Linking out to Pagrotsky will give you what you need. I have already put it in the newsfeed:

http://feeds2.feedburner.com/creditwritedownsnewsfeed

However, I have to say it is the guarantees, the relatively bipartisan process, the independence of the bad bank regulator and so forth which I find MOST important. I am less interested in the potential posturing of Swedish economists and politicians.

When I first broached this subject I concluded saying:

This is an immense task that the Swedes took on. Their entire banking system was effectively insolvent. Yet, they were able to fashion a workout scheme that had bi-partisan political support, did not unfairly reward shareholders, dealt with moral hazard, separated regulatory and workout roles so as to reduce conflicts of interest, and that quickly wrote down valuations and liquidated the bad debts as opposed to dragging the process out. The Swedish authorities should be especially commended for dealing with the liquidity and solvency concerns simultaneously, while keeping moral hazard to a minimum.

In my view, this must be commended because one can see the U.S. solution is thoroughly lacking by comparison.

Men tack för dina åsikter.

Pagrotsky, at least, admits that it has little bearing if any on current events.

Maybe you can be the blogger that finally puts this urban myth to rest.

Många svenskar skulle tacka dig om du åtminstone försökte säja sanningen i stället för att upprepa densamma politisk propaganda hela tiden.

du ska inte tro att du bor i Norden och det ger dig omedelbar trovärdighet. Jag föredrar att debatten grundar sig på fakta. Jag har mer kunskap om Skandinavien än du anta.

My point is, yes, he has a horse in this race given his prior involvement but, on the whole, his assessment has merit. I am less concerned with whether this bank or that bank was nationalized and more concerned with whether pieces of this model are applicable to present day.

I do like the article you linked to and will link out.

The Swedes that were involved in the 1991 bank crash debacle have been sounding off like a gaggle of proud geese trying to make it sound like they meant to nationalize *one and only one* bank. Didn’t happen that way. Nationalizing was the only option they had and it did not happen as a matter of policy. It happened because the only alternative was a complete collapse. No amount of goose stepping or goose honking to the contrary will change the facts of what really happened.

Du kan ändra den här grisens smink och kläder hur mycket du vill. Den är fortfarande en gris.

Had you taken the time to read the full paper linked at the bottom of this short article you would have seen that Jonung makes EXACTLY the same points you do about the peg. Perhaps, you should examine the evidence in full before you go around disparaging people.

Read the PDF and inform yourself.

Sweden’s banking crash was no accident. It was caused by Swedish policy makers’ foolish attempts to peg their currency, the Krona, at an unrealistic level vis-a-vis the dollar and pound. Currency speculators, including Soros, took on the Swedes and their peg. The Swedish politicians, and one assumes Jonung was one among this crowd of clowns, responded with interest rate hikes to try to defend the peg. This eventually resulted in overnight interest rates exceeding 500% and a crash of the banking sector.

And far from any nationalization “plan” or “swift policy action” (talk about redefing the word “swift”) the nationalization of a single bank, Nordbanken, was only undertaken after the Swedish state went hat-in-hand and peddled it to any takers. When not a single buyer at any price appeared ready to take the bank off their hands they then had no other option than to put it on the states books and nationalize it.

Leif Pagrotsky, another politician active at the time. has written a different account in his op-ed piece in Euro-Intelligence – http://www.eurointelligence.com/article.581+M5b55b38d58a.0.html . Pagrotsky does extend the urban legend of the Swedish “plan for nationalization” (i.e. there was no “plan”) but he is at least honest enough to tell us that it is no model for the current problems in the US or EU economies.