Valero Energy has just announced it is shutting down its Delaware City Refinery.  This is a major news announcement because refiners should be seen as a canary in the coalmine for end-user demand and Valero is one company in the oil patch which has been loath to cut workers to improve the bottom line. This announcement is an indicator that, despite a technical recovery, the economy still has major obstacles to overcome.

Business Wire reports:

Valero Energy Corporation (NYSE: VLO) announced today it intends to permanently shut down its Delaware City refinery due to financial losses caused by very poor economic conditions, significant capital spending requirements and high operating costs. The shutdown will affect approximately 550 employees at the plant.

Valero notified refinery employees today of the impending shutdown, and will immediately begin negotiations with the refinery’s unions regarding the effects of the plant closure and the employees’ severance packages. A safe and orderly shutdown of the refinery will commence immediately. Valero remains committed to its marketing businesses in the Northeast and will continue to reliably supply its customers, partially through higher throughput rates at the company’s other refineries.

“The decision to permanently close the Delaware City refinery was a very difficult one,” said Valero Chairman and CEO Bill Klesse. “We have spent the last year diligently trying to avoid this situation, and I have worked closely with Gov. Markell in an effort to find a different outcome. Earlier this fall, we shut down the gasifier and coking operations in an attempt to improve reliability and financial performance, but the refinery’s profitability did not improve enough. Additionally, we have sought a buyer for the refinery, but feasible opportunities have not materialized. At this point, we have exhausted all viable options.

“We realize that the decision to close the refinery affects many employees, their families, and the community. We are thankful to our employees for their service, and we will treat them fairly during this difficult period.”

In the fourth quarter of 2009, the company expects to report a pre-tax charge of approximately $1.7 billion to $1.8 billion, or $2.00 to $2.15 per share after taxes, related primarily to asset impairment, employee severance and other shutdown costs. The company estimates the cash portion of the pre-tax charge will be in the range of $125 million to $150 million. The current and historical financial results of the affected operations will be shown as discontinued operations in the company’s financial statements.

The new CEO Bill Klesse came to Valero via Ultramar Diamond Shamrock (UDS), which Valero acquired at the top of the market in 2001. So, company ethos may be different than under Bill Greehey who was very committed to community. And Delaware City is an old Getty/Shell-Motiva oil refinery and a legacy asset of Blackstone-controlled Premcor, the company run by former Tosco head and Salomon Brothers commodities trader Tom O’Malley. So, it was not core to Valero’s operations. Valero already cut staff there in September. And the Shell-Motiva JV had serious operating difficulties with the asset before offloading it to Premcor.

Nevertheless, this was a refinery which has been upgraded significantly to process less expensive heavy, sour crude oil. The fact that Valero is laying off workers and shuttering the entire site tells you that the situation is bad. They are saying in effect “we cannot continue to operate at a loss through this business cycle.” If Valero can’t make money, no oil refiner can.

I see this in a macro context as a sign of cyclically weak end-user demand.  I do think peak oil is for real but the world is awash in oil and oil products right now.  Witness the recent post by FT Alphaville’s Izabella Kaminska, which points to a glut of distillate entering the season of high distillate demand:

We feel it’s Olivier Jakob at Petromatrix who really expressed the matter best on Friday. As he wrote (emphasis FT Alphaville’s):

As per our Tuesday ad hoc note on floating stocks; on a crude equivalent basis all of the OPEC and half of the IEA estimated oil demand growth for 2010 is already parked at anchor in floating stocks and these idled cargoes filled with oil are getting more and more attention.

By the end of the winter there is likely to be as much distillates afloat as in the total US at the end of winter 2007 and we expect that it will be more and more difficult for some of the Wall Street commodity banks to avoid mentioning the subject and to continue to hide the floating storage fill-up as “demand from emerging economies”.

The ICE Gasoil contango is currently widening and this will not work towards the reduction of these floating stocks. In an environment of spare refining capacity the only solver to the growing floating stocks of Distillates is a sharp reduction in OPEC supplies [ahem…Daily Mail], but only lower prices would trigger that.

The only answer that we see to GOD (Glut of Distillate) is a flat price correction sharp enough to force more OPEC supply cuts.Starting 2010 with WTI at 80+$/bbl and a contango in a low demand environment there will not be much returns to be expected from commodities by some of the largest financial institutions; hence with the evidence of the GOD being harder and harder to hide we would not be surprised if in a few weeks some of the Wall Street commodity banks start to change their tune and start to publicize the GOD. A flat price correction would anyway be needed in the first quarter to allow a repositioning from the large financial players at better entry levels.

