Valero Energy has just announced it is shutting down its Delaware City Refinery.  This is a major news announcement because refiners should be seen as a canary in the coalmine for end-user demand and Valero is one company in the oil patch which has been loath to cut workers to improve the bottom line. This announcement is an indicator that, despite a technical recovery, the economy still has major obstacles to overcome.

Business Wire reports:

Valero Energy Corporation (NYSE: VLO) announced today it intends to permanently shut down its Delaware City refinery due to financial losses caused by very poor economic conditions, significant capital spending requirements and high operating costs. The shutdown will affect approximately 550 employees at the plant.

Valero notified refinery employees today of the impending shutdown, and will immediately begin negotiations with the refinery’s unions regarding the effects of the plant closure and the employees’ severance packages. A safe and orderly shutdown of the refinery will commence immediately. Valero remains committed to its marketing businesses in the Northeast and will continue to reliably supply its customers, partially through higher throughput rates at the company’s other refineries.

“The decision to permanently close the Delaware City refinery was a very difficult one,” said Valero Chairman and CEO Bill Klesse. “We have spent the last year diligently trying to avoid this situation, and I have worked closely with Gov. Markell in an effort to find a different outcome. Earlier this fall, we shut down the gasifier and coking operations in an attempt to improve reliability and financial performance, but the refinery’s profitability did not improve enough. Additionally, we have sought a buyer for the refinery, but feasible opportunities have not materialized. At this point, we have exhausted all viable options.

“We realize that the decision to close the refinery affects many employees, their families, and the community. We are thankful to our employees for their service, and we will treat them fairly during this difficult period.”

In the fourth quarter of 2009, the company expects to report a pre-tax charge of approximately $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion, or $2.00 to $2.15 per share after taxes, related primarily to asset impairment, employee severance and other shutdown costs. The company estimates the cash portion of the pre-tax charge will be in the range of $125 million to $150 million. The current and historical financial results of the affected operations will be shown as discontinued operations in the company’s financial statements.

The new CEO Bill Klesse came to Valero via Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS), which Valero acquired at the top of the market in 2001. So, company ethos may be different than under Bill Greehey who was very committed to community. And Delaware City is an old Getty/Shell-Motiva oil refinery and a legacy asset of Blackstone-controlled Premcor, the company run by former Tosco head and Salomon Brothers commodities trader Tom O’Malley. So, it was not core to Valero’s operations. Valero already cut staff there in September. And the Shell-Motiva JV had serious operating difficulties with the asset before offloading it to Premcor.

Nevertheless, this was a refinery which has been upgraded significantly to process less expensive heavy, sour crude oil. The fact that Valero is laying off workers and shuttering the entire site tells you that the situation is bad. They are saying in effect “we cannot continue to operate at a loss through this business cycle.” If Valero can’t make money, no oil refiner can.

I see this in a macro context as a sign of cyclically weak end-user demand.  I do think peak oil is for real but the world is awash in oil and oil products right now.  Witness the recent post by FT Alphaville’s Izabella Kaminska, which points to a glut of distillate entering the season of high distillate demand:

We feel it’s Olivier Jakob at Petromatrix who really expressed the matter best on Friday. As he wrote (emphasis FT Alphaville’s):

As per our Tuesday ad hoc note on floating stocks; on a crude equivalent basis all of the OPEC and half of the IEA estimated oil demand growth for 2010 is already parked at anchor in floating stocks and these idled cargoes filled with oil are getting more and more attention.

By the end of the winter there is likely to be as much distillates afloat as in the total US at the end of winter 2007 and we expect that it will be more and more difficult for some of the Wall Street commodity banks to avoid mentioning the subject and to continue to hide the floating storage fill-up as “demand from emerging economies”.

The ICE Gasoil contango is currently widening and this will not work towards the reduction of these floating stocks. In an environment of spare refining capacity the only solver to the growing floating stocks of Distillates is a sharp reduction in OPEC supplies [ahem…Daily Mail], but only lower prices would trigger that.

The only answer that we see to GOD (Glut of Distillate) is a flat price correction sharp enough to force more OPEC supply cuts.Starting 2010 with WTI at 80+$/bbl and a contango in a low demand environment there will not be much returns to be expected from commodities by some of the largest financial institutions; hence with the evidence of the GOD being harder and harder to hide we would not be surprised if in a few weeks some of the Wall Street commodity banks start to change their tune and start to publicize the GOD. A flat price correction would anyway be needed in the first quarter to allow a repositioning from the large financial players at better entry levels.

Which, of course, doesn’t mean banks have been hoarding oil in a bid to drive the prices up. It means, if anything, they’ve been too slow to acknowledge the extent of the oversupply in the market and degree of muted demand, as well as depended too much on the idea that economic recovery will help spur demand by the year’s end.

Meanwhile, as Jakob states, the solution to the glut lies in Opec shut-ins — not more output.

The fact that oil is trading at $80 a barrel in this climate should tell you that it is trading more as a financial asset than on supply/demand imbalances. Is this why Warren Buffett is buying yet more oil assets? Watch refining margins; they are telling indicators.

Disclosure: I have owned owned shares and call options in Valero and other refiners for a number of years, but I sold all positions in 2007.

Related posts:

• Refiners as proxy for demand: layoffs for first time at Valero
• Valero crushes earnings: I was wrong
• Refiners as a canary in the coalmine
• Stocks pummeled as value plays increase
• Germany: Hertie as a symbol of recession

Video embedded below

Related posts:

• Bill Gross thinks the June unemployment data is bad
• Bill Gross: Fed on hold through 2010
• Bill Gross: Sell equities and buy Treasuries
• Bill Gross: “almost all assets appear to be overvalued on a long-term basis”
• The $1 trillion deficit: has Bill Gross gone crazy?

Initial jobless claims for the past week were 505,000, tied with last week for the lowest since January. This brings the 4-week average down to 514,000, the lowest since November of last year and the 11th consecutive week of declines. 

Clearly, fewer people are losing their jobs.  But, 505,000 is still a large number – one consistent with a net loss of 150,000-200,000 jobs per month. And there are still 5.6 million people with continuing unemployment insurance claims, 1.8 million more than at this time last year.

I see this as reflective of an inexorable but slow decline in layoffs complicated by a lack of new jobs, which will keep unemployment elevated as far as the eye can see. So, yes, the employment market in the United States is improving. But it is improving slowly, leaving many long-time unemployed workers bereft. This is what is called structurally high unemployment – and its happening at a level much higher than even I thought likely.

Here are two nuances in the data flow.

Dichotomy in seasonal and non-seasonal data.

All of the numbers above are seasonally-adjusted data. But, I tend to think they overstate the number of job losses (this particular point puts me somewhat at odds with David Rosenberg).  My reason is simple: we are in the recovery part of the business cycle, which means that any seasonal adjustment bias will tend to elevate the numbers.

For example, when you look at year-on-year numbers, the seasonally adjusted continuing claims data show an average 1.82 million more workers filing claims. But, the non-seasonally adjusted data show 1.56 million.  That’s a pretty sizable difference. This leads me to conclude that the seasonal adjustments may be overstating continuing claims.

Year-on-year data much worse for continuing claims

On the other hand, the initial claims numbers are flat with year-ago levels. While, as I indicated above, continuing claims are greatly elevated. To me, this points to the likelihood that the unemployment rate will rise much higher. Last year, we were seeing 500,000 layoffs as well. Yet non-farm payrolls were declining at a greater rate (380K in October, almost 600K in November and almost 700K in December). I see only two ways this is possible: 1. more people are getting hired today so the net job loss is less; or 2. more likely, non-farm payrolls understate the number of job losses because of losses not tracked in small businesses.

I have not been able to reconcile these two points. I hope to see a trend which explains both points develop in the coming weeks.

Related posts:

• US Jobless claims decline in latest week
• Initial and continuing jobless claims decline
• Jobless claims in second week just over 600K
• Jobless claims fall again due to seasonality
• Jobless claims rise 30,000 from artificially low number

Barack Obama has now come clean about his thinking on why his administration has decided to focus first on reducing the deficit and next on jobs. He fears a double-dip recession will occur if foreigners lose confidence in the U.S. dollar, causing interest rates to spike. 

This is nonsense and it demonstrates how much at odds Obama’s economic thinking is with reality. This is the clearest indication that the Obama Administration doesn’t understand how modern money works. In fact, by focusing on deficit reduction, he has increased the chances of a double dip instead of decreasing them.

If he wants to reduce deficits, knowing it will precipitate a double dip and would decrease malinvestment. Fine. That’s not my solution, but it is accurate view of the economics.

What Obama actually said

At issue is whether the federal government’s enormous debt burden in the U.S. could cause investors to lose confidence in the U.S. government and shun its debt.

In an interview on Fox News today, the President said the following:

I think it is important though to recognize that. If we keep on adding to the — Even in the midst of this recovery that at some point. People could lose confidence in the US economy in a way that could actually lead to a double dip recession.

Is this really true though?

How deficits really work

Think of an economy this way: the people in any economy buy goods and services from one another and from the outside. In any given time period, one person, one company or one group/sector might use credit in order to buy more goods and services than it makes in income. It’s like spending future income by using credit. This puts that individual, company or group/sector in deficit i.e. they have spent more money than they have earned. Now obviously, if one sector is in deficit in a given period (i.e. they have spent more capital than they have earned), then the other sectors are in net surplus (i.e. they have received more cash than they have earned).

Let’s give these groups/sectors of the economy names: the private sector, the public sector and the foreign sector.  Giving the groups names makes it plain that if the public sector is in deficit, the combined foreign and private sectors must be in surplus.  Simply put, if you look at all of the households and businesses that make up the private sector and aggregate them together, you can determine if the private sector has a net surplus or a net deficit in any individual time period. And if the private sector has a net surplus, the combined foreign sector and public sector must have a deficit for that time period. The sector financial balances move in concert.

