Hat tip Rolfe Winkler.

Related posts:

• Steve Keen and the spectre of terminal debt
• Steve Keen: On the Edge with Max Keiser
• Bloomberg News is still after the Fed for more disclosure
• Dilbert on the asset-based economy
• What does Mises say about trying to stimulate the economy out of recession

The US Department of Agriculture highlights how the United States in the last decade, despite increased aggregate wealth, slid back significantly in terms of food insecurity as measure of poverty. With everyone now focused on the unemployment situation, it bears noting that even before the downturn in the economy there had been a large surge in food insecurity nationwide.

The Guardian says:

Food insecurity – defined by the USDA as when "food intake … was reduced and their eating patterns were disrupted at times during the year because the household lacked money and other resources for food" – afflicted 14.6% of Americans in 2008. ie, some 50 million people were too poor to guarantee being able to put food on the table.

The table below, also from the Guardian, shows where food insecurity is highest. While much of the distress is concentrated in the South, there are plenty of states in the Southwest and West as well. Maine has the highest food insecurity in the Northeast.

My interpretation of the data goes to income inequality. I see this as evidence that the last decade of growth in the U.S. has not been beneficial for poorer Americans. However, I would go further in saying that the downturn in the U.S. and rising unemployment, bankruptcy and foreclosure in the middle class has made plain that the middle class has also been left behind. While distress amongst poorer Americans is plain from these numbers, the diminished position in the middle class was masked by a surge in debt. This was made plain only as a result of a drop in asset prices.

At present, U.S. policy makers are trying to make this problem go away by reflating an asset bubble, but continued high unemployment is the elephant in the room which higher asset prices can not make disappear.

As for the poor, a related Guardian article gets to the heart of things:

The report said 6.7 million people were defined as having "very low food security" because they regularly lacked sufficient to eat. Among them, 96% reported that the food they bought did not last until they had money to buy more. Nearly all said they could not afford to eat balanced meals. Although few reported that this was a permanent situation throughout the year, 88% said it had occurred in three or more months.

Nearly half reported losing weight because they did not have enough money to buy food.

The number of children living in households where there were shortages of food at times rose by nearly one-third to 17 million. The report says that most parents who did not get enough to eat ensured their offspring received sufficient food but that more than 1 million children still suffered outright hunger.

The worst affected states are in the south with Mississippi having the largest proportion of its population enduring shortages of food followed by Texas and Arkansas. More than half of those affected are minorities, principally black people and Hispanics.

Millions more Americans do not go hungry only because they are so poor they receive government food stamps or rely on handouts from food banks such as Feeding America. In some states, such as West Virginia, one in six of the population is on food stamps.

This is certainly the stuff of depressions more than V-shaped recoveries. The first Guardian article has links to the data for downloading.

Source

Hungry America: food insecurity, state by state – Guardian

Record numbers go hungry in the US – Guardian

Related posts:

• News from 17 November 1930: “we face a winter of hunger and distress”
• If you can’t afford food, steal it: lessons from Japan
• “That’s what happens when a town full of broke people gets a whiff of free money”
• Massive U.S. job loss of 598,000 in January
• 467,000 jobs lost in the U.S. in June 2009

On the eve of U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to China, a major Chinese official has criticized U.S. monetary policy in unusually harsh language. Liu Mingkang, China Banking Regulatory Commission chairman said the zero interest rate policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve posed a “new systemic risk.”

Liu, using language reminiscent of warnings by NYU economist Nouriel Roubini and speaking at a financial forum in China’s capital Beijing, said:

This situation has already encouraged a huge dollar carry trade and had a massive impact on global asset prices… It is boosting speculative investment in stock and property markets and will pose new, insurmountable risks to the global recovery and, particularly, to the recovery in emerging markets.

In my view, this is pure political posturing by the Chinese in order to defuse any U.S. criticisms of Beijing’s currency peg. Call it a pre-emptive strike. The U.S. has seen the unemployment rate rise to 10.2% and the trade deficit rise quite dramatically as well. Many are blaming the Chinese and their currency peg to the U.S. dollar.

When Barack Obama visits China this week, the Chinese expect him to focus on the yuan dollar peg. His administration will find it increasingly difficult to hold protectionist pressures at bay given the yuan’s firm peg to the U.S. dollar even while the dollar has plummeted.  To prevent the U.S. from successfully painting the Chinese peg as the sole major risk to the global economic recovery, the Chinese must therefore point to the destabilizing effects from measures taken by the U.S. to reflate its domestic economy.

The Chinese have shown success thus far. Last week, Tim Geithner penned an Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal along with the Finance Ministers of Indonesia and Singapore which pointed a critical finger at China by asking for “market-oriented exchange rates.” Yet when the APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) summit in Singapore ended that same language was cut from the final commiunique.

On the other hand, there has been little change in the prospects of a revaluation of the yuan peg.

Reuters reports:

Chinese Vice Commerce Minister Chen Jian on Sunday played down talk of a shift in the central bank’s currency policy as well as mounting expectations of a rise in the yuan’s exchange rate.

Speculation that China might let the yuan resume its climb after a 16-month pause swirled after a change last Wednesday in the long-standing wording used by the People’s Bank of China to describe its currency stance.

In its third quarter monetary policy report, the central bank failed to refer to keeping the yuan "basically stable at a reasonable and balanced level" when discussing the outlook for the exchange rate.

Asked whether the PBOC was heralding a return to the gradual appreciation of the yuan against the dollar seen from July 2005-July 2008, Chen told Reuters: "I don’t think the central bank meant to say that."

And all indications suggest that we are now returning to the same unbalanced pre-crisis growth model – but with the global economy in a considerably more fragile state. In this climate, the issues of the yuan currency peg and low interest rates in the U.S. will continue to be front and center for some time to come.

Related posts:

• Chinese to start settling trade in Yuan
• China issues bonds to “promote the RMB in neighbouring countries”
• US angling to get Chinese to revalue renminbi
• China slams U.S. profligacy
• Is China avoiding using US dollars?

Hat tip Barry Ritholtz

Related posts:

• Hugh Hendry: China – The Emperor has no clothes
• Jon Stewart’s indictment of CNBC
• Which homebuilder will go bankrupt next?
• National City is on probation
• Circuit City as canary in the coalmine for commercial real estate

Hong Kong’s leader Donald Tsang has come out with a scathing criticism of U.S. monetary policy, comparing it to Japan’s which he believes contributed to 1997’s Asian crisis. This is the most direct and strident criticism of the U.S. Federal reserve’s monetary policy from a major international politician yet.

Bloomberg reports:

The Federal Reserve’s policy of keeping interest rates near zero is fueling a wave of speculative capital that may cause the next global crisis, Hong Kong’s leader said.

“I’m scared and leaders should look out,” said Donald Tsang, chief executive of the city, said in Singapore today. “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time,” he said, adding that Japan’s zero interest rate policy contributed to the 1997 Asian financial crisis and U.S. mortgage meltdown…

“We have a U.S. dollar carry trade at the moment,” Tsang, 65, said in a speech where leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum are gathering for a weekend summit. The carry trade is where investors borrow cheaply in one currency and use the funds to invest in other currencies.

“Where is the money going — it’s where the problem’s going to be: Asia,” Tsang said. “You can see asset prices going up, not only in Korea, in Taiwan, in Singapore and in Hong Kong, going up to levels that are incompatible or inconsistent with the economic fundamentals.”

Tsang’s criticisms are sure to draw attention as it comes during the APEC summit in Singapore, which is a cross-Pacific economic and political group now being used to show Asian-U.S. cooperation and harmony. Tsang has an especially painful memory of the Asian Crisis as he was Hong Kong’s financial secretary at the time and was forced with the central bank to spend $15 billion to defend Hong Kong’s currency peg as speculative capital fled Asian markets en masse. Depression ensued across wide swathes of Asia, leaving a psychological scar that reverberates today.

As for the comparisons of America to Japan, I find them very well placed.  Yesterday I posted an article in which Marshall Auerback and Fox’s Brian Sullivan discussed parallels between the two. Nouriel Roubini fears that a U.S. dollar carry trade is building which is being used to help inflate assets outside of the U.S. in a global financial bubble.

This is certainly what the Japanese had done in the 1990s. Last August, before the Lehman collapse and panic I wrote that Japan was an enabler of the tech bubble of the late nineties:

the Bank of Japan did not realize the limitations of monetary policy. It could provide easy money, but it could not control where that money ended up. So, ultimately it ended up in the carry trade and helped supply the fuel for the tech bubble.

Was the BOJ responsible for the Tech Bubble? That’s a question that cannot be answered. But, what is true is that the Japanese government and monetary authorities were very instrumental both in the late 1990s and earlier this decade in providing free money to global investors via the carry trade.

Tsang is saying that Japan’s easy money policy also infected Asian markets, helping to inflate an unsustainable bubble which led to collapse and depression. In a macabre repeat of economic history, he sees the same re-occurring now as the U.S. tries desperately to ward off deflation.

Source

Fed May Cause Next Crisis, Hong Kong’s Tsang Suggests – Bloomberg

Related posts:

• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Is the U.S. dollar carry trade replacing the one in Japanese yen?
• Depression in Japan
• Asia is de-coupling
• Big Mac Index: Europe overvalued, Asia undervalued

A friend sent me the following presentation earlier in the week when I was feeling a bit ill. So I neglected to post it.  But, I want to return to it because it is in keeping with my recovery/depression theme. These are the issues that were complicit in the latest financial crisis and almost none of them have disappeared.  They will most certainly rear their heads again precipitating or worsening the next downturn.

We’re talking about:

1. Duration mismatches (borrowing short and lending long)
2. Accounting (Mark-to-market, deferred tax assets and a lot more)
3. Conflicts of interest (no Chinese walls, ratings agencies)
4. Regulation (especially given poor risk controls)
5. Risk management (is Meriwether a leading indicator?)
6. Investment Banking vs. Utility Banking
7. Too big to fail (they must be downsized)
8. Heads I win, tails you lose (socialization of losses is crony capitalism)
9. Quantitative easing (QE has costs)
10. Hedges instead of capital

My baseline thinking at the moment is that we are seeing the beginnings of a cyclical recovery built on the back of asset relation more than anything else. The underpinnings of this uptrend are tenuous. So, when this latest burst of reflation hits the wall, all of the aforementioned issues will re-appear and policy makers will again do the who-could-have-known routine we saw in 2001 and again in 2008/ But the broader public is increasingly wise to this song and dance. Hat tip Scott.

Jim Chanos Presentation at Darden, 22 Oct 2009

Related posts:

• Chinese officials warn banks about reckless lending
• European banks: still undercapitalised
• The U.S. financial system is effectively insolvent
• Lessons from Japan’s Bank Crisis
• Bank of Canada blames Geithner for financial mess

Columbia University Professor and former Federal Reserve official Frederic Mishkin wrote a much-discussed Op-Ed in the Financial Times yesterday. In it, he asks

Are potential asset-price bubbles always dangerous?

He answers this question with a no, noting that some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others because of their connection to debt and credit. I agree with his delineation and assertion that some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others. But, his conclusion that the non-credit variety of asset bubble — what he calls the “pure irrational exuberance bubble” — is not dangerous is false. This is the same blinkered thinking which led to Nasdaq 5000 and its crash. Experience demonstrates that all asset bubbles are dangerous, some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others. Think Animal Farm: All bubbles are equal, but some bubbles are more equal than others.