Which, of course, doesn’t mean banks have been hoarding oil in a bid to drive the prices up. It means, if anything, they’ve been too slow to acknowledge the extent of the oversupply in the market and degree of muted demand, as well as depended too much on the idea that economic recovery will help spur demand by the year’s end.

Meanwhile, as Jakob states, the solution to the glut lies in Opec shut-ins — not more output.

The fact that oil is trading at $80 a barrel in this climate should tell you that it is trading more as a financial asset than on supply/demand imbalances. Is this why Warren Buffett is buying yet more oil assets? Watch refining margins; they are telling indicators.

Disclosure: I have owned owned shares and call options in Valero and other refiners for a number of years, but I sold all positions in 2007.

Related posts:

• Refiners as proxy for demand: layoffs for first time at Valero
• Valero crushes earnings: I was wrong
• Refiners as a canary in the coalmine
• Stocks pummeled as value plays increase
• Germany: Hertie as a symbol of recession

After a huge fall off in credit consistent with the fall in nominal GDP, we are seeing credit stabilise at a lower level. Debt to GDP ratios may not be lower, but as GDP is lower, so too is credit in the system.  Yet there is a large difference between the haves and the have-nots, largely due to a difference in which banks received government largesse and which did not.

Bank analyst Don Coxe puts this in perspective for us:

A sustained U.S. economic recovery is unlikely until all banks, and not just the big institutions bailed out with government funds, start to recover from the effects of the financial crisis, according to longtime investment strategist Don Coxe.

Many banks that got funding from the government have seen their shares soar, while smaller, regional banks have not.

That’s a sign that investors believe the smaller banks are less well placed to participate in, and contribute to, the economic recovery, said the chairman of Coxe Advisors LLC in Chicago, who advises clients of the BMO Financial Group.

Think big banks – big business, small banks-smaller business.  In effect, the credit flow for large multinationals is now back to normal.  However, like consumers, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are finding a tougher reception. Revolving credit lines are being cut and loans are harder to come by (one reason Warren Buffett and Goldman Sachs are stepping into this space in this crucial holiday season).

This is a case of supply and demand constraints. One the one hand, credit supply is constrained because regional financials are loaded down with bad debts and have not received the same measure of bailout money that big banks have.  On the other hand, SMEs are having to downsize and are demanding less credit.

"The thousands of regional U.S. banks on which an economic recovery depends have not participated in the sudden explosion of trading profits" of the biggest five U.S. banks, he said.

The state aid granted to large banks during the financial crisis has convinced investors the government will step in again in future to save the behemoths if needed. That has helped pull share prices back up from the 12-year lows hit in March.

By contrast, as more commercial real estate loans turn bad in the still-feeble economy, regional and community banks are struggling.

A key gauge of the gulf between big banks and smaller lenders is the KBW Regional Bank Index exchange traded fund (KRE.P). The ETF’s recovery has lagged the rebound in shares of the biggest five U.S. banks, said Coxe.

"There will not be the kind of sustained U.S. economic recovery that will drive a sustained U.S. bull market until the shares of the Main Street (KRE) banks begin to outperform" both those of the biggest five banks and the S&P 500 index .SPX, he said.

Small bank index suggests recovery is elusive – Reuters

Related posts:

• More warnings on regional banks
• Regionals are exposed to credit crisis
• Michael Panzner: regional banks in trouble
• Relative value in financial services
• Fifth Third takes on assets of Freedom Bank

Today, I want to run a few thoughts by you courtesy of John Mauldin.  In his recent weekly newsletter, he makes a number of points I have made here over the past few weeks and comes to a similar conclusion about the weakness of recovery and the likelihood of a double dip recession.

John Mauldin, Best-Selling author and recognized financial expert, is also editor of the free Thoughts From the Frontline that goes to over 1 million readers each week. For more information on John or his FREE weekly economic letter go to:http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/learnmore

No one goes into Wal-Mart and asks to pay extra sales tax. Thus sales taxes are reasonable barometers for retail sales. This week we look at how taxes are doing in a period of economic recovery. Then we turn our eyes to a very interesting (and sobering) analysis of possible future unemployment rates. This is an anecdote to the happy-face analysis of employment numbers you get from establishment economists. There will be a lot of charts and tables, so this letter may print a little longer, but I think you will find it very interesting.