What this means for today is that a government which reduces its deficit in a given time period is forcing an equal reduction in surplus in the private and foreign sectors. So that means, in aggregate, the private sector and the foreign sector will reduce the surplus cash it is taking in over what it spends.

Scott Fullwiler has a good graph depicting how the private sector surplus/deficit moves in concert with the public sector deficit/surplus, the difference being the current account deficit:

We can look historically at how these sector financial balances have moved over time. Figure 2 shows how closely the private sector surplus and the government sector deficit have moved historically, which isn’t surprising given they are nearly the opposing sides of an accounting identity. The difference between them, more visible starting in the 1980s, is the current account balance.

Figure 2: Historical Behavior of Private Sector Surplus and Government Sector Deficit as a percent of GDP

Below, I am now providing figure three from Fullwiler’s post at reader request, as it shows the current account deficit as the missing link since the 1980s.

Unless the increasing current account deficit switches direction violently, this can only mean that reducing the government’s deficit reduces the private sector’s surplus. Net-net, the government’s decreased deficit spending will decrease savings in the private sector. And no deleveraging can occur if savings in the private sector are reduced.

Is that what we want? Reduced private savings means continued high private sector leverage. In the U.S., the private sector has much greater debt burdens relative to the size of the economy than the federal government does. You would think we want the private sector to reduce leverage more than the public sector.

Long-term deficit reduction

What I have suggested is long-term deficit reduction.  If the President is concerned about deficits as far as the eye can see, he might want to look at retiree healthcare costs.  In June I said:

Yesterday, I argued that the United States faced a policy dilemma in avoiding debt deflationary forces while maintaining fiscal prudence.  The reality is that President Obama faces political constraints in Washington right now in regards to budget deficits.  He is not likely to get another stimulus package through the Congress unless he can credibly demonstrate a longer-term deficit reduction outlook.  In my view, this necessarily means changes to Social Security and/or Medicare.

But, of course, President Obama is not going to do that because this would mean cutting Medicare benefits, a political loser.

This looks like Hoover more every day

The President just doesn’t seem to understand how the economy works frankly. Reducing deficits by cutting spending or raising taxes decreases aggregate demand. And it is a decrease in aggregate demand which would induce a double-dip recession. So, the President’s logic just doesn’t work.

But what about a strike on U.S. government debt?  As you probably surmised from the above, if the U.S. private sector is increasing its savings, there is automatically a greater domestic bid for U.S. treasury securities.  So, it is a misnomer to say the U.S. is dependent on foreigners, thinking that this must continue. If the private sector saves more, a larger percentage of government bonds will be bought with domestic savings. In Japan, interest rates did not spike when the government increased deficit spending for this very reason.

The only question we have to ask ourselves is whether we want to reduce debt by:

1. The Liquidation Scenario. decreasing aggregate demand and precipitating a major depression in order to liquidate zombie companies and malinvestment. This would cause a massive wave of defaults and decrease debt burdens significantly through bankruptcy and debt repudiation. or;
2. The Glide Path Solution. increasing aggregate demand by maintaining government spending while trying to liquidate zombie companies and malinvestment. This would allow the private sector to decrease debt burdens significantly over time through increased savings. It also has the benefit of reducing dependency on foreign sources of capital. The downside is a major increase in government debt, the spectre of big government and a long muddle through.

As I have said previously, the Obama Administration is doing neither of the above. It has opted for a third Herbert Hoover solution:

• The Hoover Status Quo. decreasing aggregate demand and precipitating a double dip recession in order to reduce government deficits. This would cause a wave of defaults and decrease debt burdens through bankruptcy and debt repudiation. Meanwhile they will try to prop up zombie companies and maintain malinvestment. This would simultaneously prevent the private sector from decreasing debt burdens through increased savings and maintain dependency on foreign sources of capital – all without ending the spectre of big government.

I have advocated the glide path solution. But I see the liquidation scenario as much better than the present path – especially since, with the present course, we are witnessing crony capitalism on a massive scale. The problem with the liquidation scenario is a lower standard of living and the prospect of geopolitical tension, social unrest, poverty, and war.

The Herbert Hoover solution we are now using leads to a Japanese outcome at best or a Great Depression outcome at worst.

Obama: Debt Could Fuel ‘Double-Dip Recession’ – FOXNews.com

Related posts:

• Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head
• The choice is between increasing or decreasing aggregate demand
• I am now moving from multi-year recovery to a double dip baseline
• Barack Obama as Herbert Hoover
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus

This excerpt comes from the blog News from 1930 which gives us a day-to-day account of what was being reported in 1930 before the worst of the Great Depression hit.

“The unemployment situation in New York is critical. Unless it is speedily met, we face a winter of hunger and distress for families whose bread-earners are without work and without funds. The great majority of family men now unemployed are asking not for charity, but for a job. In the richest city of the world, where the vast majority are at work, it is unthinkable that anyone should be permitted to starve. The Emergency Employment Committee is composed of New York business and professional men, formed at the request of experienced welfare organizations of the city. It is raising funds which will be used by these organizations to give temporary work to heads of families and to relieve distress caused by unemployment without regard to race, creed, or color.” Followed by endorsement from Pres. Hoover and appeal for funds.

Sen. Smoot denies tariff is retarding business recovery, says it has saved thousands of jobs and helped maintain wages and preserve farm purchasing power; points out only one country has increased its tariff since US adopted revisions; says question now is whether tariff is high enough, not whether it is too high.

I find the parallels to present day frightening to say the least. Let’s hope for some serious divergence.

Related posts:

• Black humor on Wall Street circa 1930
• Unemployment: U-6 data versus the Great Depression
• Food insecurity: alternative measure of economic distress skyrockets
• “That’s what happens when a town full of broke people gets a whiff of free money”
• When is the next panic?

The US Department of Agriculture highlights how the United States in the last decade, despite increased aggregate wealth, slid back significantly in terms of food insecurity as measure of poverty. With everyone now focused on the unemployment situation, it bears noting that even before the downturn in the economy there had been a large surge in food insecurity nationwide.

The Guardian says:

Food insecurity – defined by the USDA as when "food intake … was reduced and their eating patterns were disrupted at times during the year because the household lacked money and other resources for food" – afflicted 14.6% of Americans in 2008. ie, some 50 million people were too poor to guarantee being able to put food on the table.

The table below, also from the Guardian, shows where food insecurity is highest. While much of the distress is concentrated in the South, there are plenty of states in the Southwest and West as well. Maine has the highest food insecurity in the Northeast.

My interpretation of the data goes to income inequality. I see this as evidence that the last decade of growth in the U.S. has not been beneficial for poorer Americans. However, I would go further in saying that the downturn in the U.S. and rising unemployment, bankruptcy and foreclosure in the middle class has made plain that the middle class has also been left behind. While distress amongst poorer Americans is plain from these numbers, the diminished position in the middle class was masked by a surge in debt. This was made plain only as a result of a drop in asset prices.

At present, U.S. policy makers are trying to make this problem go away by reflating an asset bubble, but continued high unemployment is the elephant in the room which higher asset prices can not make disappear.

As for the poor, a related Guardian article gets to the heart of things:

The report said 6.7 million people were defined as having "very low food security" because they regularly lacked sufficient to eat. Among them, 96% reported that the food they bought did not last until they had money to buy more. Nearly all said they could not afford to eat balanced meals. Although few reported that this was a permanent situation throughout the year, 88% said it had occurred in three or more months.

Nearly half reported losing weight because they did not have enough money to buy food.

The number of children living in households where there were shortages of food at times rose by nearly one-third to 17 million. The report says that most parents who did not get enough to eat ensured their offspring received sufficient food but that more than 1 million children still suffered outright hunger.

The worst affected states are in the south with Mississippi having the largest proportion of its population enduring shortages of food followed by Texas and Arkansas. More than half of those affected are minorities, principally black people and Hispanics.

Millions more Americans do not go hungry only because they are so poor they receive government food stamps or rely on handouts from food banks such as Feeding America. In some states, such as West Virginia, one in six of the population is on food stamps.

This is certainly the stuff of depressions more than V-shaped recoveries. The first Guardian article has links to the data for downloading.

Source

Hungry America: food insecurity, state by state – Guardian

Record numbers go hungry in the US – Guardian

Related posts:

• News from 17 November 1930: “we face a winter of hunger and distress”
• If you can’t afford food, steal it: lessons from Japan
• “That’s what happens when a town full of broke people gets a whiff of free money”
• Massive U.S. job loss of 598,000 in January
• 467,000 jobs lost in the U.S. in June 2009

Nouriel Roubini, writing in the New York Daily News , said on Sunday that “unemployed Americans should hunker down for more job losses” given the likelihood of a job less recovery. This was as gloomy a piece as I have seen from Roubini in the past few months. He has clearly become more downbeat about the long-term picture for the U.S. economy.

The article begins:

Think the worst is over? Wrong. Conditions in the U.S. labor markets are awful and worsening. While the official unemployment rate is already 10.2% and another 200,000 jobs were lost in October, when you include discouraged workers and partially employed workers the figure is a whopping 17.5%…

…we can expect that job losses will continue until the end of 2010 at the earliest. In other words, if you are unemployed and looking for work and just waiting for the economy to turn the corner, you had better hunker down. All the economic numbers suggest this will take a while. The jobs just are not coming back.

This sounds dire. As a result, Roubini goes on to call on the Obama Administration to take direct action on jobs. Extending unemployment benefits is not going to cut it.  Roubini says we need:

a bold prescription that increases the fiscal stimulus with another round of labor-intensive, shovel-ready infrastructure projects, helps fiscally strapped state and local governments and provides a temporary tax credit to the private sector to hire more workers. Helping the unemployed just by extending unemployment benefits is necessary not sufficient; it leads to persistent unemployment rather than job creation.

