Credit Writedowns

The following is the second in a series of posts by QB Partners on the dollar standard monetary system. The first post is available for review at Credit Writedowns. In section 1, we tried to lend perspective to the current global monetary system, its weaknesses and predisposition to fail, whom it benefits and harms, and the natural incentives of various participants to push it towards demise. Though obvious to us and many of you, this state of affairs has not been widely addressed by global leaders responsible for steering public economic policies. And though there have been some overtures towards public acknowledgement made by prominent people, such talk has no doubt been seen by active Western policy makers as inconvenient and maybe even irresponsible discourse. Officially, a “strong dollar policy” remains in effect.

The global crisis has called into question how banks are run and how they should be regulated. Highly leveraged banks went under, threatening to drag down the entire financial system with them. Here, David Miles of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, shares his personal views on the optimal leverage for banks. He concludes that it is much lower than is currently the norm.

In April 1989, Mexico’s external debt negotiator, Angel Gurria, asked his country’s commercial bank creditors for a 55 percent haircut. This was the opening pitch of the newly created Brady Plan, which finally addressed both the debt overhang of developing countries and the weak balance sheets of their commercial bank creditors, ultimately resolving the LDC Debt Crisis.

More than twenty years later, Europe is in the midst of a similar sovereign debt and banking crisis. The EU is in a destabilizing feedback loop that it cannot control. Sovereign credit is deteriorating and this is reducing confidence in national banking systems, causing or increasing the likelihood that sovereigns will have to assume bank liabilities. This further impairs the sovereign credit and increases the lack of confidence in the banks.

We review the basic tenets of the Brady Plan in the context of our personal experience working on many of these sovereign restructurings and how they could apply in a comprehensive solution for the European debt crisis. The markets and the Eurozone desperately need a positive confidence shock in the form a comprehensive plan that simultaneously addresses the sovereign debt overhang and the balance sheets of European commercial banks.

Austrians and MMTers should be on the same side. After all, both camps understand the relationship between money and credit, and both understand the full ramifications of having fiat money. They should be on the same side arguing against economists who argue that demand can be created by flooding the banking system with reserves, and both should be on the same side arguing against those who think that increasing inflation expectations is an effective way to get an already over-indebted economy to take on more debt.

By Michael Lebowitz and Daniel Cohen, Absolute Investment Management

Given that we can not adequately explain the enormous rise as of late and don’t believe it to be related to the weakening dollar or the economy (as gold has not experienced a similar rise) we think its time to sit on the sidelines and let it play out.

The Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) first (“Advance”) estimate of the annualized growth rate of the first quarter 2011 U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 1.75%, down significantly from the 3.11% growth rate reported for the fourth quarter of 2010. When compared to the prior quarter the lower growth was caused by a number of factors: somewhat weaker consumption of durable goods, weaker fixed investments, substantially weaker overall trade numbers, and increased contraction in governmental expenditures. The only improving factor was stronger inventory growth, which reverted to form after an anomalous fourth quarter reduction (most likely driven by a noisy, if not aberrant, price “deflater”).

Over the last three decades the US financial sector has grown six times faster than nominal GDP. This column argues that there comes a point when the financial sector has a negative effect on growth – that is, when credit to the private sector exceeds 110% of GDP. It shows that, of the advanced countries currently suffering in the fallout of the global crisis were all above this threshold.

Bernanke (and Dudley) have been testifying that inflation is not an issue. But what signs and maps are they reading? Bernanke specifically invokes inflation expectations as being most important, and he contends they are low. They both note that the “output gap” (more on it later) is still high and that wage inflation is unlikely in a period of high unemployment. But, as Greenspan recently said, “The problem is, none of these indicators will tell you when inflation is about to take hold.”

The Economic Cycle Research Institute wrote what I think is a very powerful editorial about the problem with Fed policy and inflation. I will quote some of the more important paragraphs:

“Central bankers need to stop clinging to policy orthodoxy and pay attention to proven cyclical leading inflation indicators that can actually tell them when inflation is about to take hold. Otherwise, if a well-meaning Fed stimulates the economy for too long, it will let inflation and/or asset prices get out of control, fostering boom-bust cycles that keep long-term unemployment at elevated readings as each short boom ends with a bust that pushes the jobless rate back up.”

World War II was the last war the United States fought with a formal declaration of war. The wars fought since have had congressional approval, both in the sense that resolutions were passed and that Congress appropriated funds, but the Constitution is explicit in requiring a formal declaration. It does so for two reasons, I think. The first is to prevent the president from taking the country to war without the consent of the governed, as represented by Congress. Second, by providing for a specific path to war, it provides the president power and legitimacy he would not have without that declaration; it both restrains the president and empowers him. Not only does it make his position as commander in chief unassailable by authorizing military action, it creates shared responsibility for war. A declaration of war informs the public of the burdens they will have to bear by leaving no doubt that Congress has decided on a new order — war — with how each member of Congress voted made known to the public.

By John Mauldin Loose Monetary Policies and Emerging Markets So far we have focused on the United States and other mature, developed economies that have far too much debt. With Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland at close to zero percent interest rates, it seemed like a good idea to stimulate the economy. However, emerging markets that [...]

Is the global saving glut to blame for global imbalances? This column argues that the role played by loose monetary policy from the US Federal Reserve should not be overlooked. The prolonged decline in long-term interest rates in the mid-2000s is largely to blame for the housing boom in the US.

In my previous missive I concluded that investors should stay true to the principles that have always guided (and should always guide) sensible investment, but I left readers hanging as to what I believe those principles might actually be. So, now, for the moment of truth, I present a set of principles that together form what I call The Seven Immutable Laws of Investing.

They are as follows:

Always insist on a margin of safety
This time is never different
Be patient and wait for the fat pitch
Be contrarian
Risk is the permanent loss of capital, never a number
Be leery of leverage
Never invest in something you don’t understand