If This is Recovery, Where Are the Taxes?

I keep reading about surveys that show that retail sales are up. But as noted above, no one pays extra sales taxes, or decides they need to pay more income taxes. The surest way to measure retail sales is sales taxes. Want to know how incomes are doing? Look at income tax receipts. Let’s look at sales taxes first.

First off, I can find no single source of recent sales tax information. It is all one-off, but it is consistent. Sales taxes in my home state of Texas are down 12.8% year-over-year, and we’re in the fifth straight month of decreases of 11% or more. Projections are for sales taxes to continue to decline into 2010.

There is a very revealing study by the Pew Center on state taxes, called "Beyond California" (http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/). Everyone knows how bad California is. The Pew Center looks at how the rest of the states are doing, and focuses on 10 states that also have severe problems. Sales tax receipts are down 14% in Arizona, and state income taxes are down 32%.

On average, revenues are down almost 12%. Oregon has seen their revenues collapse a stunning 19%. New York is down 17%, with a deficit of 32%. Illinois has a projected deficit of 47% of its budget, second only to California with 49%. You can see how your state fares at http://downloads.pewcenteronthestates.org/Beyond_California_Appendix.pdf.

The Liscio Report notes that all states had negative year-over-year sales tax collections in October, and the weighted average decrease was 10.2%, down from a negative 7.2% in September. (www.theliscioreport.com)

Sales at Wal-Mart stores slipped by 0.4% in the third quarter. Actual government figures show that retail sales were down 1.5% in September from the previous month and 5.8% year-over-year. So how do we keep seeing headlines about retail sales being up, as unemployment keeps rising?

Remember that such reports are usually based on surveys, and generally cover mid-sized and up retailers, leaving out smaller businesses. Further, if you are a retail chain that has closed 10% of its stores, the remaining stores should in theory benefit from getting your loyal customers into them.

Last Business Standing

Yesterday I was with an associate, and I hesitated in asking them how their business was doing, because I knew things had been tough at the beginning of the year. But I did ask, and they said sales were up over the last months and business was looking better. Surprised, I asked them what made the difference. "Ah," they said, "less competition. Our competitors have gone out of business."

Best Buy and other electronic retailers had to benefit from Circuit City disappearing. That is Schumpeter’s creative destruction at work. Not very good for total employment, but it does help the profitability of the survivors.

So, if things are so bad, how did we have 3.5% growth in the third quarter? First off, things are not as bad as they were in the past year. We are in fact getting close to an economic bottom, at least for now. Second, the 3.5% number is a preliminary estimate. A study by Goldman Sachs suggests that the number will be revised down by at least 0.5% and maybe as much as 1%.

Why? The estimate does not really take into account how poorly small businesses are performing. If you look at small-business indexes and compare them to historical GDP numbers, you get the smaller number mentioned above. And since at least 2% of the GDP was from the stimulus package (Cash for Clunkers, houses, tax cuts), the economy on its own was flat. That begs the question, what happens when the stimulus runs out?

And the answer is that we won’t know for some time, as the stimulus is just getting ramped up. "According to CBO estimates, only 21% of [the stimulus] spending will occur in 2009; another 38% will come in 2010, and 22% in 2011. After that, its effect will dissipate quickly." (The Liscio Report)

But David Rosenberg notes that what the federal government is giving, the states are taking away. The Pew Study shows that at least nine other states are in appalling shape, so it is no wonder that David writes:

Stimulus, What Stimulus?

"Fully nine states are in fiscal distress and only two have balanced budgets. States like Michigan are planning 20% budget cuts for the coming year. Indiana is planning a 10% spending cut in light of a 7.4% YoY revenue decline. How can the economy really be out of recession if government revenues are still deflating?

"The states are filling around 40% of their fiscal gaps with the federal stimulus (so much for spending on "shovel ready" infrastructure projects). Even after the fiscal help from Washington, the state governments will still face a projected deficit of $142 billion for 2011 (versus $113 billion in 2010). All in, the restraint in the state and local government sector is estimated to drain a full percentage point from U.S. GDP growth in 2010 and more than fully offset the stimulative efforts from Washington. The U.S. economy is more likely to post growth of little more than 2% next year, rather than the 5% currently being discounted by the equity market."