With statistics showing that the rate of long-term joblessness is at the highest since the Great Depression, Roubini joins an increasing number of economists who are calling on the Obama Administration to take the employment situation more seriously.

Paul Krugman has said that we are now in a liquidity trap. Therefore, we need to subsidize jobs and promote work sharing as Germany is doing.

I have made similar arguments about quantitative easing for the past year. Monetary policy is effectively useless – and is merely creating bubbles.

The Obama Administration is moving into deficit hawk mode at the wrong time as this will only worsen the jobs situation and lead to a double dip recession. Instead, I have called for a payroll tax cut or a job subsidy.

Randall Wray, a professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, has also offered a unique job solution.

All of this is urgent, as Roubini indicates:

Based on my best judgment, it is most likely that the unemployment rate will peak close to 11% and will remain at a very high level for two years or more.

The weakness in labor markets and the sharp fall in labor income ensure a weak recovery of private consumption and an anemic recovery of the economy, and increases the risk of a double dip recession…

The damage will be extensive and severe unless bold policy action is undertaken now.

The Obama Administration is taking an ‘indirect’ approach. They do so for three reasons. First, they are afraid of being boxed in politically by taking more direct measures. They also see a need to defend their previous policy decisions.  But, Mark Thoma thinks part of the resistance to more direct measures is ideological.  In a post earlier today, he says:

Growth policy is an attempt to make the economy grow faster, and stabilization policy attempts to keep the economy as close as possible to that trend, i.e. to avoid business cycles.

When Republicans had the political microphone, they emphasized growth policy (because it allowed them to argue for what they really wanted, lower taxes, growth policy was simply the vehicle that allowed them to get there), and this was supported by academic work from people such as Robert Lucas who claimed that, from a welfare perspective, stabilization was of second order concern, growth policy was where policymakers should focus their effort if they wanted to enhance welfare. Summers’ remarks reflect this type of thinking.

The Obama Administration’s approach of focusing on deficit reduction without enough direct job measures is sure to keep unemployment elevated. In looking at the politics of economics I said recently:

I see jobs as the first area for Obama to attack. The question is whether he does this directly via some modified private-sector controlled W.P.A.-type program or indirectly via something like a payroll tax cut. After jobs comes foreclosure. Personal income and taxes are the least important area going forward (especially as any tax cuts will either increase deficit spending or have to be made up by tax increases elsewhere).

The Obama Administration is doing the opposite. They seem to have received the ‘deficit reduction comes first takeaway’ from recent state elections in Virginia, New Jersey, and New York instead of the ‘jobs come first takeaway.’ That is bad news for Democrats and it is also bad news for the hopes of a sustained recovery.

Source

The worst is yet to come: Unemployed Americans should hunker down for more job losses – Nouriel Roubini, NY Daily News
Job Losses Mount, Enduring and Deep – Floyd Norris, NY Times (the long-term unemployment image is also from this story)

Related posts:

• Comprehensive unemployment rate is 17.5%
• 467,000 jobs lost in the U.S. in June 2009
• 651,000 jobs lost but unemployment rate at 8.1% in U.S.
• 10.2% unemployment, 190,000 jobs lost
• Unemployment rate to 9.7%, 216,000 jobs lost

Today, I want to run a few thoughts by you courtesy of John Mauldin.  In his recent weekly newsletter, he makes a number of points I have made here over the past few weeks and comes to a similar conclusion about the weakness of recovery and the likelihood of a double dip recession.

John Mauldin, Best-Selling author and recognized financial expert, is also editor of the free Thoughts From the Frontline that goes to over 1 million readers each week. For more information on John or his FREE weekly economic letter go to:http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/learnmore

No one goes into Wal-Mart and asks to pay extra sales tax. Thus sales taxes are reasonable barometers for retail sales. This week we look at how taxes are doing in a period of economic recovery. Then we turn our eyes to a very interesting (and sobering) analysis of possible future unemployment rates. This is an anecdote to the happy-face analysis of employment numbers you get from establishment economists. There will be a lot of charts and tables, so this letter may print a little longer, but I think you will find it very interesting.

If This is Recovery, Where Are the Taxes?

I keep reading about surveys that show that retail sales are up. But as noted above, no one pays extra sales taxes, or decides they need to pay more income taxes. The surest way to measure retail sales is sales taxes. Want to know how incomes are doing? Look at income tax receipts. Let’s look at sales taxes first.

First off, I can find no single source of recent sales tax information. It is all one-off, but it is consistent. Sales taxes in my home state of Texas are down 12.8% year-over-year, and we’re in the fifth straight month of decreases of 11% or more. Projections are for sales taxes to continue to decline into 2010.

There is a very revealing study by the Pew Center on state taxes, called "Beyond California" (http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/). Everyone knows how bad California is. The Pew Center looks at how the rest of the states are doing, and focuses on 10 states that also have severe problems. Sales tax receipts are down 14% in Arizona, and state income taxes are down 32%.

On average, revenues are down almost 12%. Oregon has seen their revenues collapse a stunning 19%. New York is down 17%, with a deficit of 32%. Illinois has a projected deficit of 47% of its budget, second only to California with 49%. You can see how your state fares at http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates.org/Beyond_California_Appendix.pdf.

The Liscio Report notes that all states had negative year-over-year sales tax collections in October, and the weighted average decrease was 10.2%, down from a negative 7.2% in September. (www.theliscioreport.com)

Sales at Wal-Mart stores slipped by 0.4% in the third quarter. Actual government figures show that retail sales were down 1.5% in September from the previous month and 5.8% year-over-year. So how do we keep seeing headlines about retail sales being up, as unemployment keeps rising?

Remember that such reports are usually based on surveys, and generally cover mid-sized and up retailers, leaving out smaller businesses. Further, if you are a retail chain that has closed 10% of its stores, the remaining stores should in theory benefit from getting your loyal customers into them.

Last Business Standing

Yesterday I was with an associate, and I hesitated in asking them how their business was doing, because I knew things had been tough at the beginning of the year. But I did ask, and they said sales were up over the last months and business was looking better. Surprised, I asked them what made the difference. "Ah," they said, "less competition. Our competitors have gone out of business."

Best Buy and other electronic retailers had to benefit from Circuit City disappearing. That is Schumpeter’s creative destruction at work. Not very good for total employment, but it does help the profitability of the survivors.

So, if things are so bad, how did we have 3.5% growth in the third quarter? First off, things are not as bad as they were in the past year. We are in fact getting close to an economic bottom, at least for now. Second, the 3.5% number is a preliminary estimate. A study by Goldman Sachs suggests that the number will be revised down by at least 0.5% and maybe as much as 1%.

Why? The estimate does not really take into account how poorly small businesses are performing. If you look at small-business indexes and compare them to historical GDP numbers, you get the smaller number mentioned above. And since at least 2% of the GDP was from the stimulus package (Cash for Clunkers, houses, tax cuts), the economy on its own was flat. That begs the question, what happens when the stimulus runs out?

And the answer is that we won’t know for some time, as the stimulus is just getting ramped up. "According to CBO estimates, only 21% of [the stimulus] spending will occur in 2009; another 38% will come in 2010, and 22% in 2011. After that, its effect will dissipate quickly." (The Liscio Report)

But David Rosenberg notes that what the federal government is giving, the states are taking away. The Pew Study shows that at least nine other states are in appalling shape, so it is no wonder that David writes:

Stimulus, What Stimulus?

"Fully nine states are in fiscal distress and only two have balanced budgets. States like Michigan are planning 20% budget cuts for the coming year. Indiana is planning a 10% spending cut in light of a 7.4% YoY revenue decline. How can the economy really be out of recession if government revenues are still deflating?

"The states are filling around 40% of their fiscal gaps with the federal stimulus (so much for spending on "shovel ready" infrastructure projects). Even after the fiscal help from Washington, the state governments will still face a projected deficit of $142 billion for 2011 (versus $113 billion in 2010). All in, the restraint in the state and local government sector is estimated to drain a full percentage point from U.S. GDP growth in 2010 and more than fully offset the stimulative efforts from Washington. The U.S. economy is more likely to post growth of little more than 2% next year, rather than the 5% currently being discounted by the equity market."

The Reality of Unemployment

All this is, of course, going to put continued pressure on employment. As I noted last week, the number of unemployed actually soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey, not the 190,000 you read about in the mainstream media. Unemployment is sadly continuing to rise by significant amounts.

In August, I did an interview with CNBC from Leen’s Fishing Lodge in Maine. The unemployment numbers had just come out. I did a back-of-the-napkin estimate that we would need about 15 million new jobs over the next five years just to get back to where we were when the recession started.

That works out to a need for about 125,000 new jobs each month to handle new workers coming into the market (which comes to a total of 7.5 million over five years), plus the 8 million and rising jobs we’ve lost. That is a daunting number. It amounts to 250,000 new jobs a month every month for five years. And we are still losing more than that number a month, let alone adding the needed 250,000.

Look at the chart below. It shows the establishment survey employment figures for the last ten years. Only once, in 1999, did we actually add over 250,000 jobs a month for a whole year. And that was during the internet boom.

Sadly, the private sector has shed over 300,000 jobs since 1999. Think about that. We have had a decade where there have been no new jobs added by the private sector. Real incomes are roughly where they were, and the stock market is down. Talk about a lost decade.

I love it when someone does the really heavy lifting for me, and my friend Mike Shedlock of Sitka Pacific Capital Management has done a wonderful job of taking that speculation of mine and putting it into a spreadsheet that helps us get a real handle on what unemployment is likely to look like for the next ten years. I am going to make use of his basic analysis and then modify some of his assumptions in the spreadsheet he provided me, in order to think about different scenarios.

