These debt-related shocks will occur regularly for many more years, and each shock will advance or retard the rebalancing process so that it affects the way future shocks occur. There are only a few broad paths along which the Chinese economy can rebalance, and if we can get some sense of the China’s institutional constraints and balance sheet structures, we can figure what these paths are and how likely we are to slip from one to another. In order to get Chinas right I would argue that above all we must understand the dynamics of debt, and of balance sheet structures more generally.
By Michael Pettis Two years ago it was hard to find analysts who expected average GDP growth over the rest of this decade to be less than 8%. The current consensus seems to have dropped to between 6% and 7% on average. I don’t think Beijing disagrees. After assuring us Tuesday that China’s economy – which is growing a little […]
I have always thought that the soft landing/hard landing debate wholly misses the point when it comes to China’s economic prospects. It confuses the kinds of market-based adjustments we are likely to see in the US or Europe with the much more controlled process we see in China. Instead of a hard landing or a soft landing, the Chinese economy faces two very different options, and these will be largely determined by the policies Beijing chooses over the next two years.
The Euro area composite PMI rose to 54.0 from 53.1, making it unlikely that the ECB will move against deflation in May The Chinese HSBC/Markit flash manufacturing PMI was up to 48.3 from 48.0. However, this still shows contracting manufacturing and means China is still rebalancing Yesterday on Boom Bust, the finance show I produce, Marshall Auerback gave a good […]
Recent economic and geopolitical events should be seen through a longer-term strategic lens. During the Cold War, we lived in a bipolar world dominated by the US and its Allies on one side and the Soviets and their vassal states on the other. Ever since the Soviet Union and the east bloc collapsed, there has been a lot of talk […]
I had four big topics in today’s links: Japan, China, Ukraine and Spain. I want to concentrate here on the two Asian countries over the European ones. The wage issue in Japan is an important one because it informs the policy choices in the US and Europe. And the Chinese slowdown is having a big impact on commodity markets, softening growth prospects in emerging markets and commodity exporters.
I got a lot of feedback from my January 5 blog entry because of my argument that the implementation of the reforms proposed in the Third Plenum all but guarantees that growth rates in China will slow down. For that reason I thought it might make sense for me to explain a little more carefully why I think this must happen, and why I think that we can almost judge how successfully the reforms are implemented by how quickly growth slows.
George Magnus is one of the few economists that could claim to have predicted the financial crisis which began in 2007. And last night, he spoke with great concern about the budding crisis now ongoing throughout the emerging markets. I have posted the video below but I want to make a few comments about the discussion.
China is not the first country to have experienced a long period of miraculous growth. But the most difficult part of growth miracles has not been the growth miracle itself but rather the subsequent adjustment.
Current-account deficits have caused problems in several Eurozone countries, but surpluses are also an issue. This column argues that surpluses are detrimental to the welfare of the population to the extent they are driven by structural weaknesses affecting demand. Addressing these issues through structural reforms, while letting wages and prices respond flexibly to market signals, would be welfare-enhancing for the surplus countries.
As analysts and official entities like the World Bank continue to downgrade their forecasts for medium-term growth in China, I have been asked increasingly often for the reasons I believe that 3-4% average annual growth rates is likely to be the upper limit for China during the adjustment period. In this blog entry I want to explain how I arrived at my numbers.
If you look at the last two posts on this site from Marc Chandler and from Sober Look the connection between Fed tapering and money flows is clear. Hot money is flowing out of emerging markets and into Europe.