The Reality of Unemployment

All this is, of course, going to put continued pressure on employment. As I noted last week, the number of unemployed actually soared by 558,000, to 15.7 million, as measured by the household survey, not the 190,000 you read about in the mainstream media. Unemployment is sadly continuing to rise by significant amounts.

In August, I did an interview with CNBC from Leen’s Fishing Lodge in Maine. The unemployment numbers had just come out. I did a back-of-the-napkin estimate that we would need about 15 million new jobs over the next five years just to get back to where we were when the recession started.

That works out to a need for about 125,000 new jobs each month to handle new workers coming into the market (which comes to a total of 7.5 million over five years), plus the 8 million and rising jobs we’ve lost. That is a daunting number. It amounts to 250,000 new jobs a month every month for five years. And we are still losing more than that number a month, let alone adding the needed 250,000.

Look at the chart below. It shows the establishment survey employment figures for the last ten years. Only once, in 1999, did we actually add over 250,000 jobs a month for a whole year. And that was during the internet boom.

Sadly, the private sector has shed over 300,000 jobs since 1999. Think about that. We have had a decade where there have been no new jobs added by the private sector. Real incomes are roughly where they were, and the stock market is down. Talk about a lost decade.

I love it when someone does the really heavy lifting for me, and my friend Mike Shedlock of Sitka Pacific Capital Management has done a wonderful job of taking that speculation of mine and putting it into a spreadsheet that helps us get a real handle on what unemployment is likely to look like for the next ten years. I am going to make use of his basic analysis and then modify some of his assumptions in the spreadsheet he provided me, in order to think about different scenarios.

All three scenarios are based on assumptions, so let’s see what Mish started with. There is a wealth of data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Census Bureau. According to the Census Bureau Population Estimates we are going to add about 2.5 million working-age (16 years old and up) citizens a year, from now until 2020. The numbers varies slightly year to year. Mish used an estimate of the average, summing up the buckets from 16 to 100+ for the years in question and rounding the result.

You can go to the BLS site and look at Table A-1, which shows the civilian noninstitutional population (those over 16 not in prisons), the participation rate (those who are working and/or want to work), the unemployment rate, the number employed, those not in the labor force, and those who want a job. Those are starting numbers for the charts below.

For those interested, you can read Mish’s very full (and quite detailed) analysis at his blog site http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2009/11/mish-unemployment-projections-through.html). But let’s look at his assumptions:

• Job losses are likely to continue for a minimum of another year.
• When job gains start, they will be very slow at first, then pick up.
• An extremely generous monthly job gain stat over the course of the year would be 150,000 jobs.
• A falling participation rate (boomers retiring) will continue to mask reported unemployment.
• Starting in 2013 the labor pool will start decreasing because of Boomer demographics.
• The noninstitutional population will rise by 2.5 million workers a year.

The spreadsheet below needs a little explanation. Let’s start with the assumptions. Mike starts with current working-age population and adds 2.5 million people a year. He assumes that Boomers will retire at 65 (something which all the surveys say is not going to happen). And his last estimate is what the unemployment numbers will be. Everything else is based on those assumptions, which leads to the first column, or the expected unemployment number.

By the way, we know that everyone will want to make different assumptions. I am going to create three scenarios, but you can go to Mike’s blog and at the bottom of the post is a link to the actual spreadsheet. Have fun. Let’s look at scenario 1.

This assumes there is no double-dip recession, and jobs roughly rise along the same lines as the last recovery. Actually, Mish is far more optimistic, as in the very first chart you will notice that job losses were negative in the first year after the end of the recession and flat the second year. Mish has jobs rising by 120,000 next year and 600,000 the second year (2011), and then a fairly robust recovery. Below is the graph of the unemployment numbers under such a scenario.

Notice that unemployment stays at or above 11% for three years. Pessimistic? Mainstream and usually very optimistic Mark Zandi of www.economy.com predicted this week that unemployment would rise to 11% by the middle of next year, right in line with this scenario. Also note that total jobs rise by 14 million over ten years. Hardly doom and gloom. Again, Boomers all retire on time and there is no double-dip recession.

Let the Good Times Roll

What would it take to get back to 5% unemployment? I played with the spreadsheet and came up with the following numbers, which get us below 5% by 2020. I assume no recessions for the next ten years, and 2 million new jobs a year after 2011, which I start off with almost 1.5 million jobs. Of course, we have never done that, but let’s be optimistic.