All three scenarios are based on assumptions, so let’s see what Mish started with. There is a wealth of data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. According to the Census Bureau Population Estimates we are going to add about 2.5 million working-age (16 years old and up) citizens a year, from now until 2020. The numbers varies slightly year to year. Mish used an estimate of the average, summing up the buckets from 16 to 100+ for the years in question and rounding the result.

You can go to the BLS site and look at Table A-1, which shows the civilian noninstitutional population (those over 16 not in prisons), the participation rate (those who are working and/or want to work), the unemployment rate, the number employed, those not in the labor force, and those who want a job. Those are starting numbers for the charts below.

For those interested, you can read Mish’s very full (and quite detailed) analysis at his blog site http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/mish-unemployment-projections-through.html). But let’s look at his assumptions:

• Job losses are likely to continue for a minimum of another year.
• When job gains start, they will be very slow at first, then pick up.
• An extremely generous monthly job gain stat over the course of the year would be 150,000 jobs.
• A falling participation rate (boomers retiring) will continue to mask reported unemployment.
• Starting in 2013 the labor pool will start decreasing because of Boomer demographics.
• The noninstitutional population will rise by 2.5 million workers a year.

The spreadsheet below needs a little explanation. Let’s start with the assumptions. Mike starts with current working-age population and adds 2.5 million people a year. He assumes that Boomers will retire at 65 (something which all the surveys say is not going to happen). And his last estimate is what the unemployment numbers will be. Everything else is based on those assumptions, which leads to the first column, or the expected unemployment number.

By the way, we know that everyone will want to make different assumptions. I am going to create three scenarios, but you can go to Mike’s blog and at the bottom of the post is a link to the actual spreadsheet. Have fun. Let’s look at scenario 1.

This assumes there is no double-dip recession, and jobs roughly rise along the same lines as the last recovery. Actually, Mish is far more optimistic, as in the very first chart you will notice that job losses were negative in the first year after the end of the recession and flat the second year. Mish has jobs rising by 120,000 next year and 600,000 the second year (2011), and then a fairly robust recovery. Below is the graph of the unemployment numbers under such a scenario.

Notice that unemployment stays at or above 11% for three years. Pessimistic? Mainstream and usually very optimistic Mark Zandi of www.economy.com predicted this week that unemployment would rise to 11% by the middle of next year, right in line with this scenario. Also note that total jobs rise by 14 million over ten years. Hardly doom and gloom. Again, Boomers all retire on time and there is no double-dip recession.

Let the Good Times Roll

What would it take to get back to 5% unemployment? I played with the spreadsheet and came up with the following numbers, which get us below 5% by 2020. I assume no recessions for the next ten years, and 2 million new jobs a year after 2011, which I start off with almost 1.5 million jobs. Of course, we have never done that, but let’s be optimistic.

And the graph below shows the unemployment numbers for the Good Times Scenario.

Want to get to 5% within five years? Add 3 million jobs a year starting now. With no housing recovery, a smaller auto industry, and financial firms getting leaner.

The Quick Double-Dip Scenario

When I called the last two recessions about a year before they happened, it was not all that hard. We had inverted yield curves, falling leading indicators, and a lot of other data that pretty much pointed to a recession. Believing that we had a housing bubble and a looming credit crisis also helped my conviction in calling the last recession.

I think we are in for a double-dip recession in 2011, yet I readily admit there will be little if any statistical evidence in advance this time. This is more of an instinct call. I have serious doubts that we can have what amounts to the largest tax increase of all time in what will be a very weak (albeit growing) economy, without putting us back into recession. And Speaker Pelosi thinks it is a smart thing to add another 5.4% surtax on what will already be a rising capital gains and dividend tax.

Taxing small businesses, and that is what the tax increase amounts to, is a very bad idea in a weak economy. Small businesses are where the job growth comes from. Taking money from productive businesses and giving it to government is a fundamentally flawed concept.

Now, if they decide to postpone the tax increase, or phase it in slowly, then maybe we avoid the double dip. But right now it doesn’t look like that will be the case. So, let’s quickly see what a double-dip scenario might look like. Let’s be optimistic and assume we only lose another 1.2 million jobs in the next recession, since we have already lost so many in this one (8 million and counting). And then the economy comes roaring back in 2012 with 1.5 million jobs and continues to grow rather smartly for the rest of the decade. No further recession. We absorb the tax increases and move on with our economic lives.

Unemployment under such a scenario would rise to just under 13% and stay above 10% for 8 years. Take a look at the chart and graph.

Think 13% is too dire? This week David Rosenberg said unemployment would rise to between 12-13%. The former Merrill Lynch economist was one of the few mainstream economists who called the recession and the credit crisis. The so-called "Blue Chip" economists told us at the beginning of 2008 that unemployment would peak out at 6%. While Rosie is not optimistic of late, he has a rather solid record of being right.

We are at 10.2% unemployment today. The economy lost jobs for 21 months after the end of the last recession. That would easily take us into 2011. Another million lost jobs will take us well over 11% and close to 12% (remember, you have to add in the increasing population), even without my double-dip scenario.

The letter is getting long and it’s getting late, so let me close with a few thoughts.

First, 12% unemployment is horrendous by American standards. But Spain is now at 20%, and much of Europe has been in the 10% range for years.

Second, Americans are not used to the concept of 12% unemployment or 10% rates for extended periods. That is going to cause a serious backlash across the political spectrum. Couple that with the discomfort over $1.5-trillion deficits and there could be some serious political changes in the coming years. I think the message will be more anti-incumbent than one party or the other.

Third, the only way out of this morass is to create an environment where small business can thrive. As I’ve noted for the last several weeks in this letter, government spending does not increase GDP over time. It is a temporary nonproductive stimulus. It takes private investment to create jobs and increase productivity. Over the next few months, I will write more about how to do that.

Related posts:

• Comprehensive unemployment rate is 17.5%
• Payroll data mixed despite the bullish headline job loss figure
• Are jobless claims pointing to structurally high unemployment?
• Unemployment numbers still point to partial recovery
• US unemployment hits 5-year high of 6.1%

Hat tip Barry Ritholtz

Related posts:

• Hugh Hendry: China – The Emperor has no clothes
• Jon Stewart’s indictment of CNBC
• Which homebuilder will go bankrupt next?
• National City is on probation
• Circuit City as canary in the coalmine for commercial real estate

From Bloomberg:

Confidence among U.S. consumers unexpectedly dropped in November as the loss of jobs threatened to undermine the biggest part of the economy.

The Reuters/University of Michigan preliminary sentiment index decreased to a three-month low of 66 from 70.6 in October…

Rising joblessness puts the economy at risk of slipping into a vicious circle of firings and declines in consumer spending that will limit the emerging recovery.

I don’t pay as much attention to consumer confidence as I do to some other economic data because I have yet to see enough statistically significant correlations between confidence and future economic paths.  However, I do realize there is a connection having recently posited the following about a term I coined unemployment rate illusion:

behavior changes in accordance with the nominal numbers used as economic signposts in an economy…

The parallel of money illusion to unemployment rate illusion is that a higher posted rate of unemployment can have a serious negative impact on consumer confidence and personal consumption (think balance sheet recession). All else being equal, higher unemployment rates mean lower confidence and consumption…

• If people see 12-13% in 2010, they will be floored, angry, and looking for someone to blame. As Democrats control Washington, they will get the lion’s share of the blame and lose big time in 2010.
• Making matters worse, this is the kind of shock that causes people to put their checkbooks away and go home for the night a.k.a sending us into a double dip recession.

So I am concerned that we are going to se a relapse. (Note: I have moved from seeing a double dip recession as a 1/3 chance to a base case scenario). My optimism about recovery is now fading.

Unfortunately, similar downbeat confidence numbers are also coming from the Conference Board index which unexpectedly fell in October:

The Consumer Confidence Index, released by The Conference Board, sank unexpectedly to 47.7 in October — its second-lowest reading since May.

Forecasters predicted a higher reading of 53.1. A reading above 90 means the economy is on solid footing. Above 100 signals strong growth.

The index has seesawed since reaching a historic low of 25.3 in February and climbed to 53.4 in September.

The connection to markets comes again via David Rosenberg from this past October 29th who I seem to be quoting a lot recently. In reference to the Conference Board numbers, Rosenberg said (highlighting added):

So many people are deluding themselves that we have some sort of durable recovery on our hands and yet consumer confidence, at 47.7 in October, is unbelievable — the lowest this every got in the 2001 recession, which included the 9-11 terrorist attacks, was 84.9. Think about that for a second. If the equity market is catching on to the view that we could be in for some slowing in the data, then a significant correction after a 60% surge is very likely. This is a time to be raising cash if you haven’t done so already — valuation, technicals, fund flows and fundamentals at this juncture are all near-term obstacles.

Related posts:

• Consumers ‘do believe in the green shoot story’
• Unemployment rate illusion
• The slow but inexorable decline of jobless claims
• A note on government statistics and unemployment
• Data on past consumer deleveraging during recessions

The motivating factor?  this article in Politico:

President Barack Obama plans to announce in next year’s State of the Union address that he wants to focus extensively on cutting the federal deficit in 2010 – and will downplay other new domestic spending beyond jobs programs, according to top aides involved in the planning.

The president’s plan, which the officials said was under discussion before this month’s Democratic election setbacks, represents both a practical and a political calculation by this White House.

The article, while couched in the language of fiscal responsibility and political tactics, is really an ode to the likelihood of spending cuts, tax increases or both. I see tax increases and I will tell you why later. Either way, these measures will choke off aggregate demand, making a double dip a much more likely scenario.

Below is the associated video from Politico, talking about the political calculus.

Get ready for 1937 redux – it’s coming. I warned against this before Obama even took office. But, no one in the White House is listening.