The real question Mishkin attempts to answer is whether the Federal Reserve (where he once worked) or any other central bank should target asset prices so as to prevent bubbles from taking form.

Because the second category of bubble does not present the same dangers to the economy as a credit boom bubble, the case for tightening monetary policy to restrain a pure irrational exuberance bubble is much weaker. Asset-price bubbles of this type are hard to identify: after the fact is easy, but beforehand is not. (If policymakers were that smart, why aren’t they rich?) Tightening monetary policy to restrain a bubble that does not materialise will lead to much weaker economic growth than is warranted. Monetary policymakers, just like doctors, need to take a Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm”.

Are we to take this seriously?  Even Alan Greenspan is showing more realism in the wake of our latest bubble.  This man is outright dangerous.  Don’t be fooled; his piece is a plant. We have some serious asset bubbles forming right now and he is looking to give intellectual cover to the watch-the-bubble-and-clean-up-after-the-mess policy we saw on display in the late 1990s. Yves Smith thinks there is a connection between his statement and likely Federal Reserve policy.

What I find interesting is how the Federal Reserve under Greenspan had an explicit policy of targeting asset prices as a means of reflating the economy. Yet, Mishkin is saying they should not target asset prices as a means of deflating the economy. This is what is called monetary policy asymmetry, otherwise known as the Greenspan Put. It’s not about targeting asset prices but looking for excess credit growth, which was certainly on display in the Nasdaq boom as well.

In effect, Mishkin is arguing for us to continue with business as usual. This is one of the more loathsome pieces of prattle I have witnessed since the financial crisis began. I hope no one takes this man seriously. I am ashamed that he is a professor at the business school I attended.

I would be remiss if I didn’t point out his equally absurd piece of research on Iceland’s economy before it collapsed. he wrote a piece called “Financial Stability in Iceland” with Tryggvi Herbertsson which stated:

Our analysis indicates that the sources of financial instability that triggered financial crises in emerging market countries in recent years are just not present in Iceland, so that comparisons of Iceland with emerging market countries are misguided.

No, Mr. Mishkin your analysis is misguided. It was with Iceland and it is here again. See below for a real analysis on Iceland from Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert which we can take seriously.

As I have been saying, you can get wildly different conclusions from two people based on the same facts and largely the same analysis. It goes to philosophical predisposition.  What this FT article by Mishkin demonstrates is that no amount of real world evidence of the havoc that bubbles wreak will dissuade these ivory tower ideologues from supporting failed economic policy.

Sources

Not all bubbles present a risk to the economy – Frederic Mishkin, FT

Financial Stability in Iceland (pdf) – Icelandic Chamber of Commerce

The collapse of Iceland’s banks: the predictable end of a non-viable business model – VoxEU

Central Banks Can Do Better Than Just Mopping Up – Caroline Baum, Bloomberg

Related posts:

• Popping bubbles
• Federal Reserve’s Fisher says tightening will be aggressive
• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Quote of the day: William White and inflation
• Bank leverage: forever blowing bubbles part two

This article by Peter Tasker, a well-regarded financial analyst in Asia, comes via the Financial Times (hat tip Marshall). He sees an enormous bubble forming in China – and parallels to Japan circa 1987:

Emerging markets, it seems, have had a good crisis. In contrast to the debt-ridden G7 economies, they have quickly resumed their growth trajectory. No surprise, then, that US emerging market mutual funds are experiencing record inflows. The stellar performance of the Brics markets – Brazil, Russia, Indian and China – is due to continue into the distant future.

Such is the narrative now forming among investors. To anyone who has lived through the rise and fall of the Japanese bubble economy, it should set off alarm bells.

Remember that it was in the years following the 1987 "Black Monday" crash that Japanese assets went from being expensive to absurdly overvalued and the Nikkei’s dizzy rise to 39,000 forced the bears to throw in the towel…

But what you saw was decidedly not what you got. The crisis, far from leaving Japan unscathed, exacerbated its structural problems and laid the groundwork for a far greater disaster…

Interest rates have been far too low for far too long. If the natural interest rate is, as the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell posited, around the level of nominal GDP growth, then China’s interest rates should have been close to 10 per cent for most of this decade. Alan Greenspan, former chief of the US Federal Reserve, has been criticised for holding interest rates too low and setting off a housing and credit bubble in the US. But if US monetary policy was wrong for the US, it was even more wrong for the high-growth countries that "imported" it. The result could only be a massive misallocation of capital…

At the 2008 peak, the price-to-book ratio of the Shanghai stock exchange was over seven times, well above the five times achieved by Japanese stocks in 1989. After the turbulence of the past 18 months, the ratio has fallen to 3.3 times, still the world’s second highest after India, and residential real estate trades at multiples of income that make the US housing boom look tame…

What is scary is that the current frothiness of emerging markets, centred on China, may be only a taste of what is to come.

There is a lot more in the original article. Link below.

Source

China rushes towards a Japan-style bubble – Financial Times

Related posts:

• China: reflation play spells trouble for rest of the world
• Subprime housing bubble timeline
• Marc Faber: China’s numbers are fake
• Hong Kong: “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time”
• Huge property bubble in China

If you have been wondering whether a statistical recovery is at hand, today’s ISM manufacturing report should be the clincher.  The report was definitely bullish with the ISM index rising to 55.7 and sub-components supporting the understanding that the manufacturing sector is expanding. This is quite a contrast to last month’s weak data and demonstrates that last month was a one-month aberration in what should now be seen as a full-blown technical recovery.

I want to talk about this recovery briefly in the context of the signs that came before it, my own forecasting psychology and what the future holds.

The ISM data

The key data points to see as evidence of a fairly broad-based expansion in manufacturing come from new orders, production and inventories.  The production number came in at an incredibly bullish 63.3, marking the fifth consecutive month of increase. New orders slipped slightly, but were also in striking distance of the 60 range. (50 represents the demarcation between expansion and contraction).

But, from my perspective, it is inventories which are the most bullish data points. The inventories data show that inventories in the manufacturing sector were still being purged in October even while production is increasing.  That means that inventories are likely to make a huge contribution to GDP going forward in Q1 and Q2 of 2010. GDP could again surprise to the upside.

My mea culpa on forecast herding

All of this suggests the economy has been growing since the beginning of Summer. In the early Spring, I indicated that jobless claims were peaking (which added to my stock market bullishness at the time). This call turns out to have been accurate. However, at the time, this post produced very negative sentiments, albeit more from readers on Naked Capitalism than Credit Writedowns – in my opinion because most people erroneously extrapolate a current trend into the future (see my reaction to this from a post weeks later, “Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere”)

Nevertheless, a piece from NBER guru Robert Gordon that I reported demonstrated to me that I was not alone in seeing the trend reversal in jobless claims. Eventually, in May I indicated that the jobless claims data were pointing to an imminent recovery and remarked that the data had usually been fairly accurate in the past.

And for the record, I have said I see a recovery happening probably in Q4 2009 or Q1 2010 (see my post “The Fake Recovery”).

The real question is how robust a recovery are we going to have and this is directly related to why the jobless claims series has been sending a false signal.  Now, initial claims has been sending a recovery signal since January. Yet, continuing claims continued to rise more quickly until last week.  In the past, one had seen these two series as harbingers of imminent recovery.  But, I am talking Q4 here.  Why? Deleveraging.

In the end, consumers are going to be forced to reduce debt and save more in this more cautious financial environment.  Team Obama does seem intent on re-kindling animal spirits but the personal savings rate has gone up nonetheless.  This will be a drag on GDP growth going forward and means that the economy’s rebound will be more tenuous and slower to develop.  In my view, this means recovery will be delayed and once it gets going it will be weak.  The potential for a double dip is very high.

So, to be clear, first derivatives are starting to turn up and since recession is a first derivative event, we are probably going to see an end to this recession soon enough.  But, with structural problems still remaining, the U.S. economy will be weak for a long time to come.

Why do I bring this up?  Because, despite the data pointing to recovery, I decided the start of the recovery process would be delayed until this quarter or Q1 2010 by consumers repairing their balance sheets – and, in retrospect, in part due to a desire to avoid being too far out of step with the consensus.

I must admit to falling prey to forecast herding, something I talked about in June (admittedly without mentioning my own culpability which I should have done). At the time, I said:

No one wants to go out on a limb with a bold call only to see this prediction proved wrong.  If one fails, it is better to fail conventionally.  The necessary corollary of that statement is this: market forecasters and analysts play it safe by making sure their forecasts are not often far from the consensus forecast.  Think of the consensus forecast as an anchor which restricts the outlook of any individual forecaster afraid of failing unconventionally.

In Roubini’s case – and this logic also applies to media darlings like Meredith Whitney – it does NOT pay to up the ante.  What Faber is saying is that they have already benefitted from the bold and unconventional contrarian market call they initially made.  There is little payoff and much risk from continuing on that path.  A bearish analyst who misses the turn gets the stick.  Just ask the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman.

Roubini is not running with the herd

The one thing that makes me think about my error in tweaking my bullishness has to do with Nouriel Roubini. In the quote above, I said he has little incentive to double down on a bearish forecast at this point in time.  Both he and Meredith Whitney, two voices of caution leading into crisis, have been much more upbeat of late. Are they hedging as I did?  Hard to say.

But, with Nouriel Roubini’s recent FT Op-Ed, this is over. Roubini decried the easy money policy he believes is leading to a dollar carry trade and an increase of risk appetite across a wide variety of asset classes. He believes this experiment will not end well. I share his view.

Roubini, in going public in this way, is officially departing from a more hedged nuanced position he has been using over the last few months as the recovery has taken hold. Yves Smith says:

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp.

I applaud him for coming out with this piece and suggest you read it because it may come to be seen as the make or break call in determining his reputation as economic soothsayer.

Recovery is happening, but watch asset prices

For my part, I will look to avoid a repeat of the ‘jobless claims incident.’ Hopefully, I have done by writing my depression post at the beginning of last month, which outlines my view that we are in a cyclical recovery in the middle of a longer-term depression.

I would like to make some amendments to my thinking at the time though. First and foremost, I have come to doubt whether we are seeing a balance sheet recession right now. One reason I am writing this post is because the ISM manufacturing data turned up in May at precisely the same time that the credit revulsion-induced savings rate turned down. Translation: there is no balance sheet recession in the U.S., at least not yet. (see my post “Americans are not increasing savings”). This means the recovery could surprise to the upside. Moreover, the ISM data point to potential upside surprises from inventories, leading to an even more robust outlook.

What I believe is happening has much to do with Nouriel Roubini’s comments. U.S. economic policy is geared toward reproducing the status quo ante via reflation of asset prices (something Bill Gross thinks is the right policy and even Dilbert has made fun of). The policy has been wildly successful so far, with asset prices bubbling over globally. I have called this the fake recovery, but as recently as September I was on the fence about how much uptick we were to get. I never dreamed the recovery process could be so robust given the headwinds we faced.

However, reflation has also given investors a license to take risk. Look at the return of John Meriwether as a telltale sign.  Reflation policies are inflating assets far and wide: European high yield, American high yield, Swedish house prices, London house prices, Chinese property prices, and inducing reckless lending. The list is endless. Even Bill Gross’ piece pointed to inflated prices, a view shared by Jeremy Grantham.