And the graph below shows the unemployment numbers for the Good Times Scenario.

Want to get to 5% within five years? Add 3 million jobs a year starting now. With no housing recovery, a smaller auto industry, and financial firms getting leaner.

The Quick Double-Dip Scenario

When I called the last two recessions about a year before they happened, it was not all that hard. We had inverted yield curves, falling leading indicators, and a lot of other data that pretty much pointed to a recession. Believing that we had a housing bubble and a looming credit crisis also helped my conviction in calling the last recession.

I think we are in for a double-dip recession in 2011, yet I readily admit there will be little if any statistical evidence in advance this time. This is more of an instinct call. I have serious doubts that we can have what amounts to the largest tax increase of all time in what will be a very weak (albeit growing) economy, without putting us back into recession. And Speaker Pelosi thinks it is a smart thing to add another 5.4% surtax on what will already be a rising capital gains and dividend tax.

Taxing small businesses, and that is what the tax increase amounts to, is a very bad idea in a weak economy. Small businesses are where the job growth comes from. Taking money from productive businesses and giving it to government is a fundamentally flawed concept.

Now, if they decide to postpone the tax increase, or phase it in slowly, then maybe we avoid the double dip. But right now it doesn’t look like that will be the case. So, let’s quickly see what a double-dip scenario might look like. Let’s be optimistic and assume we only lose another 1.2 million jobs in the next recession, since we have already lost so many in this one (8 million and counting). And then the economy comes roaring back in 2012 with 1.5 million jobs and continues to grow rather smartly for the rest of the decade. No further recession. We absorb the tax increases and move on with our economic lives.

Unemployment under such a scenario would rise to just under 13% and stay above 10% for 8 years. Take a look at the chart and graph.

Think 13% is too dire? This week David Rosenberg said unemployment would rise to between 12-13%. The former Merrill Lynch economist was one of the few mainstream economists who called the recession and the credit crisis. The so-called "Blue Chip" economists told us at the beginning of 2008 that unemployment would peak out at 6%. While Rosie is not optimistic of late, he has a rather solid record of being right.

We are at 10.2% unemployment today. The economy lost jobs for 21 months after the end of the last recession. That would easily take us into 2011. Another million lost jobs will take us well over 11% and close to 12% (remember, you have to add in the increasing population), even without my double-dip scenario.

The letter is getting long and it’s getting late, so let me close with a few thoughts.

First, 12% unemployment is horrendous by American standards. But Spain is now at 20%, and much of Europe has been in the 10% range for years.

Second, Americans are not used to the concept of 12% unemployment or 10% rates for extended periods. That is going to cause a serious backlash across the political spectrum. Couple that with the discomfort over $1.5-trillion deficits and there could be some serious political changes in the coming years. I think the message will be more anti-incumbent than one party or the other.

Third, the only way out of this morass is to create an environment where small business can thrive. As I’ve noted for the last several weeks in this letter, government spending does not increase GDP over time. It is a temporary nonproductive stimulus. It takes private investment to create jobs and increase productivity. Over the next few months, I will write more about how to do that.

Related posts:

• Comprehensive unemployment rate is 17.5%
• Payroll data mixed despite the bullish headline job loss figure
• Are jobless claims pointing to structurally high unemployment?
• Unemployment numbers still point to partial recovery
• US unemployment hits 5-year high of 6.1%

A friend sent me the following presentation earlier in the week when I was feeling a bit ill. So I neglected to post it.  But, I want to return to it because it is in keeping with my recovery/depression theme. These are the issues that were complicit in the latest financial crisis and almost none of them have disappeared.  They will most certainly rear their heads again precipitating or worsening the next downturn.

We’re talking about:

1. Duration mismatches (borrowing short and lending long)
2. Accounting (Mark-to-market, deferred tax assets and a lot more)
3. Conflicts of interest (no Chinese walls, ratings agencies)
4. Regulation (especially given poor risk controls)
5. Risk management (is Meriwether a leading indicator?)
6. Investment Banking vs. Utility Banking
7. Too big to fail (they must be downsized)
8. Heads I win, tails you lose (socialization of losses is crony capitalism)
9. Quantitative easing (QE has costs)
10. Hedges instead of capital

My baseline thinking at the moment is that we are seeing the beginnings of a cyclical recovery built on the back of asset relation more than anything else. The underpinnings of this uptrend are tenuous. So, when this latest burst of reflation hits the wall, all of the aforementioned issues will re-appear and policy makers will again do the who-could-have-known routine we saw in 2001 and again in 2008/ But the broader public is increasingly wise to this song and dance. Hat tip Scott.