From an article here on 20 November 2008:

Recently, deficit hawks have been pushing a nefarious line of argument that I need to debunk right here and right now. The line goes as follows: we need to spend government monies now to get the economy back on its feet. In a couple of years, we can signal all clear and then raise taxes on the middle class in order to reduce the deficit again, much as we did in 1993.

While I agree that deficits will need to be eliminated, this line of thinking risks a repeat of 1937-38 in the U.S. and 1997 in Japan and must be refuted…

Just as in the two previous periods of asset deflation, we are dealing with massive amounts of debt and leverage combined with severe declines in standards of living for average citizens. In both previous cases, government thought we were out of the woods and raised taxes in order to return to fiscal prudence. On both occasions, the result was a severe recession and stock market meltdown.

Can we really balloon the deficit to $1 trillion and expect business as usual in 4 to 5 years given the precedents and given the low savings and high debt? This doesn’t make sense to me. Read my post “Charts of the day: U.S. macro disequilibria” to see greater detail on some of the headwinds we face.

I would normally consider myself a deficit hawk as well. However, this is not the early 1990s. The recession will be much deeper, the possibility of systemic risk much greater. And the imbalances are much larger.

Maybe the presence of so many Clinton Administration officials is skewing this Administration’s understanding of the magnitude of the problem facing us. I don’t know. But, the White House seems to think this IS the early 1990s and we are reliving a repeat of the Clinton days. It is clearly not.

I have a lot of sympathy for the Austrian school view, although I have grave misgivings due to the likelihood of geopolitical tension and civil unrest. John Mauldin simplifies the view in a recent post:

Here I refer to the Austrian school of economic theory, based on the work of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, et al. There are those in the Austrian camp who argue the need to do away with the Fed, return to the gold standard, allow the banks that are now deemed too big to fail to go ahead and fail, along with any businesses that are also mismanaged (such as GM and Chrysler), and leave the high ground to new and more properly run.

In their model, government spending is slashed to the bone, as are (in most cases) taxes. The advantage is that, in theory, you get all your pain at once and then can begin to recover from what would be a very bad and deep recession. The bad news is that you risk getting 30% unemployment and another depression that could take a very long time to climb out of.

Now, let me say that I have GREATLY simplified their argument. If you want to learn more you can go to www.mises.org. It is an excellent web site for all things Austrian. While I am not Austrian, I have spent a lot of time reading the literature and have certain sympathies for this view.

That being said, this also has almost no chance of being implemented. In Congress, only my friend Ron Paul is its advocate. Most Austrian followers are Libertarian by nature, and that is just not a political reality for the coming decade.

And Mauldin is right. Barack Obama is not focusing on deficits in order to “get all your pain at once." This is not a Libertarian solution. The President is trying to reduce the deficit to please deficit hawks, all while perpetuating the bailout culture we have become addicted to.  This is the Japanese solution and it will not work.

Witness recent comments from Arnold Kling, who is an Austrian school economist at George Mason:

In my view, the current Administration is pro-business and anti-market–the worst possible combination. By pro-business, I mean that it likes businesses that survive on the basis of subsidies and regulatory advantages.

Now, what I fail to understand is how the Administration believes it can cut the deficit and add stimulus. James Pethoukoukis, who writes in Reuters says we are likely to see more stimulus initiatives:

How much money are we talking about? Alec Phillips of Goldman Sachs calls $250 billion over three years a “conservative” estimate. And what might be in the bill? Look for more highway spending, more aid to state and local governments and some sort of business hiring tax credit.

The only way to both add stimulus and reduce the deficit is to increase taxes – on whom is the only question. Obviously, adding stimulus while increasing taxes sounds a lot like ‘tax and spend’ and opens the door to all manner of attacks from the right. This is a huge tactical error that will be both politically damaging and unlikely to actually stimulate the economy. I see this as a potentially catastrophic outcome for Democrats. It is all too predictable although Obama is rushing ahead with this even earlier than I suspected he would.

Deficit spending on this scale is politically unacceptable and will come to an end as soon as the economy shows any signs of life (say 2 to 3% growth for one year). Therefore, at the first sign of economic strength, the Federal Government will raise taxes and/or cut spending. The result will be a deep recession with higher unemployment and lower stock prices.

I understand the why of this i.e. the need to provide cover for moderate democrats in 2010. But the “tax and spend” onus during a period of weakness will have people talking about shifts to the left and Jimmy Carter’s presidency – both of which are poison to moderate Democrats.

If the Administration really wants to provide cover for Moderates, a payroll tax cut or a tax break for any firm that hires X % more employees will be more targeted to the jobs problem and will avoid both the more taxes and the more spending labels.

Donald Tsang is right; America is doing exactly what Japan did last time – not just on monetary policy but on fiscal policy too. It didn’t work for Japan and it won’t work for the United States either.

Sources

After spending binge, White House says it will focus on deficits – Politico

Obama eyes domestic spending freeze – AP

Related posts:

• Barack Obama: “if we keep on adding to the debt… that could actually lead to a double-dip”
• Beware of deficit hawks
• The Great Depression II meme
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• A brief philosophical argument about the role of government, stimulus and recession

This morning, David Rosenberg of Gluskin Sheff had another wonderful piece. I am only going to take on one part of it here. I have linked to the full article below so that you can read his analysis in it’s entirety (registration free but required).

The part I want to focus in on has to do with GDP revisions. Basically, the GDP numbers the U.S. government releases are always revised when more complete data come in. Often the data come in years later via tax returns and other slower-to-report channels, so we can get huge disparities in what was reported at the time and what ends up being the final data series. Rosenberg thinks Q3 is going to see major, major downward revisions because of small businesses.

He says the following (highlighting added):

We noticed an interesting piece of research on U.S. GDP from Goldman Sachs’ Economics team that’s worth highlighting. The team questions whether the official government GDP statistics capture how poorly small businesses (ie, sole proprietorships) are doing. The weakness in small business sentiment is seemingly at odds with the recent 3.5% Q3 GDP reading but may explain why the unemployment rate has continued to steadily increase. Part of the reason for small business weakness is that most don’t have the same access to credit as larger firms and larger firms’ output tends to be better captured in the GDP data. While sole proprietorships tend to be small they collectively account for a nontrivial 17% of the U.S. economy.

The Goldman team uses a couple of different statistical approaches to test their thesis. They use timely data from the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) confidence survey, which shows that despite a recent improvement, confidence remains exceptionally weak (in fact two standard deviations below long-run trends). The first model suggests that the NFIB survey is consistent with overall GDP growth of 2.5% to 3.0% — not the 3.5% reported. As well, they find that current NFIB readings are more in line with below-50 readings on the ISM manufacturing index versus the actual reading of 55.7.

The second approach has to do with revisions to the GDP data and their relationship to the NFIB. U.S. GDP goes through many revisions as more, and better, information becomes available with lags — historically preliminary numbers are revised down by almost 0.5 percentage point. This second model suggests that Q3 GDP could be revised down by as much a 1-2 percentage points.

Translation: small businesses are suffering disproportionately because of a credit crunch. Their pain is not adequately reflected in the numbers because of big company bias in real-time data. GDP growth is probably much lower than we realize.

This view is consistent with the dichotomy in the BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics) household survey used to calculate the unemployment rate and the establishment survey used to calculate non-farm payrolls.

See the data below and pay attention to the area highlighted in red:

That shows employment levels dropping off a cliff over the last three months in the household survey. While I question the magnitude of the fall given the weekly jobless claims data, these numbers are much worse than the job losses seen in Non-farm payrolls. Directionally, this has to be right, meaning the 530,000 weekly claims was probably translating into something more like 300,000 job losses than the 200,000 reported. Again, underreporting of small business distress explains the difference.

My conclusion based on that we are still seeing about 500-510,000 jobless claims is that we are around a 200,000 job loss level at present.

As for third-quarter GDP growth, it is most certainly lower than 3.5%. How much lower? We won’t find out for years to come.

Toast with Dave (pdf)– David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff

Related posts:

• GDP revisions are out
• Last week’s employment numbers
• Rosenberg: “the mother of all jobless recoveries”
• GDP benchmark revisions coming on Friday
• US GDP comes in at minus 1%

A friend sent me the following presentation earlier in the week when I was feeling a bit ill. So I neglected to post it.  But, I want to return to it because it is in keeping with my recovery/depression theme. These are the issues that were complicit in the latest financial crisis and almost none of them have disappeared.  They will most certainly rear their heads again precipitating or worsening the next downturn.

We’re talking about:

1. Duration mismatches (borrowing short and lending long)
2. Accounting (Mark-to-market, deferred tax assets and a lot more)
3. Conflicts of interest (no Chinese walls, ratings agencies)
4. Regulation (especially given poor risk controls)
5. Risk management (is Meriwether a leading indicator?)
6. Investment Banking vs. Utility Banking
7. Too big to fail (they must be downsized)
8. Heads I win, tails you lose (socialization of losses is crony capitalism)
9. Quantitative easing (QE has costs)
10. Hedges instead of capital

My baseline thinking at the moment is that we are seeing the beginnings of a cyclical recovery built on the back of asset relation more than anything else. The underpinnings of this uptrend are tenuous. So, when this latest burst of reflation hits the wall, all of the aforementioned issues will re-appear and policy makers will again do the who-could-have-known routine we saw in 2001 and again in 2008/ But the broader public is increasingly wise to this song and dance. Hat tip Scott.

Jim Chanos Presentation at Darden, 22 Oct 2009

Related posts:

• Chinese officials warn banks about reckless lending
• European banks: still undercapitalised
• The U.S. financial system is effectively insolvent
• Lessons from Japan’s Bank Crisis
• Bank of Canada blames Geithner for financial mess

In the video below, Marshall Auerback gives a even-handed analysis of the parallels between the US and Japan on Fox Business with Brian Sullivan.

