The Unlikely Bull Market

This is not the time to be fully invested but neither is it the time to be side lined. We are in a nervous market where great opportunities present themselves at regular intervals. We recommend holding 25-50% in cash or cash like instruments (depending on your risk profile) which can be deployed at short notice when those opportunities arise

The Facts They Don’t Want You to Know

If I told you that the composition of an average UK equity fund changes by 90% a year, would that startle you? How would you feel if I added that the 20 funds with the highest turnover returned just 4.7% to investors in the 3 years to the end of March 2011 whereas the 20 funds with the lowest turnover returned 16.8% over the same period? From the same source: Out of 1,230 funds across 12 different strategies, only 35 fund managers produced a performance consistent enough to earn their fund a place in the top quartile in each of the last three years (upper half of chart 1). In a universe of 1,230 funds, over a three year period and completely disregarding skill, the expected number of funds consistently ranked in the top quartile is 1,230*0.253=19.22. In other words, more than half the 35 managers were there not because of skill but because, statistically, someone was always likely to ‘over-achieve’

Ignore Egan-Jones at Your Peril

If you are still inclined to give Greece the benefit of the doubt, I suggest you study the works of Egan-Jones, a credit rating company located in Haverford, Pennsylvania. Contrary to most other rating companies, Egan-Jones does not receive any compensation from bond issuers (a huge conflict of interest in the world of credit rating agencies) and, unlike most of its competitors who haven’t exactly covered themselves in glory in recent years, Egan-Jones has a formidable track record (see it here).

Sean Egan, co-head of Egan-Jones, predicts the eventual haircut on Greece to be close to 90%. He has done his homework and believes that Greece can support no more than €40 billion of debt through tax revenues. That amounts to only 10-15% of outstanding Greek sovereign debt. Sean put his case forward brilliantly in an interview in Barron’s earlier this year

Point of Maximum Pessimism?

We have been structurally bearish on equities since Absolute Return Partners was established in 2002. ‘Structurally bearish’ does not imply that we, or our clients, have had no exposure to equities throughout this period. Neither does it mean that we have been expecting equities to post a loss every year for the past nine years. No, ‘structurally bearish’ is a term we (and others) use to express our view on multiple trends. In a structural bear market, price/earnings (P/E) ratios decline; i.e. corporate earnings need to outgrow the decline in valuations for equities to post positive returns. Equity investors are swimming against the tide, so to speak.

Now, nine years after having made that call, we begin to spot real value again with European equities trading at 9.4 times trailing 12-month earnings and 7.6 times next year’s earnings (see chart 3). A price-to-book value just below 1 and a dividend yield of 5.3% does not exactly make the value story any less compelling

Will ARMs de-stabilise the covered bond mortgage system?

Ed asked me to comment on hidden contingent sovereign liabilities of Danish mortgage bonds given the most recent Absolute Return Letter

A Credible Solution to America’s Mortgage Crisis

The adoption of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark Act in 1849 provided the first regulatory framework and Danish mortgage financing has ever since been tightly regulated, ensuring an entirely unblemished track record with not a single default to report in over 210 years. Even in 1813, when the Kingdom of Denmark defaulted, the mortgage bond system survived intact. Even more impressively, the combined loss ratio for all Danish mortgage credit institutions (MCIs) has never exceeded 1% in any one year[7] – a number most other countries can only dream of

Why U.S. of AA Matters

A U.S. downgrade is, in itself, almost meaningless. A nation that issues debt denominated solely in its own currency and which is in full control of its monetary policy, cannot default unwillingly. Nations default because they run out of foreign currency to service their debt, but the U.S. doesn’t need foreign currency to service its debt. So what does it mean? Near term, other U.S. financial institutions (Fannie Mae? Freddie Mac? JP Morgan?) will be downgraded as a result – perhaps as early as today or tomorrow. Following that, if Standard & Poors wants to maintain whatever credibility it has left, it will probably have to downgrade a few sovereigns as well. France springs to mind; it is not far behind the US as far as profligacy is concerned, and it may prove difficult for Standard and Poors to justify the AAA rating it currently assigns to France.

What Happens Next?

The question is not whether Greece will default but what will happen once it has. If Greece defaults but stays in the euro, not only will it not solve the underlying lack of competitiveness, but markets will immediately turn their attention to Portugal and Ireland and force those countries to default, and once they fold, Spain and possibly Italy will be next, so a Greek default on its own could quite possibly make matters worse for everyone. If Greece defaults and exits the euro at the same time, the market reaction won’t be much if any different to begin with, but things may actually take an interesting turn in one particular respect. Once the people of Portugal, Italy, Spain and Ireland see how the Greek economy actually benefits from the exit, they may in fact demand an exit in their countries too. It is therefore fair to say that a Greek default, with or without an exit from the eurozone, achieves nothing if the aim is to keep the eurozone intact. However, there is another way forward

Five Misconceptions Squashed

Niels Jensen clears up a number of common misconceptions about the macroo environment which whave great importance for investing

The Case for Human Ingenuity

There are essentially three reasons why I think oil prices will go through a rather dramatic correction over the next several years:

1. Many investors who, in recent years, have added commodities to their portfolios as a hedge will ultimately be disappointed by the lack of diversification this asset class offers;

2. Governments and regulatory authorities, both in Europe and the United States, have effectively declared war on commodity speculators, and the area will become subject to a lot more scrutiny and regulation in the years to come;

3. A number of new alternative energy forms are in much more advanced development than many investors realise and will, over the next 3-5 years, become serious alternatives to oil, particularly as far as transportation is concerned

Confessions of an Investor

By Niels Jensen The Absolute Return Letter, April 2011 “When models turn on, brains turn off.” Til Schulman I have been thinking a great deal about risk over the past couple of years. The depth of the financial crisis took many of us by surprise. I made mistakes. I am sure you made mistakes. In

From Dublin to Tripoli

The Absolute Return Letter, March 2011 By Niels Jensen “Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes” Oscar Wilde A remarkable month Two remarkable events unfolded during the month of February. One cleared the front pages all over the world. The other one barely got a mention – outside of its home country that