The long and short is we are seeing another asset bubble inflating courtesy of easy money. While Morgan Stanley worries easy money will lead to inflation, former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie fears this will end in a double dip. To make matters worse, there is a dollar carry trade now spreading a liquidity seeking return dynamic abroad. This is the additional risk of which Roubini writes, believing it could precipitate another crunch or crash. Ironically, a strong recovery is not necessarily bullish.

Is a double dip or crash a baseline scenario? No, not necessarily – but it is increasingly likely. So, as bullish as I believe the data are, I am more worried about a bad outcome, not less.

Related posts:

• ISM shows manufacturing sector close to recovery
• Both initial claims and continuing claims now pointing to recovery
• Jobless claims may signal the end is near
• ISM: September manufacturing data disappoint; market sells off
• Morgan Stanley: Recession will ‘end by mid-to-late summer’

Former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie joins other famed prognosticators like Nouriel Roubini in worrying about an incipient asset bubble. The Rosetta Stone Advisors board member sees the huge increase in money supply created by central banks as fuel to an asset bubble fire. He even goes so far as to call the central banks ‘arsonists.’

The financial crisis exposed gross inefficiencies in the massive amounts of money financial institutions received from central banks. Supplying so much money to the same people who caused the crisis — and with the same incentives — does not feel right. The argument in favor of this policy is that, when the house is on fire, you have to do whatever to extinguish the fire and find the culprit later. The problem is that, in this case, the arsonists have been asked to put out the fire. How can we be sure they won’t start another fire?

Most argue that the answer is not to limit the money supply but to reform the financial system. In this way, future demand for money would be efficient. But so far, no corrective reforms have been implemented in response to the financial crisis. Why? Because the global financial system became so big over the past decade that it has co-opted central banks, legislators and entire governments. Any reforms that do come will not address the main factors leading to the current crisis.

Even the best reforms will never resolve a problem based on the fact that financial professionals generally risk other people’s money: They get big rewards when bets go right and don’t have to pay when bets go wrong. The problem with this incentive system suggests the global financial system is structurally biased toward taking on more risk than what would be taken in an efficient market. The only way to counter this is for central banks to limit money supplies. Asset inflation over the past 10 years and the catastrophe incurred when it burst lend credibility to this argument.

Xie sees stagflation as a threat and a double dip coming, as a result. He warns bond market speculators, “you’ll want to run for your life” when the bond market tanks.

A word of caution for all would-be speculators: You’ll want to run for your life as soon as the bond market takes a big fall. And the case for a double dip in 2010 is already strong. Inventory restocking and fiscal stimuli are behind the current economic recovery, and when these run out of steam next year, the odds are quite low that western consumers will take over. High unemployment rates will keep incomes too weak to support spending. And consumers are unlikely to borrow and spend again.

Many analysts argue that, as long as unemployment rates are high, more stimuli should be applied. As I have argued before, a supply-demand mismatch rather than demand weakness per se is the main reason for high unemployment. More stimuli would only trigger inflation and financial instability.

The post is very entertaining, if scary. (“monetary growth is being used to support leverage, mostly in the financial sector.”) While I am not in the stagflation camp, I agree that money supply growth is fuelling unsustainable increases in asset prices globally. Xie concentrates on China where retail investors dominate the equity markets, operating under the assumption that government will not let assets prices fall. My view is that prices must eventually fall if they are too high relative to the income streams that underpin that price. The resultant crash in prices will be deflationary. Xie believes that this discrepancy between price and value will be closed via inflation.

However, you see it, I recommend reading this article. It asks some very important questions for investors, businesspeople and economists alike, the most important of which is a variation on theme of the Stephen Roach article:

While workers and businesses struggle, asset players are reaping substantial paper profits again. As the central bank’s monetary policy is behind the asset boom, we should ask whether the policy is achieving its goal by helping the real economy, or whether it is just helping speculators and hoping they have something left over for the real economy.

Much, much more here.

Related posts:

• Quote of the day: William White and inflation
• The inflation – deflation debate redux
• Inflation: The strategy that dare not state its name
• Central banks will face a Scylla and Charybdis flation challenge for years
• Is this the way to fight inflation?

Nouriel Roubini seems to think so. In remarks quoted via Bloomberg, he called the enormous increase in asset prices “the mother of all carry trades.”

Investors worldwide are borrowing dollars to buy assets including equities and commodities, fueling “huge” bubbles that may spark another financial crisis, said New York University professor Nouriel Roubini.

“We have the mother of all carry trades,” Roubini, who predicted the banking crisis that spurred more than $1.6 trillion of asset writedowns and credit losses at financial companies worldwide since 2007, said via satellite to a conference in Cape Town, South Africa. “Everybody’s playing the same game and this game is becoming dangerous.”

If you recall, this is the same trade the world’s punters were putting on via the Japanese yen when the Japanese were pumping out huge amounts of liquidity earlier in this decade.  The yen’s real effective exchange rate only hit post Plaza Accord trade-weighted lows in 2007 when the carry trade was all the rage and just when all hell was breaking loose in subprime.

Reuters said then:

The yen’s real trade-weighted value slipped in October as the Federal Reserve’s interest rate cuts gave a boost to global stock markets and prompted investors to sell the Japanese currency in carry trades.

Bank of Japan data on Friday showed its index of the yen’s real effective exchange rate fell 1.9 percent in October to 96.7 JPYEEXR=J.

The retreat in the BOJ’s REER index took it closer to a 22-year low of 92.8 hit in both June and July, when the currency was sliding as carry trades flourished.

That was the weakest since the September 1985 Plaza Accord in which the five biggest industrialised countries agreed to depreciate the dollar against the German mark and the yen via intervention, aiming to correct the giant U.S. trade deficit at the time.

For the year the yen’s real value has lost 3.6 percent despite periodic bouts of strength as the credit market crunch this year and worries about the U.S. economy prompted market players to unwind risky carry trades.

The yen has suffered in the past few years from carry trades in which investors use the low-yielding Japanese currency as a cheap source of funds to buy higher-yielding currencies or rising assets, such as stocks or commodities.

My view has been that the Japanese yen carry trade was a major contributor to asset bubbles globally as the Bank of Japan’s excess liquidity found its way to other asset markets via the carry trade.  Last August, in my post “Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck” I also pointed to the yen carry trade as a major factor in the Internet bubble. And I certainly see it as a major factor in this decade’s housing bubbles.

Now the U.S. dollar is the carry trade currency of choice, with zero percent interest rates funding asset purchases globally. This play is certainly pumping up all manner of asset prices. But as with the yen carry trade before it, I do not see this ending well.

Roubini takes a similar tack:

The risk is that we are planting the seeds of the next financial crisis,” said Roubini, chairman of New York-based research and advisory service Roubini Global Economics. “This asset bubble is totally inconsistent with a weaker recovery of economic and financial fundamentals.

Source

Roubini Says Carry Trades Fueling ‘Huge’ Asset Bubble – Bloomberg

Related posts:

• China slams U.S. for inflating global asset prices via carry trade
• U.S. Bailout: the mother of all carry trades?
• Hong Kong: “America is doing exactly what Japan did last time”
• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Chart of the day: Aussie – Yen cross

Bill Gross has a must-read piece out for his monthly Investment Outlook called “Midnight Candles.” He begins the piece with allusions to his advancing years (Gross is now 65) and the mortality he feels because of it – pretty sobering stuff. gross then abruptly segues into his investment outlook, leaving one with the distinct impression he is suggesting there is something ephemeral in the global financial system’s status quo ante.

To solve the problem, Gross suggests continuing artificially low interest rates to maintain pumped up asset prices. This is a perverse conclusion I reject categorically. But his analysis leading up to this is right on the money. And the line he takes to make the transition to his thinking is right out of Credit Writedowns’ playbook.

I’ll jump straight into a discussion of why in a New Normal economy (1) almost all assets appear to be overvalued on a long-term basis, and, therefore, (2) policymakers need to maintain artificially low interest rates and supportive easing measures in order to keep economies on the “right side of the grass.”

Let me start out by summarizing a long-standing PIMCO thesis: The U.S. and most other G-7 economies have been significantly and artificially influenced by asset price appreciation for decades. Stock and home prices went up – then consumers liquefied and spent the capital gains either by borrowing against them or selling outright. Growth, in other words, was influenced on the upside by leverage, securitization, and the belief that wealth creation was a function of asset appreciation as opposed to the production of goods and services. American and other similarly addicted global citizens long ago learned to focus on markets as opposed to the economic foundation behind them. How many TV shots have you seen of people on the Times Square Jumbotron applauding the announcement of the latest GDP growth numbers or job creation? None, of course, but we see daily opening and closing market crescendos of jubilant capitalists on the NYSE and NASDAQ cheering the movement of markets – either up or down. My point: Asset prices are embedded not only in our psyche, but the actual growth rate of our economy. If they don’t go up – economies don’t do well, and when they go down, the economy can be horrid.

This, my friends, is the dreaded asset-based economy. It is the same financial model which has led us to mountains of debt and repeated bubbles and extreme financial instability.  I have said in the past that aggregate debt levels as measured by ratios like debt to nominal GDP should remain constant to the degree that the capital used to generate that growth is efficiently allocated. However, we have seen a ballooning in debt, which suggests that we need far more capital to generate a unit of growth than we did a generation ago.  Gross makes similar arguments, focusing instead on assets instead of debt (liabilities).

First of all, assets didn’t always appreciate faster than GDP. For the first several decades of this history, economic growth, not paper wealth, was king. We were getting richer by making things, not paper. Beginning in the 1980s, however, the cult of the markets, which included the development of financial derivatives and the increasing use of leverage, began to dominate. A long history marred only by negative givebacks during recessions in the early 1990s, 2001–2002, and 2008–2009, produced a persistent increase in asset prices vs. nominal GDP that led to an average overall 50-year appreciation advantage of 1.3% annually. That’s another way of saying you would have been far better off investing in paper than factories or machinery or the requisite components of an educated workforce. We, in effect, were hollowing out our productive future at the expense of worthless paper such as subprimes, dotcoms, or in part, blue chip stocks and investment grade/government bonds.

Again, these themes echo something i recently posted on, namely the hollowing out of America’s middle class from downsizing and outsourcing. See my post “A conversation with Stephen Roach on Charlie Rose “ in which the juxtaposition between a Stephen Roach interview circa 1996 and one from this past week makes plain the long-term problem.

Gross comes to a very different conclusion to all of this than I come to.  He says, faced with a potential collapse in nominal GDP growth, the answer is to feed the patient more of the asset price elixir to wean him off his drugs. Cold turkey would lead to depression (i.e. death – that makes the tie to his lead in plain).

This is where it gets tricky, however, because policymakers, (The Fed, the Treasury, the FDIC) recognize the predicament, maybe not with the same model or in the same magnitude, but they recognize that asset prices must be supported in order to generate positive future nominal GDP growth somewhere close to historical norms. The virus has infected far too many parts of the economy’s body, for far too long, to go cold turkey. The Japanese example over the past 15 years is an excellent historical reference point. Their quantitative easing and near-0% short-term interest rates eventually arrested equity and property market deflation but at much greater percentage losses, which produced an economy barely above the grass as opposed to buried six feet under. The current objective of global policymakers is to do likewise – keep the capitalistic patient alive through asset price support, but at an “old normal” pace if possible, six feet or 6% in U.S. nominal GDP terms above the grass.