Demographic trends, GDP trends and deleveraging trends are all similar. But, Marshall goes further by pointing to the misallocation of fiscal resources, the emergence of crony capitalism and the likelihood of zombie banking which he saw in Japan and is seeing now in the U.S.

Another similarity is low interest rates. One issue Marshall didn’t take on when asked about low interest rates by Brian is how this policy not only reduces the cost of capital, but also decreases investment returns, encouraging the carry trade and excessive risk.

When looking at how we are avoiding the mistakes of Japan, I didn’t find the arguments as convincing because it’s early days yet. But, there is hope.

The segment runs just over 5 minutes.

Related posts:

• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Chart of the day: Aussie – Yen cross
• Hong Kong: “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time”
• Is the U.S. dollar carry trade replacing the one in Japanese yen?
• The carry trade unwinds and it’s not pretty

The latest number on unemployment claims shows a seasonally-adjusted 502,000 people applied for unemployment insurance last week, bringing the more meaningful 4-week average down to 519,750, the lowest since late November 2008. That is a good thing because it shows the labor market is improving.

Nevertheless, 500,000 initial claims in an environment of reduced hiring is still consistent with the loss of 200,000 jobs monthly.  We really need to see this number hit 450-475,000 before non-farm payrolls increase.

Of course, seasonal adjustments are a big factor here going into the holiday season.  Actual claims were 529,446, which is up nearly 50,000 from the prior week. The pre-New Year’s seasonal adjustment peak comes in early December (140% adjustment down) followed by another peak in early January (up to 180% downward adjustment).  If we see smaller spikes in these weeks (last January hit a peak of 956,791 actual claims), then this could be a harbinger of better to come in Q1.

Source

Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report – U.S. Department of Labor

Related posts:

• A sustainable recovery with 530,000 weekly claims?
• Better last claims report before employment number
• Unemployment claims falling faster than in half of past recessions
• Jobless claims stuck near 530,000, point to structurally high unemployment
• U.S. initial jobless claims fall 21,000 to 554,000

I have just taken a look at the consumer credit figures for September, released just yesterday by the Federal Reserve. The data do show some modest deleveraging, especially when looking at the recent increase in nominal GDP. However, it is still not clear to me that the scale of deleveraging is great enough to induce a recessionary relapse.

My baseline for deleveraging is Debt to Nominal GDP – when debt to GDP goes down, that shows deleveraging. For example, for the latest data released in September for Q2 2009, Private sector total debt to GDP (incl. financial services) in the U.S. was 292.2% of GDP. Because of the huge drop in nominal GDP, this was actually up from 283.0% when the recession began in Q4 2007. For households, the number was 96.8% in Q2 2009, up slightly from 95.9% at the end of Q4 2007.  What this shows is that deleveraging has yet to begin in earnest as debt levels have remained relatively high even while GDP had collapsed.

The lack of deleveraging is probably a result of financial stress. In the Great Depression, the personal savings rate dropped from 4.5% in 1929 to 4.1, 3.9, –0.9, and finally -1.5% in 1930-1933.  People had to use savings to service debt as the deflationary spiral took hold.

So, in the absence of quarterly data on debt levels, I look at data from things like consumer credit for a proxy.  On a seasonally-adjusted basis, consumer credit declined to $2.471 to $2.456 trillion. That is the lowest since June 2007 and marks the ninth consecutive monthly drop.

However, looking at the non-seasonal data makes plain what is happening:

Nonrevolving credit is now increasing along with GDP. Look at the area highlighted in red; that coincides with the 3.5% real GDP print we just saw. On the other hand, revolving credit is getting crushed. Below is the reason why (click to expand):

Credit from commercial banks and savings institutions have dropped off a cliff.  When you hear people saying that banks aren’t lending, this is what they are talking about. In Q3, banks are lending again (think cash for clunkers) because nonrevolving debt is up.  That’s also why GDP is up. But, revolving credit lines (credit card lines) are being cut.

My conclusion is largely the same as last month, namely I had anticipated more deleveraging than we are seeing. However, consumer credit is only coming down on the nonrevolving side. And given the stabilization in house prices and increases in refinancing activity, I wouldn’t expect mortgage debt levels to be down substantially. When we see Household Debt to GDP levels from Q3, they probably will not be substantially lower than they were in Q2.

This does support recovery but only at the risk of continued high levels of debt to GDP.

G.19 data series – Federal Reserve

Related posts:

• Data on past consumer deleveraging during recessions
• Consumer credit falls 4.4% from year ago levels
• Why is everyone saying consumer credit is falling? It’s not.
• Do the personal income data demonstrate unbalanced reflation?
• Household debt as an indicator of secular bull and bear markets

While I see the job numbers as pretty much what was expected, the data do make clear that we are seeing a major jobless recovery. David Rosenberg has a piece out today that goes right to the heart of the issue:

All we can say is that if the overwhelming consensus is correct that the recession is behind us, then what we have on our hands is the mother of all jobless recoveries and whatever economic growth is being squeezed into the system comes courtesy of the most dramatic intervention by the government in recorded history, including the New Deal 1930s era. President Obama is now running fiscal deficits that would have made FDR blush.

But while Uncle Sam can try and stimulate spending on autos and housing and even mortgage credit via the myriad of policy measures that have been undertaken, the return to job creation is as elusive as ever. It is hard to fathom that, according to the White House estimates earlier this year, the stimulus was supposed to help cap the unemployment rate at 8.5%. Here we are today with both an unemployment rate and a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio both north of 10%. While real GDP did manage to rebound at a 3.5% annual rate in Q3 — stagnant if not for the government incursion — those dual 10%-plus figures cited in the previous sentence highlight the fact that GDP is not the only barometer of a nation’s economic health.

TODAY’S HEADLINE PAYROLL PRINT CONTAINED TROUBLING SIGNPOSTS
While the government can try to induce people to spend, no recovery can be sustained without a resumption in job growth and October’s employment data contained some troubling signposts.

While the -190,000 headline nonfarm payroll print was not that far off the consensus, and while there were upward revisions to the prior two months (of over 90,000), the major problem is that the Establishment Survey, at this time, is missing a very important part of the story, which is the strain that the small business sector continues to face. Small businesses have less cash on the balance sheet, less access to credit and less exposure to overseas growth dynamics compared to large companies. The Establishment Survey (nonfarm payrolls), has a “large company” bias that the companion Household Survey does not have. If you look at the historical record, you will find that at true turning points in the economic cycle, the Household Survey leads the Establishment Survey. This has always been the case heading into expansions and into recessions.

My interpretation of this is threefold:

• The headline data understate the severity of the problem because of “large company” bias and a low labor force participation rate. In reality the U-6 number of 17.5% is more reflective of the state of the economy – and that is a depressionary number.
• To the degree you expect the recovery to continue, labor force participation rates should be increasing, not decreasing. In my previous post, I failed to point this out, leading to the conclusion I saw the data as a net positive. I see the data as a net wash – as it was in line with expectations. However, when discouraged workers come back into the labor force, we are going to see a much higher headline unemployment rate.
• Given the fact that unemployment is pointing to depression but we are in a recovery, you should conclude that this recovery will fade once government stimulus is removed.

Lunch with Dave — U.S. Payrolls: 10-Plus (PDF, registration free but required) – David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff

Related posts:

• The weak employment situation summary for June 2009
• Payroll data mixed despite the bullish headline job loss figure
• Comprehensive unemployment rate is 17.5%
• U.S. employment data in line with estimates
• Payrolls fall by 159,000 in U.S.

The employment market is pretty grim. We’re talking a double digit unemployment rate – and that’s just the base rate. The comprehensive unemployment rate is now 17.5% in the US.  This is a fact not lost on our politicians. Today, Barack Obama signed a bill that extends unemployment benefits and home buyer tax credits. But,, let’s parse the data to get a real read of what’s happening.

The household survey

The unemployment rate is based on a household survey. Basically, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) asks a bunch of people, “do you have a job?  No? Are you looking? By asking enough different people these questions, the BLS can produce a statistic to represent the nationwide unemployment rate. That number is currently 10.2% – or 15.7 million of a labor force of 154.0 million in a population of 236.6 working age folks.

The two things to note are the rate 10.2% and the participation rate, now 65.1%, the lowest in 23 years. What this is telling us is that the actual toll of joblessness is much higher than 10.2% because a lot of people have given up looking for jobs.

The numbers above are all seasonally-adjusted. So, the true picture could be somewhat better because without adjustments the number of unemployed is actually 14.5 million, 9.5% of the active labor force and down from 15.2 million in August. Either way, it’s still a grim picture.

I actually like to watch year-on-year data as an indicator of directionality.  On this front, the report is looking much better. The increase in the number of unemployed is down from a peak of 6.0 million (6.2 million unadjusted) to 5.5 million (5.1 million unadjusted). So the year-on-year rate increase is now 3.6%, down from 3.9% in June.  Again, these numbers are grim (the peak y-o-y change was 1.8% in 2001, for example). But the direction of change is now down.

The establishment survey

This is where the BLS gets non-farm payrolls (NFPs), the number of job losses per month. Non-Farm Payrolls (130.8 million) are now at their lowest level since March 2004 (also 130.8 million). And if one goes back to the period before the previous recession, NFPs were 132.5 million in February 2001. That means we have lost 1.7 million jobs over a nine-year time frame. This is an ugly data point.

The silver lining here is that both unadjusted data and y-o-y changes are better. NFPs are now 132.0 million unadjusted and that is up 1 million from 2 months ago. year-on-year changes are now falling. Translation: the labor market is still grim, but the worst is over.

