Global Manufacturing Steadies as She Goes, or Does She?

The year got off on a much better foot than might have been expected, at least as far as global manufacturing is concerned. So the fall in global manufacturing has flattened out, even though the bounce back has more of a dead cat look about it than anything else. As usual in recent months the report was very much a mixed bag

A Month In Spain That Didn’t Shake The World

Spain’s economic problems are very grave. The country is facing a decade long depression, and if enough young qualified people leave during this period then the country could enter a negative dynamic from which it will never properly recover. At the outset (2007) I and others argued for a 20% internal devaluation to shift resources over to the export sector. This did not happen, and virtually no one is interested in the idea. The main priorities are still reducing the deficit, and restructuring the financial sector without injecting any significant quantity of public money. Both these policies are contractionary in their impact. In addition the proposed labour market reform is timid, and won’t act quickly enough to stop the rot on the growth front

Monti, The Full Version

Fortunately the ECB has deep pockets, and as I argue in this post, these will probably suffice to keep short term bond yields down to acceptable levels, and help the banks fund themselves and recapitalise. What the ECB’s LTRO’s won’t do is get new credit moving (one significant part of the initiative involves banks in the troubled periphery economies not having to write down the asset side too much too quickly, so there will be little room for “creative destruction”)

The Massendowngrade Effect

Perhaps the main point to take to heart from the events of the last week is the way the recent ECB liquidity measures have apparently been able to stabilise the debt crisis, at least for the time being, even while it is not clear that they will have the same success stabilising the deterioration in the respective real economies

Playing Chicken And Rooster With Hungary

Tension surrounding the application of a series of so-called “unorthodox policies” by Hungary’s Fidesz government has certainly been rising in recent days. While Washington has been reasonably quiet as government emissary Tamas Fellegi meets with top IMF officials, Brussels has seen a veritable avalanche of official statements and policy initiatives. Despite constant rumours that an agreement with the IMF is near, I find it pretty implausible that any deal can be reached without some kind of EU assent. At the present time this assent is unlikely to be forthcoming, and indeed the ”ante” has been pushed up and up

From Here To Eternity, Hungarian Style

It was in Hungary that the new orthodoxy of relying on “non-Keynesian” effects related to expectations and credibility was formally announced and put to work. However, private consumption, unfortunately, has notably failed to rise. Perhaps there will be more than a little historic irony involved in Hungary being the country where the whole experiment eventually went badly wrong, although I doubt the Hungarians themselves will se it that way

The Rain In Spain Falls Mainly On The Journalists, It Seems

Nothing in Spain is exactly as it appears to be, and that few of the arguments politicians and so called “experts” advance are entirely innocent. Most “information” circulating in Spain is highly politicised. Really “independent” analysts are virtually unknown

Italy Braces Itself For The Full Monti

The bottom line is that Italy is both too big to fail and too big to be bailed out, which is why it is still hanging dangerously in limbo-land. Since, as I argue in this article, some sort of restructuring or other is well nigh inevitable in the Italian case, the sooner Europe’s leaders work up a credible plan on how to achieve this, the better. Otherwise it will not only be Italy’s citizens who are subjected to the Full Monti, Europe’s leaders may also find themselves with their credibility stripped naked

Is Finland Really A Closet Member Of The Eurozone Periphery?

The country’s debt dynamics are far from unsustainable at this point, but given the weakening in the country’s export performance and the steady unwinding of the housing boom we can now anticipate I would expect growth to be weaker than either the EU or the IMF are currently anticipating, and pressure on the country to increase fiscal spending to maintain expectations to rise, with the implication that pressure on the Finnish spread over 10 year German bunds will continue, as the country risks drifting off from being part of the core towards the growing periphery, at least in the eyes of investors

A Deep Seated Hostility Towards European Construction?

The British decision to veto the proposed new EU treaty is not surprisingly provoking an avalanche of commentary this weekend. Among journalists, at least, there seems to be a consensus that David Cameron committed some kind of major diplomatic blunder.

Possibly this is so, but given the difficulties presented by having to take this agreement forward outside the formal structure of the EU, it is hard to not reach the conclusion that both Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy have been guilty if not of a similar blunder, then at least a major error of judgment

Last Days Of Pompeii?

What is becoming clearer to almost everyone is that this is now no longer simply a Euro periphery sovereign debt crisis. It has become a full blown crisis of confidence in the Euro itself

How Would You React To The News Your Local Central Bank Just Went Bust?

Alarm signals have been going off over the last week, not only due to the surge in the yields on Spanish and Italian debt but also due to evidence that the infection (contagion) is now spreading to what was previously considered to be the core (France, Austria) with the evident danger that more countries will lose their triple A rating. This has put the spotlight on the ECB as an institution, but the bank is reluctant to adopt the role of ultimate guarantor. This is not principally due to the so called “inflation fear” – demand driven inflation is extremely unlikely in the Euro Area in the near term – but rather due to a fear of accumulating sizeable losses in the event that large quantities of bonds are purchased and then countries like Italy and Spain have to restructure their debt. Naturally some argue that a central bank can simply accept losses, since the bank doesn’t necessarily need recapitalisation and could be allowed to carry on regardless of the red ink on the bottom line. I am not very convinced by this argument. I think my fears are shared by the Bundesbank, and my intuition is that they are not at all keen to run the experiment just to see what actually happened