My conclusion is different. I have said before that I also think cold turkey would lead to disaster (see my post “Confessions of an Austrian economist), but I am under no illusion that we need to keep supporting the asset-based economy indefinitely.  Our goal should be to use government stimulus as cover to eliminate malinvestments and downsize bloated sectors of the economy like financial services. This is one reason I am in favor of introducing a comprehensive too-big-to-fail (TBTF) resolution process to allow big banks to fail and breaking up TBTF financial institutions.

Going back to Gross, he concludes that his policy preference for maintaining is supportive of asset prices in the medium-term but not so supportive that we are going back to the gold rush of yesteryear.

If policy rates are artificially low then bond investors should recognize that artificial buyers of notes and bonds (quantitative easing programs and Chinese currency fixing) have compressed almost all interest rates. But while this may support asset prices – including Treasury paper across the front end and belly of the curve, at the same time it provides little reward in terms of future income. Investors, of course, notice this inevitable conclusion by referencing Treasury Bills at .15%, two-year Notes at less than 1%, and 10-year maturities at a paltry 3.40%. Absent deflationary momentum, this is all a Treasury investor can expect. What you see in the bond market is often what you get. Broadening the concept to the U.S. bond market as a whole (mortgages + investment grade corporates), the total bond market yields only 3.5%. To get more than that, high yield, distressed mortgages, and stocks beckon the investor increasingly beguiled by hopes of a V-shaped recovery and “old normal” market standards. Not likely, and the risks outweigh the rewards at this point.

While I disagree with Gross, his is a very good piece if you want to know which way the wind is blowing. I have linked to it below.

Enjoy.

Source

Midnight Candles – Bill Gross, Pimco

Related posts:

• Bill Gross: Fed on hold through 2010
• Gross isn’t buying corporates, high yield or equities even with zero rates
• Bill Gross: “Stop the decline in asset prices”
• Bill Gross: the new normal means investors should shun risk
• Bill Gross: “Staying Rich in the New Normal”

There is mounting evidence that bubbles are forming again everywhere across the globe as easy money makes itself felt in asset prices. The latest evidence comes from Sweden where Europe’s lowest home loan rates have pushed up the price of residential property.

At issue is the extremely loose monetary policy in Sweden that is an outgrowth of both recession in Sweden and a massive exposure by Swedish banks to the Baltics which are presently in depression. Sweden’s central bank, the Riksbank, has cut interest rates to near zero and is charging banks interest to keep reserves on deposit. Meanwhile, the bank has also embarked on a policy of quantitative easing in order to get credit flowing again.

In my July post, “Sweden: negative interest rates and quantitative easing,” when Sweden went negative on interest rates, I wrote:

Pretty aggressive plan, if you ask me. Will it work, though?

Well, first of all, most every major central bank in the world, certainly the biggest: the Americans, the Eurozone, the British, the Swiss, and the Japanese, have rates near zero and are printing money.  The world is awash in money and the incentive to borrow is huge.  So, is the Swedish announcement qualitatively different?  On some level, it is not.  Nevertheless, it is the most aggressive policy and the fact that they are charging negative interest rates for deposits is unprecedented.  This does make events in Sweden something to watch.

So, if you have been watching, what you have seen is a financial sector which is still critically weak – so much so that the federal government has been having secret meetings with the banks to get together a game plan in a worst-case scenario in Latvia, the worst of the lot in the Baltics.

But, even so, while the real economy is in recession, one has to conclude that the aggressively expansionary policy by Sweden’s central bank is reflating asset prices in a major way. Experts are now sounding the alarm as house prices hit new highs.

Below is a translation of yesterday’s Dagens Nyheter article reporting on the warning.

Experts warn: Sweden risks housing bubble

Europe’s cheapest home loans, tax cuts and a continued housing shortage. These are some of the reasons house prices are rising to new record highs in Sweden – right in the middle of a raging recession. Now a growing number of experts warn of a new housing bubble.

Swedish mortgage customers are sitting pretty. The Riksbank’s key interest rate of  0.25 percent is unique in Europe. By comparison, the corresponding rate is 1.25 percent in Norway and Denmark, 1.0 percent in the euro area and 0.5 percent in Britain.

Variable interest rates in Sweden are currently about 1.6 percent. As DN Economics related a couple of weeks ago, short-term rates are 2-3 percentage points higher in countries such as Denmark, Germany and Britain.

Swedish low-cost mortgages are the main cause of the housing rally. House prices fell sharply after investment bank Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy caused the financial crisis in September last year. But since the start of the year, they have risen again. Prices of flats are now 5 percent higher than a year ago. And house prices have gone up 2 percent.

Reduced income tax and the abolished property tax have also contributed to the housing rally. Likewise concerning the shortage of housing.

In 2008, there was construction of 21 500 apartments in Sweden, which was considered low. This year, new construction is expected to decline by one third, according to Swedish Construction Federation.

Six months ago many experts warned that rising unemployment could lead to falling prices in the housing market. Now they are warning of a housing bubble instead.  Nordea Chief Economist Annika Winsth has repeatedly warned of inflated prices, and SEB’s CEO Annika Falkengren said recently that she felt that both house prices and the stock market have risen too fast in the past year.

In its monetary policy report last Thursday, the Riksbank wrote, "there is evidence that house prices at present are slightly above the level that is sustainable". It also speaks to the dangers of "over-optimistic expectations about interest rates" and "more expansive lending".

Despite the warnings the banks’ barometers tell of housing prices that will continue to rise in Sweden for many months to come.

I see this ending in a very bad way.

Source

Experter varnar: Sverige riskerar bostadsbubbla – Dagens Nyheter

Related posts:

• Property more overvalued in Sweden than in US
• Denmark: the latest victim of falling house prices
• Estonia and Latvia: headed for the rails
• House prices in the U.K. up for first time since Oct 2007
• Nationwide: UK house prices down 14.6%

Morgan Stanley has an interesting piece out this morning called Debtflation. In the past, they have raised alarm bells over what they see as embedded inflation in the loose monetary policy presently being followed by most central banks.  This particular piece focuses not on a general potential for inflation, but the possibility that central banks will explicitly target higher inflation in order to reduce high debt burdens – a policy advocated by Kenneth Rogoff.

The recent downturn has called many of the old certainties into question. In the world of central banking, a prominent victim of the downturn is the – previously orthodox – view that central banks should neglect asset prices when conducting monetary policy. Yet more recently, another major tenet of central bank doctrine is being challenged – the view that monetary policy should not be used to help out governments under debt pressure. We think that the risk of independent central banks creating some amount of (controlled) inflation going forward cannot quite be dismissed out of hand.

We have flagged inflation as a major long-term risk going forward: if the recovery is as tepid as we expect, central banks will be inclined to err on the side of caution when it comes to withdrawing the unprecedented conventional and unconventional monetary stimulus. But we believe that there will be a familiar additional source of inflation risk – the mounting public debt burden.  There is no doubt that, last winter, with the global economy slumping, central bankers welcomed the help they got from hugely expansionary fiscal policy. However, the result has been a massive increase in developed countries’ public indebtedness – the extent of the debt build-up in some countries resembles the consequences of wars. Historically, developed economies have escaped high debt by growing out of it rather than inflating it away or defaulting (with the notable exception of Germany and Japan). Growth after World War II for example was fast, not least because war-ravaged economies were rebuilding their capital stocks.

This time around, however, eroding the debt through faster growth may not be an option. Instead, growth in many developed countries is likely to slow significantly going forward as labour forces shrink due to the demographic transition. Worse, population ageing will impose added pressure on public expenditure through higher pensions and healthcare costs. If outgrowing the debt is unlikely, and if governments lack the resolve to cut spending and/or raise taxes sufficiently, the remaining options are default and inflation. No policymaker in the developed world – and, by now, few in the developing world – would want to countenance default as an option. This leaves inflation. The question is familiar: could central bankers be forced to engineer inflation – ‘monetise the debt’? Almost all developing world central banks are independent from an institutional point of view. Indeed, one of the main reasons for setting up independent monetary authorities is precisely to avoid pressure from governments to inflate away the debt. So, central banks cannot be forced by their governments to generate inflation (unless governments were prepared to change the statutes of their monetary authorities; this would in most cases require going to the legislature).

With governmental coercion being unfeasible, is there a possibility that independent central bankers might generate inflation out of their own volition? If nothing else, they would take a big gamble with their hard-won credibility. And history teaches us that the reason behind most, if not all, episodes of very high inflation has been monetary expansion to finance government expenditure or reduce debt (see "Could Hyperinflation Happen Again?" The Global Monetary Analyst, January 28, 2009).

Morgan Stanley is saying in effect that it fears central banks inflating away private and public debt burdens by printing more money. It is not clear that quantitative easing really is inflationary (at least in the short-term). For this policy to actually produce inflation in an environment that is geared more toward deleveraging, we will need serious asset price inflation to spill over into the real economy – and this would require increases in asset prices that would be extremely destabilizing when the inevitable bust occurs. Most likely an asset bubble bursting would tip the global economy back into deflation. This is the Scylla and Charybdis problem I outlined in June. So, I am not sure central banks could pull this off even if they wanted to.

More from Morgan Stanley at the link below.

Source

Debtflation – Morgan Stanley

Related posts:

• Quote of the day: William White and inflation
• Are central banks independent actors?
• Stephen Roach: Downturn in Asia less severe, but recovery later
• The inflation – deflation debate redux
• Emerging Markets will be tested by inflation

John Meriwether, the 62-year old former Salomon bond trader and LTCM wizard is back for, what is this, his fourth go round.

For those of you who don’t remember the 1980s, John Meriwether was the biggest of the ‘big swinging dicks’ on Wall Street, leading Salomon Brothers to huge profits in its fixed income division. Lionized in the eponymous book “Liar’s Poker” and inspiration for Bonfire of the vanities, Meriwether and Salomon’s rise marked the change from a bulge bracket culture dominated by deal makers and IBD (Investment banking Division) white shoe bankers to one dominated by the foul-mouthed traders and math geek quants of fixed income.  The change at Goldman Sachs from a firm dominated by IBD to one dominated by trading is testament to this. Unfortunately for Meriwether, his career path since reaching the top has been rather rocky.

First there was the enormous Treasury bond scandal, in which Meriwether subordinate Paul Mozer put in fake Treasury bids on behalf of clients in an attempt to corner the market for on-the-run securities. Lax oversight got Meriwether a $50,000 fine and Salomon a $290 million fine, the largest ever to that date. Salomon head John Gutfreund resigned and Warren Buffett came in to serve as Chairman (Phibro which was recently offloaded to Occidental Petroleum by Citigroup is a Salomon Brothers company, by the way).  Meriwether left.

Soon, Meriwether was back at it at Long-Term Capital Management, the Greenwich-based hedge fund he founded in 1993 and which was famously leveraged 100 to 1, not including derivatives exposure of $1 trillion on a capital base of $5 billion. This company produced spectacular 40+% profits year after year before going spectacularly bust in 1998 after Russia devalued its currency and defaulted on its debt (see Frontline’s recent video which has a part on LTCM).