My read of the data is this: There were no big surprises. I expected losses of 200,000 based on the ADP number and the jobless claims numbers.  Yes, there was a jump in the unemployment rate, but jump was misleading because of a falloff in the labor participation rate. On the whole, the employment market is weak, but it is not deteriorating. Can we sustain a recovery even so? Probably.

Related posts:

• The weak employment situation summary for June 2009
• Unemployment rate to 9.7%, 216,000 jobs lost
• Payroll data mixed despite the bullish headline job loss figure
• 651,000 jobs lost but unemployment rate at 8.1% in U.S.
• U.S. employment data in line with estimates

Average weekly hours a record low of 33.0. Stock futures now down. The household survey says we have lost 1.3 million jobs in three months. 17.5% U-6 unemployment. Median duration of unemployment is now 18.7 weeks from 15.4 just 3 months ago – ugly.

Here is an excerpt from the release (bolding added).

The unemployment rate rose from 9.8 to 10.2 percent in October, and nonfarm payroll employment continued to decline (-190,000), the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. The largest job losses over the month were in construction, manufacturing, and retail trade.

Household Survey Data

In October, the number of unemployed persons increased by 558,000 to 15.7 million. The unemployment rate rose by 0.4 percentage point to 10.2 percent, the highest rate since April 1983. Since the start of the recession in December 2007, the number of unemployed persons has risen by 8.2 million, and the unemployment rate has grown by 5.3 percentage points. (See table A-1.)

Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rates for adult men (10.7 percent) and whites (9.5 percent) rose in October. The jobless rates for adult women (8.1 percent), teenagers (27.6 percent), blacks (15.7 percent), and Hispanics (13.1 percent) were little changed over the month. The unemployment rate for Asians was 7.5 percent, not seasonally adjusted. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)

The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks and over) was little changed over the month at 5.6 million. In October, 35.6 percent of unemployed persons were jobless for 27 weeks or more. (See table A-9.)

The civilian labor force participation rate was little changed over the month
at 65.1 percent. The employment-population ratio continued to decline in October, falling to 58.5 percent. (See table A-1.)

The number of persons working part time for economic reasons (sometimes referred to as involuntary part-time workers) was little changed in October at 9.3 million. These individuals were working part time because their hours had been cut back or because they were unable to find a full-time job.

More info coming shortly.

Related posts:

• 467,000 jobs lost in the U.S. in June 2009
• 651,000 jobs lost but unemployment rate at 8.1% in U.S.
• U.S. loses 533,000 jobs, unemployment rate up to 6.7%
• U.S. unemployment rate 7.2%, 524,000 jobs lost
• Unemployment rate climbs to 9.4%

The Department of Labor data released this morning indicated that 512,000 people filed initial claims for unemployment insurance in the latest week.  This is down 20,000 from last week and marks the last data points we are to get on employment before tomorrows employment numbers are released.

All indications are that the number will come in around the 200,000 job loss range. Wednesday’s ADP number of –203,000 jobs is consistent with this. Stock futures rallied on the data and the Dow is up about 80 points in early trading.

Nonetheless, 512,000 weekly claims is still very high.

Source

Weekly Unemployment Claims Report – ETA Press Releases

Related posts:

• A sustainable recovery with 530,000 weekly claims?
• New unemployment claims are coming down
• U.S. initial jobless claims fall 21,000 to 554,000
• Jobless Claims: 404,000
• Jobless claims stuck near 530,000, point to structurally high unemployment

Marshall Auerback here. You saw Ed’s last post on China, quoting from Peter Tasker, one of the top analysts in Japan when I lived there. I take Peter’s insights very seriously. His analysis implies something a lot more in regards to currencies, trade and credit.

China’s bank credit expansion is so great that even if nominal GDP is up five to ten percent, the credit to GDP ratio will rise by about thirty percentage points.  It took Japan ten years to  take it up by fifty or sixty percentage points, and it has already been high in China before this credit boom. How high, no one knows because there is no good data on debt outside the banking system.  But there is such debt.  The debts of households and firms outside the banking system could be thirty percent of GDP.  The total ratio now could be 185%.  This is the same as Japan at the peak and close to the US now. 

This could keep China going for quite some time, but the consequences for Japan could be disastrous.  Indeed, for most of Asia, which could precipitate another crisis for them down the road.

One relatively unexplored aspect of the emerging Asia crisis of 1997 was what pushed these countries heavily into current account deficits.  But between 1992-94, China devalued the RMB by close to 60% (she was already running a current account surplus when she did it the second time), which created huge competitive pressures for the other countries and pushed them rapidly into deficit.  This time, China is devaluing along with the US dollar and reflating a credit bubble — not to encourage domestic demand, but to create a renewed export juggernaut, at a time of weak external demand.  This could really be problematic for the rest of the world.

I wonder how long before the protectionist pressures emerge?

Related posts:

• China is now on the same bubble path as Japan post-1987 crash
• The bullish argument for China
• G-20: China is clearly looking for a new world order
• Japanese defend dollar’s status while China tears it down
• China is now America’s largest creditor

This article by Peter Tasker, a well-regarded financial analyst in Asia, comes via the Financial Times (hat tip Marshall). He sees an enormous bubble forming in China – and parallels to Japan circa 1987:

Emerging markets, it seems, have had a good crisis. In contrast to the debt-ridden G7 economies, they have quickly resumed their growth trajectory. No surprise, then, that US emerging market mutual funds are experiencing record inflows. The stellar performance of the Brics markets – Brazil, Russia, Indian and China – is due to continue into the distant future.

Such is the narrative now forming among investors. To anyone who has lived through the rise and fall of the Japanese bubble economy, it should set off alarm bells.

Remember that it was in the years following the 1987 "Black Monday" crash that Japanese assets went from being expensive to absurdly overvalued and the Nikkei’s dizzy rise to 39,000 forced the bears to throw in the towel…

But what you saw was decidedly not what you got. The crisis, far from leaving Japan unscathed, exacerbated its structural problems and laid the groundwork for a far greater disaster…

Interest rates have been far too low for far too long. If the natural interest rate is, as the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell posited, around the level of nominal GDP growth, then China’s interest rates should have been close to 10 per cent for most of this decade. Alan Greenspan, former chief of the US Federal Reserve, has been criticised for holding interest rates too low and setting off a housing and credit bubble in the US. But if US monetary policy was wrong for the US, it was even more wrong for the high-growth countries that "imported" it. The result could only be a massive misallocation of capital…

At the 2008 peak, the price-to-book ratio of the Shanghai stock exchange was over seven times, well above the five times achieved by Japanese stocks in 1989. After the turbulence of the past 18 months, the ratio has fallen to 3.3 times, still the world’s second highest after India, and residential real estate trades at multiples of income that make the US housing boom look tame…

What is scary is that the current frothiness of emerging markets, centred on China, may be only a taste of what is to come.

There is a lot more in the original article. Link below.

Source

China rushes towards a Japan-style bubble – Financial Times

Related posts:

• China: reflation play spells trouble for rest of the world
• Subprime housing bubble timeline
• Marc Faber: China’s numbers are fake
• Hong Kong: “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time”
• Huge property bubble in China

If one wants to see what happens when you use stimulus to help keep zombie companies alive and to resist reform efforts, look no further than Japan. 

For twenty years now, Japan has been dealing with the consequences of a burst asset bubble in shares and property. And for twenty years, the body politic has been unwilling to make the necessary reforms which would eliminate zombie companies while still helping to repair balance sheets in the private sector. Instead, the Japanese have piled government deficit upon deficit like Sisyphus trying to get consumers to reflate the economy. It has not worked.

Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), told the US Congress last week that the debt path was out of control and raised "a real risk that Japan could end up in a major default".

The IMF expects Japan’s gross public debt to reach 218pc of gross domestic product (GDP) this year, 227pc next year, and 246pc by 2014. This has been manageable so far only because Japanese savers have been willing – or coerced – into lending for almost nothing. The yield on 10-year government bonds has been around 1.30pc this year, though they jumped to 1.42pc last week.

"Can these benign conditions be expected to continue in the face of even-larger increases in public debt? Going forward, the markets capacity to absorb debt is likely to diminish as population ageing reduces saving," said the IMF.

The savings rate has crashed from 15pc in 1990 to near 2pc today, half America’s rate. Japan’s $1.5 trillion state pension fund (the world’s biggest) has become a net seller of government bonds this year, as it must to meet pay-out obligations. The demographic crunch has hit. The workforce been contracting since 2005.

Japan Post Bank is balking at further additions to its $1.7 trillion holdings of state debt. The pillars of the government debt market are crumbling. Little wonder that the Ministry of Finance has begun advertising bonds in Tokyo taxis, featuring Koyuki from The Last Samurai. If Japan’s bond rates rise to global levels of 3pc to 4pc, interest costs will shatter state finances.

What this illustrates is that stimulus cannot be seen as a cure-all in an economy which lacks in domestic demand or in which debt burdens are high. I see this as a cautionary tale for The Europeans and Americans looking at stimulus as some magic bullet which will make structural problems disappear.

I increasingly ask myself whether any advanced democracy has the foresight to implement a targeted monetary stimulus campaign without knee-capping efforts to induce more private sector savings – fiscal stimulus is a whole different affair. Right now, the savings rate in Japan is even lower than in the United States, a direct result of easy money.

In my view, fiscal or monetary stimulus are bridges to a sustainable economic future built on the back of deleveraging, a purge of malinvestments and industry consolidation. Right now, the stimulus in Japan is looking more like a bridge to nowhere.

It is Japan we should be worrying about, not America – Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph

Related posts:

• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Pushing on a string and similar notions on monetary policy ineffectiveness
• The new Japan, domestic consumption, and the neo-liberal thought machine
• Don Kohn says Fed policy has kept rates down 100 basis points
• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck

If you have been wondering whether a statistical recovery is at hand, today’s ISM manufacturing report should be the clincher.  The report was definitely bullish with the ISM index rising to 55.7 and sub-components supporting the understanding that the manufacturing sector is expanding. This is quite a contrast to last month’s weak data and demonstrates that last month was a one-month aberration in what should now be seen as a full-blown technical recovery.

