what should be clear is that it is the lower rate of interest that creates the credit growth. The question is whether this lowering of rates is beneficial over the long-term. Vom Mises argues it is not

On debt’s centrality to modelling complex economic systems

My view as developed in that post is that debt is central to understanding economic systems, and not just because it has a redistributive element in apportioning losses between creditors and debtors when recession forces credit writedowns. More importantly, debt accumulation adds to an economy’s ability to sutain economic growth (and malinvestment) by adding to aggregate demand. The video in this post gets to why this. matters

Why Minsky Matters

My friend Steve Keen recently presented a “primer” on Hyman Minsky. In his piece, Steve criticized the methodology used by Paul Krugman and argued that Krugman could learn a lot from Minsky. In particular Krugman’s equilibrium approach and primitive dynamics was contrasted to Minsky’s rich analysis. Finally, Krugman’s model of debt deflation dynamics left out banks–while banks always played an important role in Minsky’s approach. This post is to help explain why Hyman Minsky matters by quickly summarizing Minsky’s main areas of research. Next week I will post up more on Minsky’s view of “money and banking”

A Primer on Minsky

Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis” is one of the key foundations of Steve Keen’s approach to economics. Minsky has come into vogue these days of course, but to people who’ve known his work for several decades rather than ever since the “Minsky Moment” of late 2007, a better expression would be that he’s “come into vague”

Private savings in a post-bubble world

I caught this comment by Scott Fulwiler on a blog post a 3spoken: the notion that firms can spend and reduce net saving in order to increase net saving of the household sector–while theoretically true and true in an accounting sense–doesn’t hold up well empirically. Across business cycles (i.e., trend as opposed to cycles), firm

Economics in the Age of Deleveraging

Clearly, economic policy is now far more complex than it appeared to be before the GFC. As we enter this Age of Deleveraging, the worst thing we can do is apply policies that appeared to work during the preceding Age of Leverage—but were in fact predicated on ever-rising private sector indebtedness. Politicians should be sceptical of conventional economic advice at this time; it would be much wiser to study the history of the 1930s instead

The Fetish for Liquidity (and Reform of the Financial System)

So here’s the deal. What happened is that the financial sector taken as a whole moved into extremely short-term finance of positions in assets. This is a huge topic and is related to the transformation of investment banking partnerships that had a long-term interest in the well-being of their clients to publicly-held, pump-and-dump enterprises whose only interest was the well-being of top management.

It also is related to the rise of shadow banks that appeared to offer deposit-like liabilities but without the protection of FDIC. And it is related to the Greenspan “put” and the Bernanke “great moderation” that appeared to guarantee that all financial practices—no matter how crazily risky—would be backstopped by Uncle Sam. And it is related to very low overnight interest rate targets by the Fed (through to 2004) that made short-term finance extremely cheap relative to longer-term finance. All of this encouraged financial institutions to rely on insanely short short-term finance