Meriwether miraculously was able to start again, literally the next year, helped by a bubble in shares which increased appetite for risk. He started JWM Partners in 1999. After years of gains, this fund too produced staggering losses (44% last year) and was liquidated.

Now that shares are up some 60% in US markets, guess what, John W. Meriwether is back… and he’s taking investors.  This one is called JM Advisors Management, also based in Greenwich.

The fund is expected use the same strategy as both LTCM and JWM to make money: so-called relative value arbitrage, a quantitative investment strategy Mr Meriwether pioneered when he led the hugely successful bond arbitrage group at Salomon Brothers in the 1980s.

The strategy, described by the Nobel Prize-winning economist Myron Scholes as being akin to a giant vacuum cleaner “sucking up nickels from all over the world”, can be highly successful in periods following market dislocations.

Relative value trades profit by betting on unusual pricing relationships between securities, anticipating a return to an historically modelled “normal” state between them.

Traders say the strategy has the potential to deliver huge returns in the current market, with many banks’ proprietary trading desks having scaled back their operations and far fewer hedge funds in existence.

I bet the money is pouring in.

This post is filed under the tags hedge funds and financial bubbles.

Sources

Meriwether setting up new hedge fund – Sam Jones, FT (also with the FT Alphaville Team)

Meriwether – FT Lex

Related posts:

• Reflation watch hedge fund edition
• Quote of the day: trickier than LTCM
• Hedge funds collapsing
• Hedge Funds
• Hedge Fund Panic

Further proof that the reflationary efforts of policy makers is taking hold comes from London in the form of record high house prices.  The Guardian reports:

Property asking prices in London have broken through the record high set in November 2007 as the drought of homes for sale around the country continues to distort the market. New research out today shows that the average asking price in London jumped 6.5% to £461,157 in the four weeks to 10 October, sailing through the high of £412,731 set in November two years ago.

The survey by the property website Rightmove also shows that asking prices in England and Wales are now higher than a year ago, after climbing 2.8% in the past month.

Back in March, when the global economy was flat on its back, I suspected that policy makers saw only one way out of this mess: another asset bubble.

Their efforts point in four directions:

1. Increase asset prices. If the assets on the balance sheets of banks are falling, then why not buy them at higher prices and stop the bloodletting? This is the purpose of the TALF, Obama’s mortgage relief program and the original purpose of the TARP.
2. Increase asset prices. If assets on the balance sheet are falling, why not eliminate the accounting rules that are making them fall? Get rid of marking-to-market. This is the purpose of the newly proposed FASB accounting rule change.
3. Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not reduce interest rates so that the debt payments which are crushing debtors ability to finance those assets are reduced? This is why short-term interest rates are near zero.
4. Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not create Public-Private partnerships to buy up those assets at prices which reflect their longer-term value? This is what Geithner’s Capital Assistance Program is designed to do.

So I lied, there is only one direction the government is headed: increase asset prices (or, at least keep them from falling). Read White House Economic Advisor Larry Summers’ recent prepared remarks to see what I mean. (Summers on How to Deal With a ‘Rarer Kind of Recession’ – WSJ)

The same was certainly true in Britain as well. With share prices up well over 50% and property again at a new high in London, the government has succeeded beyond anyone’s wildest dreams.

Mind you, the real economy is still in a shambles, with manufacturing taking the slowdown especially hard.  But, the employment market is not nearly as dire and the economy seems to be leaving recession.

Things are a lot better in the City than in the real world because the increase in asset prices is a huge boon for the banks. Expect bankers in the City to reap the benefits in the form of record pay packages this year.

Unfortunately, if you are a renter looking to get onto the property ladder, it is going to be rough sledding.

Related posts:

• Random Musing: London house prices
• If the UK economy is still in recession, why are London house prices hitting new records?
• Nationwide: U.K. house prices down 16.6%
• US Home prices down 16% over last year
• Denmark’s house prices fall

The following post is from Stratfor via John Mauldin, who is a Best-Selling author and recognized financial expert. He is also editor of the free Thoughts From the Frontline that goes to over 1 million readers each week. For more information on John or his FREE weekly economic letter go to: http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/learnmore.

I think you will find this post reminiscent of Hugh Hendry’s YouTube video which I highlighted in July.

Today I offer you an insightful look at China’s real estate market – a "burgeoning bubble" that deserves a close eye as the possibility for breaking increases. Remember the chaos in Japan after their own housing dreamscape got violently yanked back to earth? As investors, we have to recognize opportunities – and know what to avoid. With a global economic crisis – and now surging housing prices in China – investors in any global market need to keep watch on political and economic developments around the world.

Today’s analysis comes courtesy my friends at STRATFOR, a global intelligence company. They provide unique and on-the-money analysis and forecasts on all things global, essential for any alternative investment strategy. They’ve got a free newsletter as well, for which I encourage you to sign up by clicking here – so you’re not limited to my caprice.

John Mauldin
Editor, Outside the Box

The China Files (Special Project): Real Estate

October 13, 2009 | 1149 GMT

Summary

The real estate market in China, particularly the residential side, is a burgeoning bubble that is growing bigger and more breakable by the day. Land and housing prices were already rising steadily when Beijing’s stimulus package hit the sector in early 2009. Now prices are surging, with developers, bureaucrats and investors cashing in while urban Chinese – once encouraged to invest in home ownership by the central government – become less and less able to buy.

Editor’s Note: This analysis is part of a series that explores China’s industry, finance and statistics.

Related Special Topic Page – The China Files (Special Project)

PDF Version: Click here to download a PDF of this report

On Sept. 10, China Overseas Land and Investment, a Hong Kong-listed company and a subsidiary of state-owned China State Construction Engineering Corp., purchased a prime piece of real estate in the Putuo district in downtown Shanghai. The company paid 7.006 billion yuan ($1.026 billion) for the undeveloped property, which will amount to an average of 22,409.3 yuan ($3,283.9) per square meter of floor space (just in land costs) once the designed residential building is constructed.

The purchase created China’s newest "land king," a term for the real estate developer who pays the highest price for a piece of real estate during a land auction. And 7.006 billion yuan was the highest price ever paid for a piece of Chinese real estate for any purpose – residential or commercial. The milestone is a result of an increasingly intense competition for land in major cities that began early in the year, when Beijing began distributing stimulus money to various industries – including the real estate sector – to sustain the economy. As a result, land prices have soared throughout China. And with increasing speculative investment in residential real estate, the market faces a surging bubble that jeopardizes the country’s long-term economic development.

Since 1998, real estate investment in China has accounted for more than 10 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP), compared to only 3 percent to 5 percent in the United States. Such investment is also closely associated with many other industries, such as construction and finance, and it provides an abundance of jobs. Therefore, it is seen as a critical pillar of China’s economy and enjoys favorable policies from the government and state-owned banks (more than 70 percent of real estate investment in China comes from bank loans). At the same time, real estate developers, local government officials and investors have escalated housing prices across the country by acquiring massive land holdings, limiting the supply and inflating prices, creating a real estate bubble that is not sustainable in the long run.

The bubble has grown mainly on the residential side of the market, where there is more demand and higher profits to be made. However, while fewer developers and investors have been chasing nonresidential projects, Beijing’s 4 trillion yuan ($586 billion) stimulus package in early 2009 has generated more interest and activity in the commercial side. Indeed, there are signs that commercial real estate may also be headed for a bubble, and STRATFOR will be watching the situation closely.

Origins of the Bubble

Since 1978, China’s pace of urbanization has increased dramatically, with the number of middle-size and large cities (those having nonagricultural populations of more than 200,000) growing rapidly. Beginning in 1985, economic reforms implemented in urban areas to make China’s planned economy more market-oriented added even more momentum to the real estate boom, with real estate investment increasing by 71 percent by 1987. The government’s macroeconomic policy of monetary belt-tightening helped cool this overheated market, which was further tempered by the government’s continuing to provide housing for state employees (fu li fen fang, or "welfare housing").

However, when the state significantly cut back on its welfare housing program in 1998, the Chinese perception of personal property changed, and this would have an important impact on the real estate sector. The government began this privatization process by making a private dwelling a "commodity" and granting the purchaser the right to own a newly built house for 70 years. (Likewise, the developer who buys the property on which residential or commercial buildings are to be constructed may own that property for 70 years.) Home ownership in China could now be a sound financial investment.

Thus, the residential real estate market would boom in almost every urban area in China – and particularly in the "first-tier" and "second-tier" cities (only Beijing, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Shanghai are in the first tier, with more than 20 cities, and mostly provincial capitals or coastal ports are in the second tier). But rising land prices would eventually put housing prices out of reach for the general public. In Dongguan, a coastal second-tier city in Guangdong province, land prices averaged 4,957 yuan ($726.42) per square meter in 2007, a more than 500 percent increase from 2003, while personal disposable income increased 24 percent during the same period (from 20,526 yuan [$3,008] to 27,025 yuan [$3,960] per year).

A 2006 survey conducted by the National Development and Reform Commission showed that the average ratio between housing prices and income was approaching 12:1 in many large and middle-size cities in China (in Beijing it had reached 27:1). Twelve to one is significantly higher than the World Bank’s suggested affordability ratio of 5:1 and the United Nations’ 3:1. The problem was compounded by the fact that, of the more than 80 percent of Chinese who owned their own homes in urban areas (generally considered cities with populations of more than 20,000), 54.1 percent were making monthly mortgage payments that constituted 20 percent to 50 percent of their monthly incomes.

The Recovery Bubble

Following a temporary drop toward the end of 2007, land prices rose steadily, then began surging again with Beijing’s stimulus package and a flood of easy credit in 2009. With much of this money flowing into the real estate sector, major beneficiaries included large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in speculative real estate and housing investment, contributing to the inflating bubble. Among the 10 highest-priced land purchases in major cities in the first half of 2009, 60 percent went to SOEs.

Paradoxically, as the global financial crisis continues, China sees little choice but to loosen its monetary policy even further, fearing the opposite would curtail economic growth and result in massive unemployment, which could lead to social instability. Beijing knows that one of the country’s underlying economic problems continues to be an overheated real estate market, but it also knows that the real long-term solution – limiting the flow of cash and credit – could have dire socio-economic ramifications. Meanwhile, real estate developers, government officials and investors continue to speculate on real estate, raising land and housing prices.

As housing prices continue to rise, a parallel trend is manifesting itself – rising vacancy rates in urban areas. A 2009 report by the Shanghai Yiju Real Estate Research Institute revealed that, by the end of 2008, the average vacancy rate for "commodity housing" (as opposed to welfare housing) in Beijing was 16.64 percent, and vacancies reached as high as 30 percent in some districts. Most of these vacant houses, however, are not unsold ones. They have been purchased by investors as speculative investments. While there are fewer and fewer ordinary people who can afford to buy houses, there is still excessive demand for investment housing – pressure that continues to drive up the prices.

This closed loop in the Chinese real estate market is facilitated by the country’s political and bureaucratic system. In China, all land is initially owned by the state, and local governments have the sole authority to sell it. And income from property taxes and land sales are a primary source of revenue for local jurisdictions. According to estimates by the State Council’s Development and Research Center, tax revenue from the land in some jurisdictions accounts for 40 percent of the local budget. Moreover, net income from land sales accounts for more than 60 percent of the local governments’ extra-budgetary revenue. The soft budget and lack of accountability to the people reinforces the local governments’ incentive to expand their real estate investments without much concern for cost or impact on public services.