I want to talk about this recovery briefly in the context of the signs that came before it, my own forecasting psychology and what the future holds.

The ISM data

The key data points to see as evidence of a fairly broad-based expansion in manufacturing come from new orders, production and inventories.  The production number came in at an incredibly bullish 63.3, marking the fifth consecutive month of increase. New orders slipped slightly, but were also in striking distance of the 60 range. (50 represents the demarcation between expansion and contraction).

But, from my perspective, it is inventories which are the most bullish data points. The inventories data show that inventories in the manufacturing sector were still being purged in October even while production is increasing.  That means that inventories are likely to make a huge contribution to GDP going forward in Q1 and Q2 of 2010. GDP could again surprise to the upside.

My mea culpa on forecast herding

All of this suggests the economy has been growing since the beginning of Summer. In the early Spring, I indicated that jobless claims were peaking (which added to my stock market bullishness at the time). This call turns out to have been accurate. However, at the time, this post produced very negative sentiments, albeit more from readers on Naked Capitalism than Credit Writedowns – in my opinion because most people erroneously extrapolate a current trend into the future (see my reaction to this from a post weeks later, “Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere”)

Nevertheless, a piece from NBER guru Robert Gordon that I reported demonstrated to me that I was not alone in seeing the trend reversal in jobless claims. Eventually, in May I indicated that the jobless claims data were pointing to an imminent recovery and remarked that the data had usually been fairly accurate in the past.

And for the record, I have said I see a recovery happening probably in Q4 2009 or Q1 2010 (see my post “The Fake Recovery”).

The real question is how robust a recovery are we going to have and this is directly related to why the jobless claims series has been sending a false signal.  Now, initial claims has been sending a recovery signal since January. Yet, continuing claims continued to rise more quickly until last week.  In the past, one had seen these two series as harbingers of imminent recovery.  But, I am talking Q4 here.  Why? Deleveraging.

In the end, consumers are going to be forced to reduce debt and save more in this more cautious financial environment.  Team Obama does seem intent on re-kindling animal spirits but the personal savings rate has gone up nonetheless.  This will be a drag on GDP growth going forward and means that the economy’s rebound will be more tenuous and slower to develop.  In my view, this means recovery will be delayed and once it gets going it will be weak.  The potential for a double dip is very high.

So, to be clear, first derivatives are starting to turn up and since recession is a first derivative event, we are probably going to see an end to this recession soon enough.  But, with structural problems still remaining, the U.S. economy will be weak for a long time to come.

Why do I bring this up?  Because, despite the data pointing to recovery, I decided the start of the recovery process would be delayed until this quarter or Q1 2010 by consumers repairing their balance sheets – and, in retrospect, in part due to a desire to avoid being too far out of step with the consensus.

I must admit to falling prey to forecast herding, something I talked about in June (admittedly without mentioning my own culpability which I should have done). At the time, I said:

No one wants to go out on a limb with a bold call only to see this prediction proved wrong.  If one fails, it is better to fail conventionally.  The necessary corollary of that statement is this: market forecasters and analysts play it safe by making sure their forecasts are not often far from the consensus forecast.  Think of the consensus forecast as an anchor which restricts the outlook of any individual forecaster afraid of failing unconventionally.

In Roubini’s case – and this logic also applies to media darlings like Meredith Whitney – it does NOT pay to up the ante.  What Faber is saying is that they have already benefitted from the bold and unconventional contrarian market call they initially made.  There is little payoff and much risk from continuing on that path.  A bearish analyst who misses the turn gets the stick.  Just ask the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman.

Roubini is not running with the herd

The one thing that makes me think about my error in tweaking my bullishness has to do with Nouriel Roubini. In the quote above, I said he has little incentive to double down on a bearish forecast at this point in time.  Both he and Meredith Whitney, two voices of caution leading into crisis, have been much more upbeat of late. Are they hedging as I did?  Hard to say.

But, with Nouriel Roubini’s recent FT Op-Ed, this is over. Roubini decried the easy money policy he believes is leading to a dollar carry trade and an increase of risk appetite across a wide variety of asset classes. He believes this experiment will not end well. I share his view.

Roubini, in going public in this way, is officially departing from a more hedged nuanced position he has been using over the last few months as the recovery has taken hold. Yves Smith says:

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp.

I applaud him for coming out with this piece and suggest you read it because it may come to be seen as the make or break call in determining his reputation as economic soothsayer.

Recovery is happening, but watch asset prices

For my part, I will look to avoid a repeat of the ‘jobless claims incident.’ Hopefully, I have done by writing my depression post at the beginning of last month, which outlines my view that we are in a cyclical recovery in the middle of a longer-term depression.

I would like to make some amendments to my thinking at the time though. First and foremost, I have come to doubt whether we are seeing a balance sheet recession right now. One reason I am writing this post is because the ISM manufacturing data turned up in May at precisely the same time that the credit revulsion-induced savings rate turned down. Translation: there is no balance sheet recession in the U.S., at least not yet. (see my post “Americans are not increasing savings”). This means the recovery could surprise to the upside. Moreover, the ISM data point to potential upside surprises from inventories, leading to an even more robust outlook.

What I believe is happening has much to do with Nouriel Roubini’s comments. U.S. economic policy is geared toward reproducing the status quo ante via reflation of asset prices (something Bill Gross thinks is the right policy and even Dilbert has made fun of). The policy has been wildly successful so far, with asset prices bubbling over globally. I have called this the fake recovery, but as recently as September I was on the fence about how much uptick we were to get. I never dreamed the recovery process could be so robust given the headwinds we faced.

However, reflation has also given investors a license to take risk. Look at the return of John Meriwether as a telltale sign.  Reflation policies are inflating assets far and wide: European high yield, American high yield, Swedish house prices, London house prices, Chinese property prices, and inducing reckless lending. The list is endless. Even Bill Gross’ piece pointed to inflated prices, a view shared by Jeremy Grantham.

The long and short is we are seeing another asset bubble inflating courtesy of easy money. While Morgan Stanley worries easy money will lead to inflation, former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie fears this will end in a double dip. To make matters worse, there is a dollar carry trade now spreading a liquidity seeking return dynamic abroad. This is the additional risk of which Roubini writes, believing it could precipitate another crunch or crash. Ironically, a strong recovery is not necessarily bullish.

Is a double dip or crash a baseline scenario? No, not necessarily – but it is increasingly likely. So, as bullish as I believe the data are, I am more worried about a bad outcome, not less.

Related posts:

• ISM shows manufacturing sector close to recovery
• Both initial claims and continuing claims now pointing to recovery
• Jobless claims may signal the end is near
• ISM: September manufacturing data disappoint; market sells off
• Morgan Stanley: Recession will ‘end by mid-to-late summer’

The data released this morning by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis on personal income somehow managed to show weakness in income and consumption as well as savings.  I see this as proof that Americans are not saving and hence not deleveraging, but they are also so income constrained that their consumption should not be expected to increase markedly either. This points to a mild recovery.

The numbers from September show a significant decline in consumption from the cash-for-clunkers juiced August numbers.

Personal outlays — PCE, personal interest payments, and personal current transfer payments — decreased $48.8 billion in September, in contrast to an increase of $138.2 billion in August. PCE decreased $47.2 billion, in contrast to an increase of $139.8 billion.

If you take out August and cash-for-clunkers and look back at June and July, September’s consumption numbers are up a tick (annualized $10.53 trillion in personal outlays versus $10.44 trillion for July and $10.42 trillion for June).

So consumers are spending money. You can see this in the savings data as well.

Personal saving — DPI less personal outlays — was $355.6 billion in September, compared with $307.0 billion in August. Personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income was 3.3 percent in September, compared with 2.8 percent in August.

3.3 percent is higher than 2.8 percent but it is a lot lower than 5.9 percent, which is where things were in May. I took this issue up at length in my post, “Americans are not increasing savings” earlier this month saying:

Savings rates averaged 9% through 1982. They were consistently above 7% through 1992. Since then, savings rates have collapsed. From Jan 1969 to November 1997 (comprising all monthly data since record-keeping began), the 10-year average savings rate was higher in every single month than the 5.9% savings rate achieved in May 2009.

So 2.8% is ridiculously low and inadequate to meet Americans’ needs in terms of reducing debt and Baby Boomers’ preparing for retirement. Absent asset-price appreciation as a source of savings, we are going to be in for some tough sledding in a few years. Clearly, record low interest rates are reducing the propensity to save.

On the other hand, incomes are still constrained. The BEA reports:

Personal income decreased $0.1 billion, or less than 0.1 percent, and disposable personal income (DPI) decreased $0.2 billion, or less than 0.1 percent, in September, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis…

Real disposable income decreased 0.1 percent in September, compared with a decrease of 0.2 percent in August. Real PCE decreased 0.6 percent, in contrast to an increase of 1.0 percent.

This puts personal income on par with Aug 2007 levels, as income is being reduced by high unemployment.

My analysis says the data are pointing to a mild recovery on the back of consumer spending which is being spurred by low interest rates. As a result, savings are now going back down to dangerously low levels. This mix is a direct result of policy decisions made in Washington, which are designed to recreate the pre-crisis status quo ante. Thus far, they have been successful.

Related posts:

• Do the personal income data demonstrate unbalanced reflation?
• Savings in America hit 5%, up from nil last year
• Third quarter GDP growth comes in at 3.5%
• Highlights from report with Q1 U.S. GDP down 6.1%
• Why the personal consumption data is important to the stock market