Economic performance also is the prime prerequisite for bureaucratic advancement, which gives local officials the incentive to generate as much revenue as possible through land auctions. And this generally involves a level of collusion – and corruption – among government officials, real estate developers and investors.

One typical strategy is for a developer to buy a big chunk of urban land from the local government but leave the land undeveloped, or build on only a small portion of it, thereby keeping the housing supply limited. Despite various state policies to lower land prices in order to make homes more affordable, local government officials and real estate developers control the land auctions. When a lower sale price is dictated from above, it is easy enough for the local sponsors to officially deem the auction a failure. Even when the developer does build houses on the property, a speculative investor, working hand in hand with the developer and government officials, can bribe both parties to ensure that he can buy all the houses at a low volume price and keep them off the market, thereby maintaining a limited supply and high prices.

Another factor that enters the equation is a cultural one. The Chinese people generally prefer to buy new houses, as opposed to renting homes or buying secondary houses in which people have already lived. Indeed, in urban areas, marriage proposals often include a promise to buy a new commodity house. As a result, the secondary housing market remains very small in comparison (due also to fewer available bank loans for lived-in houses and the complicated process involved in transferring ownership).

All of these factors contribute to the burgeoning real estate bubble – and make it difficult to predict when that bubble will burst. With 70 percent of real estate investment in China coming from bank loans, a dramatic drop in land values could send shock waves throughout the economy. There are already signs of decline. In Shenzhen, one of China’s first-tier cities, real estate prices have been dropping for the past two years (30 percent for housing), and many developers and speculators have suffered great losses. The threat looms in other large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai and may be emerging in many second-tier cities as well.

Given the current global economy and the economic balancing act it must maintain domestically, Beijing has few good choices. It must keep enough cash flowing to maintain economic growth and social stability in the short term while tightening credit to avoid a tsunami of bad loans and a market collapse over the long term. Certainly, Beijing does not want to face the kind of collapse in the housing market that Japan experienced in the 1990s, which triggered a financial crisis and more than a decade of economic malaise.

But in China’s real estate, as in most sectors of this vast and complex land, implementing and enforcing prudent regulation has never been an easy task.

Related posts:

• Chinese stock market bubble inflating
• Spain: who is responsible for the property bubble?
• Beijing starts a ‘Buy China’ policy
• China is now on the same bubble path as Japan post-1987 crash
• Manhattan Q2 Apartment Sales down 22%

Below is a wide-ranging interview with Marc Faber over four videos on CNBC TV18 in India explaining view on inflation, currencies, commodities, stocks and more.

Asset-based economy. In general, he thinks we are in an inflationary environment, whereas I think that deleveraging is secular and means any inflation is only cyclical. But he shares my belief that zero interest rates induce money balances to move into consumption or into higher yielding assets. He believes this is a boon over the medium-term (if not the short-term or long-term) for financial assets, whether they be stocks, bonds, commodities, real estate or art. And it is something that will continue, he says. Faber believes Bernanke will be loath to raise rates aggressively given his prior statements and writings.

Currencies. Faber takes the view with which I agree that the Fed’s easy money policies after 1998 flooded the global economy, especially emerging economies with liquidity. This has led to asset bubbles.  Hong Kong residential real estate is one example he cites.  As a result, Faber thinks the U.S. dollar is no longer overvalued at present levels. A snapback rally for the dollar resulting from oversold levels would be bearish for asset markets. But, longer term, Faber thinks the dollar is weak.

Equities. There has been a huge rally everywhere.  He says he is not a buyer at these levels. However, as central banks are going to continue to print money, stocks could continue higher – but he would not bet on a blow off rally from these levels.

Commodities. Faber thinks zero rate levels makes it extremely difficult to value anything.  Pose the question: which would you rather own – the “US dollar at zero interest rates or a ton of gold or a ton of copper or a ton of crude oil?” Of course, commodities are supply constrained, whereas dollars are not, so there is a justification for buying them. But, he anticipates the commodity hoarding by China is about to end and that is bearish for industrial commodities as well as precious metals. As with other commodities, he thinks the huge run up in oil could induce a setback. Long run, he is an oil bull because of limited supply.

 Financial Crisis. He is disturbed by the fact that a crisis caused by excessive debt growth, especially as a result of Federal Reserve policy has been allowed to pass with the same players in control. He says enjoy the ride for now. Longer-term, this necessarily means the same bad policies will follow and it will lead to a system-wide financial collapse.

India. Faber is bullish longer-term. Short-term, there could be a correction. India is one of the best protected countries because of less vulnerability to the export sector. He also believes the Reserve Bank of India has one of the best monetary policies in the world – supervise the financial system closely, relatively tight, and mindful not just of core inflation but other price levels like asset prices.

(videos embedded below)

Related posts:

• Marc Faber says avoid financials and buy gold
• Marc Faber: "I don’t think that you’ll see gold below $1,000 per ounce probably ever"
• Marc Faber on CNBC: bearish on oil and India
• Marc Faber: I advise every American to hold his gold outside of the United States
• Marc Faber: “A huge move is coming in the dollar, in bonds and in equities” but…

Very funny. Hat tip Scott.

Related posts:

• Application for the Federal Bail Out Program, 2008-2009
• TurboTax: targetting ads to Obama’s team problems
• Must read books for a good laugh
• The U.S. Dollar circa 2005
• Saturday Night Live Grades the Stress Tests

Marshall Auerback pointed out a statement from Dallas Fed Chief Richard Fisher today that is not getting a lot of attention despite its importance.  He said:

I expect that when it comes time to tighten monetary policy, my colleagues and I will move with an alacrity that, if needed, will be equal in speed and intensity to that with which we pursued monetary accommodation.

This is extremely hawkish language from Fisher. If true, it would be an upward move more akin to 1993-1994 than to 2004-2007. If you recall, the Fed Funds rate bottomed at 3% in May 1993. The Fed then aggressively raised rates to 6% in the next two years. This was not the ”measured” interest-rate hike campaign that the Federal Reserve followed after the Dot.com bubble.

The mid-nineties rise in rates led to a major bust at investment banks which were long treasuries like Goldman Sachs and also led to the so-called Tequila crisis (see my write-up on this in a post called “1995.”). This was the first full blown financial crisis of the Greenspan era and it seems the lesson the Fed took from the event was that it needed an asymmetric monetary policy in which rate cuts are more aggressive and quicker than hikes.

We have seen the folly in this policy, euphemistically known as ‘the Greenspan Put’ as gigantic asset bubbles ballooned out of control following cuts in 1998-1999 and 2002-2003. Fisher, a well-known inflation hawk, might be speaking for himself.  Or he might be signaling there will be no Bernanke Put.

Source

Fisher Sees Limit to Fed’s ‘Life Support’ for Housing – Bloomberg

Related posts:

• Quote of the day – Richard Fisher, head of the Dallas Fed
• The unkindest cut: the BoE got it wrong
• The Fed leads a global rate cut by central banks
• BoE dilemma highlights difficulty of turning points
• Is the Fed just jawboning?

Following up on my “Sell equities” post, I want to highlight a factoid from today’s David Rosenberg’s Breakfast with Dave distribution.

Never before has the S&P 500 rallied 60% from a low in such a short time frame as six months. And never before have we seen the S&P 500 rally 60% over an interval in which there were 2.5 million job losses. What is normal is that we see more than two million jobs being created during a rally as large as this.

In fact, what is normal is for the market to rally 20% from the trough to the time the recession ends. By the time we are up 60%, the economy is typically well into the third year of recovery; we are not usually engaged in a debate as to what month the recession ended. In other words, we are witnessing a market event that is outside the distribution curve.

I had been pretty bullish in March and April.  But almost immediately, this rally just went straight up in a moon-shot kind of way that makes someone like me who is more oriented toward fundamentals a bit nervous. After months of wondering how long this thing could last, I’ve finally said sell.

I’m not saying that the rally can’t continue (after a correction).  That depends in part on the economy and reflation. What I am saying is that a two- or three-sigma move should have you asking yourself a lot of questions. And since this is a two- or three-sigma move to the upside, you should be taking profits, not chasing that last dollar.

The video below from 7 Sep with Cazenove’s Robin Griffiths gives one the bigger picture.  Going into treasuries is a flight to safety. Going into gold is the same. Notice that Griffiths dispels the notion that Gold is an inflation hedge alone.  In reality, it is a paper money hedge and its rise represents a fiat currency rejection as much as a portend of inflation.

Source

Breakfast with Dave, 18 Sep 2009 (PDF) – David Rosenberg, Gluskin Sheff

Related posts:

• Rosenberg thinks U.S. market may Test March lows
• Sell equities
• Overbought?
• Rosenberg: Market rally is just multiple expansion
• Rosenberg: Still a bear market rally

Marshall Auerback here. I have been posting at an interesting new site called New Deal 2.0. You may have seen Edward linking out to articles on the site.

Edward saw an article I wrote there recently and asked me to post it here as well to highlight a recurrent theme at Credit Writedowns – namely that economic recovery necessarily means a return to business as usual.

Please do comment.

The President has marked the anniversary of the demise of Lehman Brothers with a new speech designed to breathe new life into his financial reform proposals. But the Obama administration already forfeited its best chance to reform the banking system when the crisis was at its height.

For all of the lofty talk about establishing “the most ambitious overhaul of the financial system since the Great Depression”, Obama’s reforms amount to nothing more than a reshuffling of the deckchairs on the Titanic.

Why? Because Too big to fail (TBTF) banks have grown even more bloated in the past 2 years. And because leverage has increased across the board. Bank of America, the biggest of the “TBTF” institutions, now holds 12% of all US deposits. The top four (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo) now have 46% of the assets of all FDIC-insured banks, up from 37.7% a year ago. Goldman Sachs, the biggest securities firm before it was handed a bank charter, has plunged into even riskier business and upped its trading and investment profits by two-thirds over the past year.

Systemic banks benefit from implicit and explicit government backstops. But a resolution regime for all systemically large and complex institutions like Fannie and Freddie — arguably one of the most important measures– is stalling in Congress amid waning political support. And — surprise! – lobbyist are gearing up to fight the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, whose fate is unclear as the bill works its way through Congress.

We haven’t yet even determined who will be the systemic risk regulator. Could be the Fed. Or it could be the Systemic Risk Council (a new body proposed to keep an eye of financial markets ). Given the Federal Reserve’s dismal record in anticipating this crisis and promoting the wrong-headed economic models that blew up the bubble, it is extraordinary that we are even discussing the notion of providing the central bank with yet more power. But is a Systemic Risk Council really the answer? Why reinvent the wheel, when the obvious alternative is the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)?

Professor James Galbraith warns that the key ingredients in systemic risk regulation are accountability and supervision.

It would be all too easy for the Federal Reserve Board to open an internal Office of Systemic Risk Assessment, to staff it with mathematical risk modelers, and to let the matter rest there. Then, when the next crisis hits, the Fed would say that it was something ‘no one could have foreseen’ – just because their internal model-builders failed to foresee it. This is probably not the outcome Congress seeks…

….Essentially, the job is to recognize emerging patterns of dangerous behavior. This function is best taken on by an agency with experience, expertise, and focus on these functions, an agency with no record of regulatory capture or institutional identification with the interests of the regulated sector.

In Gailbraith’s view, the FDIC fits the bill. And he is right. The FDIC is the logical home for systemic regulation. Yet as far as we can see, Obama is not considering it in his proposals. Perhaps part of this reluctance reflects animus toward Sheila Bair, who is definitely not part of the “old boys’ network”. It also likely reflects the comfort level of Wall Street, given its incestuous relationship with the Fed, and the concomitant embrace by both groups of a like-minded market fundamentalist ideology.

Clearly a regulator should not be chummy with the entities it is charged with regulating. The FDIC is charged with taking over any bank it deems insolvent, and then either selling that bank, selling the bank’s assets, reorganizing the bank, or any other similar action that serves the public. This largely explains why the FDIC is not particularly beloved by Wall Street or Wall Street’s main benefactors in Washington DC.

Indeed, the TARP program was at least partially established to allow the US Treasury to subvert the role of the FDIC. By injecting equity in specific banks, the Treasury managed to keep them from being declared insolvent by the FDIC, and ostensibly allow them to continue to have sufficient capital to continue to lend. The end result? TARP entrenched the dominance of the largest financial institutions, preserving many which were de facto insolvent, at the expense of the better run local, community banks (which are in effect being penalized for the sins of Citi and Bank of America). The big bank problem is one of insolvency; further big banks cannot be and should not be saved. They do not hold the key to recovery; if anything, they are a barrier to sustainable recovery. Given a chance, they will try (in fact, ARE trying) to re-inflate the bubble conditions that led to this crisis. There is nothing in the proposed new regulatory framework which will prevent this.

Additionally, the history of banking crises suggest that the regulatory focus on the liability side of the banks’ balance sheets is faulty. There is much discussion of counter-cyclical capital requirements, but the reality is that capital standards and leverage ratios for financial institutions almost never work. They are always set so low that they allow leverage that would have been viewed as extreme as recently as 30 years ago. They are easy to scam through accounting fraud. When times get tough, the financial services industry demands (and usually receives) regulatory dispensation on flaky accounting, legalizing what would otherwise be blatant securities fraud.

U. S. banks are public/private partnerships, established for the public purpose of providing loans based on credit analysis. Supporting this type of lending on an ongoing, stable basis demands a source of funding that is not market dependent. All regulation, then, should proceed from a ‘public purpose’ standpoint and the regulatory focus should be on the asset side of the balance sheet. Banks should only be allowed to lend directly to borrowers, and then service and keep those loans on their own balance sheets. There is no further public purpose served by selling loans or other financial assets to third parties, but there are substantial real costs to government regarding the regulation and supervision of those activities. And there are severe consequences for failure to adequately regulate and supervise those secondary market activities as well.

Our key recommendations:

• Banks should not be allowed to have subsidiaries of any kind. No public purpose is served by allowing bank to hold any assets ‘off balance sheet.’ Banks should not be allowed to accept financial assets as collateral for loans. Forget about leverage ratios: no public purpose is ever served by financial leverage of any kind.

• Banks should not be allowed to buy (or sell) credit default insurance. The public purpose of banking as a public/private partnership is to allow the private sector to price risk, rather than have the public sector pricing risk through publicly owned banks.

If a bank instead relies on credit default insurance, it is transferring that pricing of risk to a third party, which is counter to the public purpose of the current public/private banking system. CDSs lead investors to be indifferent to a bankruptcy, and in many cases to push for it. Since they own a CDS, they will get their payoff, while negotiating a restructuring takes time and money. Why bother if you can collect immediately via the profits proceeds of a credit default swap? These “Frankenstein” products by all rights ought to be banned outright, but the most the Obama/Geithner reforms dare to propose is a clearinghouse system to reduce potential knock-on effects (systemic risk) from the failure of a large player. But the riskiest products are not standardized enough for a clearinghouse and therefore remain exposed to bilateral counterparty risk which regulators want to mitigate by imposing higher capital charges and disclosure of aggregate position holdings. Naturally, Wall Street opposes this.

The FDIC should be directed to examine the books of the largest insured banks to uncover all CDS contracts held. The gross positions should be netted out amongst these financial behemoths, canceling CDS contracts held on one another. CDS contracts with foreign banks should be unwound; the American taxpayer should not be in the business of bailing out non-US banks. In its examination, the FDIC will have to determine which of these banks are insolvent based on current market values-after netting positions. Those that are insolvent will be resolved. The ultimate objective must be to minimize the cost to FDIC and minimize impacts on the rest of the banking system. It will be necessary to cover some uninsured losses to other financial institutions as well as to equity holders (such as pension funds) arising due to the resolution. And finally, the Treasury and Fed will be directed to work to reduce concentration of the financial sector by avoiding resolution methods that favor large institutions. There will be a bias toward rescue of smaller institutions, and use of the resolution process to break-up the larger institutions.

The past few months have provided ample demonstration that Wall Street intends to recreate the conditions that existed in 2005. And make no mistake, the current situation is worse than it was in 2007 before the collapse, particularly in relation to large, systemically-significant financial institutions. President Obama, Fed Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Geithner have made many bold claims about their new financial reforms, but these reforms in no way represent a radical shift in its framework of analysis and policy implementation. The reality all three of them continue to turn a blind eye to the underlying problems in the hope that these will not return and blow up again on their watch. This is precisely the recipe for disaster followed by Alan Greenspan, Robert Rubin, and Henry Paulson.

Related posts:

• How to downsize the US financial sector
• Mark to market is beside the point
• A brief note on the fake reform agenda
• FDIC list of problem banks
• Two more FDIC Friday Night Specials brings total to 55 failed banks

Say I’m a politician and I am concerned about my re-election prospects in 2010.  I have been a member of Congress for seven years now and have developed a good reputation as a reform-minded economic realist willing to listen to a number of competing economic ideas. However, right now I am a bit concerned about my likely 2010 rival, a respected district attorney known for being tough on crime and equally pragmatic ideologically speaking.

This past week, President Obama delivered a worthy speech on the need for reform in the financial sector. I agree with some of the broad strokes. But, quite frankly, the speech lacked in detail.  What’s more is my economic advisors have counselled me that the worst of the panic is over.  They tell me stimulus – fiscal and monetary – has worked and we are on the road to a welcome though weak recovery.

Meanwhile, I have been informed that a number of well-connected people in the financial industry are considering backing my potential 2010 rival. I have had enough money problems on my plate due to healthcare targeting my district. As I desperately need more money for my re-election campaign, getting on the finance industry’s bad side is something I do not want to happen.

What do I do?

The inside the beltway mentality

Well, unless the economy tanks between now and 2010, I would be a fool to support reforms in the financial sector, which could jeopardize my seat in Congress. Mind you, I am truly a reform-minded individual and it has been a part of my platform since I was elected in 2002. I don’t like Wall Street fat cats earning tens of millions each while people lose their homes and jobs. But, right now, everyone I respect says recovery is here. Retail sales in August just came in – up a massive 2.7%. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke came out and said outright that recovery has arrived. I am no economist, but these guys make sense. I believe them. That’s why I am loath to even mention financial sector reform – presently being demonized by my 2010 rival as big government.

Earlier this year as things were falling apart, I had decided to inform myself. I read a number of well-respected financial blogs – some of which predicted imminent economic collapse if our big banks were not nationalized. These bloggers claimed that a depression was upon us and drastic government intervention was necessary – and, again, I tended to believe them. After all, one was a recent Nobel Prize winner and another was a winner just a few years ago.

But these individuals have since been discredited, as events have not played out as they suggested. So, as we head into 2010, I am much more interested in reining in uncontrolled government spending – as this is something about which my constituency seems to care. With recovery upon us, there is zero appetite for financial reforms in Washington and I am certainly not going to put a target on my back by trying to get some passed.

Edward here. A lot of politicians are probably thinking along these lines right now. And quite frankly, this makes sense from a political perspective.  If you are looking for reform in the financial sector, the moment has passed. And only to the degree that the underlying weaknesses in the global financial system are made manifest and threaten the economy will we see any appetite for reform amongst politicians. So, as I see it, the Obama administration has missed the opportunity for reform.

Another interpretation of events

Irrespective, I believe the need for reform is clear. Those gloom & doom economists were right because the economic model which brought us to the brink of disaster in 2008 is the same one we have at present and that necessarily means another crisis will come.

Steve Keen, an Australian economist whose theories are heavily influenced by Hyman Minsky, has a cogent analysis of the true structural deficits in the current economic model that I think bears repeating here. He warns that we are trying to kick the can down the road and this will lead to an even larger bust.

In his most recent post, he put it in terms anyone can understand.

You have just come from your annual medical checkup, where your doctor assures you that you are in robust health.

Walking jauntily down the street, you bump into a practitioner of alternative medicine. He takes one look at you and declares “You have a serious tumour! It must be removed or you will die”.

You ignore him as you always have, and continue your merry way down the street. One day later, a stabbing pain suddenly cripples you, and you collapse to the pavement.

In agony, your call your doctor, who initially refuses to send an ambulance because he knows you are well.

When you lapse into a coma and stop talking mid-sentence, your doctor concludes that perhaps something is wrong, and sends an ambulance to take you to hospital.

Initially the doctor waits for you to revive spontaneously, because he still knows there’s nothing really wrong with you. But as your pulse starts to weaken, he reluctantly calls a retired doctor who had experience of a similar inexplicable malady in the distant past.

She prescribes massive doses of tranquilisers, painkillers, vitamins, and oxygen—all substances that had been removed from the medical panoply due to recent advances in medical theory. Reluctantly, your doctor follows his retired colleague’s advice—and miraculously, you start to revive.

After a year of expensive medical treatment, you return to the same robust health you displayed before your inexplicable illness. Triumphant, if somewhat puzzled, your doctor declares you well once more, and releases you from intensive care.

As you stride confidently away from the hospital, you have the misfortune to once again bump into the practitioner of alternative medicine.

“But they haven’t removed the tumour!”, he declares.

…

One shouldn’t have to spell out the details of such an analogy, but in times of widespread denial, one has to:

• You are the economy;
• The tumour is a massive accumulation of private debt;
• Your doctor is Neoclassical Economics, and the retired colleague is a so-called “Keynesian” Economist — who doesn’t know it, since her medical textbooks were poorly written, but he’s actually following another economist called Paul Samuelson, not Keynes (and your doctor’s textbooks are so bad they don’t warrant discussion);
• The alternative medicine practitioner follows Hyman Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis” (which is based on what Keynes actually did say—as well as the wisdom of Joseph Schumpeter and, in whispers, Karl Marx);
• The moment you hit the pavement is the beginning of the Subprime Crisis; The collapse of Lehman Brothers is the moment when you slip into a coma; and
• The day the doctor takes you off life support and declares all is well … is next month.

The final reason for me being a bear is that I am that practitioner of alternative medicine. Minsky’s “Financial Instability Hypothesis” has been ignored by conventional economists for reasons that are both ideological and delusional. A small band of “Post-Keynesian” economists, of whom I am one, have kept this theory alive.

According to Minsky’s theory:

• Capitalist economies can and do periodically experience financial crises (something that believers in the dominant “Neoclassical” approach to economics vehemently denied until reality—in the form of the Global Financial Crisis—slapped them in the face last year);
• These financial crises are caused by debt-financed speculation on asset prices, which leads to bubbles in asset prices;
• These bubbles must eventually burst, because they add nothing to the economy’s productive capacity while simultaneously increasing the debt-servicing burden the economy faces;
• When they burst, asset prices collapse but the debt remains;
• The attempts by both borrowers and lenders to reduce leverage reduces aggregate demand, causing a recession;
• If the economy survives such a crisis, it can go through the same process again, with another boom driving debt up even higher, followed by yet another crash; but
• Ultimately this process has to lead to a level of debt that is so great that another revival becomes impossible since no-one is willing to take on any more debt. Then a Depression ensues.

Case for reform

I have removed the end of Keen’s post which you should most definitely read here. In it, he warns that the tumour collapse occurred in 1987 and that today we have finally reached a level of debt which is so great that another reflation is impossible.  The collapse is now.

But what if it isn’t?  For the sake of argument, let’s say that, just like in 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, and 2002, there is indeed the ability to reflate the bubble – albeit on a diminished scale. Isn’t that what we see at present with equity prices up between 50-100% globally, with some commodity back at record high prices, and with oil up over 100% from its 2009 lows?

Why would any politician back reform if we seem out of the woods then? Reform doesn’t stuff campaign coffers. Reform doesn’t get your constituents jobs. Reform doesn’t pump up the economy in your district. And reform doesn’t get you elected.  Without imminent economic disaster to sharpen the mind, the case for reform just isn’t there for most politicians.

So, stop spinning the doomsday tale and develop a prevention plan. I happen to buy in to the doomsday scenario as the likely outcome. But unlike Keen, I am not convinced the time is now – it could be in one year.  It could be in two years – or four. Of course, others say, it isn’t coming at all.

Nevertheless, the case for real reform can be made even if it is divorced from the financial crisis, the present economic environment and the upcoming election cycle.

You are kidding yourself if you think real reform is coming to the financial sector before the mid-term elections, especially with health care, two wars and the need to ensure recovery still on politicians’ plates. Obama could go for real reform in 2011 – or in a second term in 2013. But, unless economic crisis is at our door, there isn’t a convincing argument which says reform is necessary. The same is true in Europe, by the way.

What I would like to see is economic thought leaders developing a blueprint of a financial crisis strategy which tackles both the immediate crisis issues (liquidity) and the structural, regulatory and monetary issues that create financial volatility (solvency). When crisis does occur, I believe it will be systemic in nature due to the forces Keen so lucidly explains. Therefore, a blueprint which is 1) heavy on tactics and, 2) if implemented in a real systemic crisis, is likely to work, builds credibility. This is political capital which will carry over to longer-term preventive strategies and reforms.

On the other hand, if Keen is right, we are on the verge of a very nasty relapse which will mean depression and debt deflation. And I reckon such a scenario means the political will should be there in spades.

Related posts:

• Steve Keen: On the Edge with Max Keiser
• Steve Keen: Debt and the economy – how do we pay for all of this?
• How many medical bankruptcies were there in Switzerland last year?
• Janet Tavakoli on fraud, derivatives, and bankruptcy
• The Eurozone and the spectre of banking collapse

Back in February, I asked you if we were experiencing a recession or depression.  A plurality said it was a depression with a small ’d.’ I agreed and went on to explain why. Since then, things have changed and we seem to be on the verge of what I call a technical recovery (or a fake recovery – take your pick).  We may even be on the verge of a multi-year economic expansion – something bears like David Rosenberg should not rule out. But vigilance is still required. I will explain why.

Since the recovery talk has gathered steam, a lot of well-respected economists and policy makers have begun to construct what I consider a revisionist history of events. It goes something like this:

We have just experienced a major economic downturn. Coupled with a financial panic of major proportions, the global economy suffered a severe shock.  However, we have learnt how to deal with such crises due to our experiences during the Great Depression. The liquidity crisis was overcome through deft monetary policy. And fiscal expansionary policy aided a return to business as usual much sooner than many would have believed.

As a result, it is quite obvious we have been through a severe contraction, but nothing more than a garden-variety recession complicated – of course – by a financial panic. Back in February, a lot of economists made alarmist predictions of woe, foretelling a global Depression. This was wrong-headed and reckless as we see today. GDP has likely turned up in this third quarter and will continue rising for the foreseeable future. With the worst of things behind us, we can normalize monetary and fiscal policy and return to a more robust economic path.

On the surface, this narrative is compelling.  But, I believe it is based on a flawed analysis.  I would like to present a different narrative here for you to dissect.

GDP is a poor measure of growth

As Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote, GDP is a very poor measure of growth and economic health.  And he is right. There are many questions of statistical accuracy in its measurement. But, more than quantity, I have problems with GDP as a measure because of quality. Robust 4% growth that is underpinned by savings and capital investment is not the same as robust 4% growth underpinned by debt and consumption.

The problem I have with the recent history of growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland in particular is that the growth was underpinned by high debt accumulation and low savings.  As debt is a mechanism through which we pull demand forward, the debt and consumption has meant we have been growing today at the expense of future growth.

Low quality growth can go on for a long time

This dynamic can continue for a very, very long time. In the United States, by virtue of America’s possession of the world’s reserve currency, an increase in aggregate debt levels has been successfully financed for well over twenty-five years. Mind you, there have been a number of landmines along the way. But, time and again, these pitfalls have been avoided through asymmetric monetary policy and counter-cyclical fiscal expansion.

So, poor quality growth can continue for very long indeed. And it is this fact which allows the narrative of easy money and overconsumption to gain sway.

The boy who cried wolf

A soothsayer who counsels against this type of economic policy, but who warns of impending collapse will surely be seen as the boy who cries wolf. Think back to 2001 or 2002. Did we not witness then the same spectacle whereby the bears and doomsdayers were let out of their holes to warn of impending doom from reckless economic policy? By 2004, unless these individuals changed their tune, they were long forgotten or even laughed at – only to resurface in 2007 and 2008 with their new tales of woe. Knowing this shapes the psychology of economic forecasting and is why missing the turn is disastrous for one’s career. Efforts to avoid missing the turn are also part of a very large pro-cyclical psychological force underpinning a cyclical bull market.

The fact is: low quality growth does not lead to immediate economic calamity. It can continue through many business cycles. Even today, it is wholly conceivable that we could experience a multi-year economic expansion on the back of renewed monetary and fiscal expansion.

Marc Faber: “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money”

You will recall that I wrote a post at the depths of the market implosion highlighting a phrase by Marc Faber, “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money.”  This quote has stuck with me as asset markets have soared in the intervening time.  What Faber was alluding to was the fact that printing money works.  It does goose the economy as intended and it can induce a cyclical recovery.

Nevertheless, the recovery is likely to be of poor quality due to significant malinvestment. Debt levels will rise and capital investment will be directed toward riskier enterprises. Look at what’s happening in China.  Are you telling me stimulus is not working? It most certainly is.

In the west, stimulus is also working. It is designed to stop people from hoarding cash and to consume. It is also designed to get people out of savings accounts and into riskier asset classes. it is doing just that. In response to a Spanish-language article on just this topic, I wrote in today’s links:

Europeans are abandoning savings accounts in favour of riskier assets as low interest rates have created a liquidity-seeking-return dynamic. This is true as much in the US as it is in Europe and it proves that a wall of liquidity can induce a cyclical recovery based on asset price inflation aka the fake recovery. The question is what comes next?

Liquidity is seeking return. It is pure speculation whether the upturn that underpins this dynamic has legs. I see an even chance that it does, which is why, despite my recent mild bearishness, I am a lot more upbeat about the economy and markets than a lot of others in the blogosphere.

So where does that leave us?

The outlook is unclear.  The Obama Administration looks ready to take a victory lap judging from recent statements. Officials say they are also withdrawing liquidity in anticipation of an upturn in the economy (though some believe these claims exaggerated). So, that is the one side – which Goldman’s Jim O’Neill takes.

On the other side of the argument is the fact that employment is still weak and incomes are down – the most since the Great Depression. After a decade with no income gains and still weak employment prospects, the ability of households to refuel a debt-induced upturn seems limited – as the recent data on consumer credit demonstrates. This is the side that David Rosenberg takes.

I take neither side. I am just not that clairvoyant. Both scenarios are plausible outcomes. But, I am still very worried about the low quality of any growth we will get in an upturn and the widening gulf of economic fortunes that result. I am equally worried about how even a low quality upturn will sap the will for reform in the financial arena. Mostly, I am worried that the eventual collapse – if it doesn’t happen now – will be much worse when it does happen.

Background

Please listen to the half-hour audio clip with Marc Faber from yesterday.  He does an excellent job of giving voice to some of the ideas I just laid out in his usual semi-apocalyptic style.  The clip comes via Bloomberg’s On the Economy podcast, a show I recommend highly. Click here for the show’s webpage and instructions on how to listen to broadcasts.

(mp3 Audio embedded below)

Related posts:

• When Giants Fall: No green shoots here
• Economic recovery and the perverse math of GDP reporting
• Andrew Smithers’ view on economic outlook
• Subprime housing bubble timeline
• The psychology of economic forecasting

In a BBC Two interview, former Fed chief Alan Greenspan waxed fatalistic, saying that another financial crisis is inevitable due to animal spirits.  In his view, booms and busts are endogenous to the capitalist system, crises being the outcome of long periods of prosperity. I agree with this assessment. But, it is surprising to hear coming from Greenspan as he sounds almost like Hyman Minsky, suggesting that economic stability leads to instability.

However, lest you thought he had given up his free-market ideology, he concludes warning that increased regulation would only make matters worse.

In order to prevent the situation arising again financiers and governments should look to clamp down on fraud and increase capital requirements for banks, the former central banker said.

Greenspan view on global economy

Regulations targeting the latter would mean banks would be forced to hold enough money to cover their normal operations and honour withdrawals.

However despite his belief in a brighter future, the former Fed chief did warn that the path to recovery should steer clear of protectionism as applying strict regulations could hamper recent developments that have opened up global trade.

"The most recent endeavour to re-regulate is a reaction to the crisis. The extraordinary impact of these global markets is making a lot of financial people feeling they have lost control.

"The problem is you cannot have free global trade with highly restrictive, regulated domestic markets."

On the whole, Greenspan’s analysis makes sense. However, his conclusions are flawed.  Greenspan, in his ideological fervour, has forgotten that his role as a central banker was antithetical to the concept of free markets.

Last night in the links, I ran a story from the Sydney Morning-Herald which is more to the point. There is no such thing as a free market.  There is more restrictive regulation, where we seem to be headed. And there is less restrictive regulation, which I prefer. But markets are never completely free. The zeal shown by Greenspan is deregulation as crony capitalism and makes the inevitable busts of which Sir Alan speaks that much more destabilising.

Source

Market crisis ‘will happen again’ – BBC News (nice video included)

Related posts:

• Greenspan: “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big”
• Ms. Watkins, why does Charlie have lit dynamite?
• Ted Forstmann: the credit crisis will get worse
• Nouriel Roubini: Bloomberg Interview on Banking Crisis Plan
• Frontline – The Warning: Who Knew About the Looming Financial Crisis?