Jim Chanos Presentation at Darden, 22 Oct 2009

Related posts:

• Chinese officials warn banks about reckless lending
• European banks: still undercapitalised
• The U.S. financial system is effectively insolvent
• Lessons from Japan’s Bank Crisis
• Bank of Canada blames Geithner for financial mess

In the wake of a few significant elections in the American states of New York, New Jersey and Virginia, a lot of pundits are putting their spin on what these elections mean for Barack Obama and his political agenda. On the whole, I find most of the conclusions partisan leaps of faith.

So, I wanted to take this issue on and outline my thoughts on American politics and the feedback loop with the economy. I will then try to take on what the election last November and just this past week mean in regards to Obama’s political agenda and the missteps I believe he made early in his tenure as President.

Confabulation and the human need to explain

First, let me start off with a basic concept of behavioral psychology: confabulation.  Back in April, I quoted from an article in New Scientist about how people will develop false narratives to explain away decisions already made. This is called confabulation. The article says:

As anyone who has ever been in a verbal disagreement can attest, people tend to give elaborate justifications for their decisions, which we have every reason to believe are nothing more than rationalisations after the event. To prove such people wrong, though, or even provide enough evidence to change their mind, is an entirely different matter: who are you to say what my reasons are?

But with choice blindness we drive a large wedge between intentions and actions in the mind. As our participants give us verbal explanations about choices they never made, we can show them beyond doubt – and prove it – that what they say cannot be true. So our experiments offer a unique window into confabulation (the story-telling we do to justify things after the fact) that is otherwise very difficult to come by. We can compare everyday explanations with those under lab conditions, looking for such things as the amount of detail in descriptions, how coherent the narrative is, the emotional tone, or even the timing or flow of the speech. Then we can create a theoretical framework to analyse any kind of exchange.

What experimenters here have shown is that there is a real human need to explain. Things happen for a reason, don’t they?  Why did the stock market rally? Why did Harry do that? Why didn’t we do something to stop this? Why did I vote for that guy back then, when I now don’t like him as much?

To the degree there is an explanation void, it will be filled. The question is: filled with what?

Confirmation bias and the psychology of politics

In politics, how the void gets filled has much to do with philosophical/political predisposition and one’s world view.

Drew Westen, a professor of psychology at Emory University, published an interesting book a few years back called “The Political Brain.” Recently, Westen has had some important things to say about the psychology of the health care debate (see Washington Post article here). But, in the book, the most memorable political psychological experiment Westen described is very much related to confabulation. I quoted from Wikipedia’s synopsis of this experiment to explain confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere back in May:

In January 2006 a group of scientists led by Westen announced at the annual Society for Personality and Social Psychology conference in Palm Springs, California the results of a study in which functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) showed that self-described Democrats and Republicans responded to negative remarks about their political candidate of choice in systematically biased ways.

Specifically, when Republican test subjects were shown self-contradictory quotes by George W. Bush and when Democratic test subjects were shown self-contradictory quotes by John Kerry, both groups tended to explain away the apparent contradictions in a manner biased to favor their candidate of choice. Similarly, areas of the brain responsible for reasoning(presumably the prefrontal cortex) did not respond during these conclusions while areas of the brain controlling emotions (presumably the amygdala and/or cingulate gyrus) showed increased activity as compared to the subject’s responses to politically neutral statements associated with politically neutral people (such as Tom Hanks).[2]

Subjects were then presented with information that exonerated their candidate of choice. When this occurred, areas of the brain involved in reward processing (presumably theorbitofrontal cortex and/or striatum / nucleus accumbens) showed increased activity.

Dr. Westen said,

None of the circuits involved in conscious reasoning were particularly engaged… Essentially, it appears as if partisans twirl the cognitive kaleidoscope until they get the conclusions they want… Everyone… may reason to emotionally biased judgments when they have a vested interest in how to interpret ‘the facts.’[3]

The study was published in the Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 18:11, pp. 1947–58, a peer-reviewed scientific journal.[1]

Even before being peer-reviewed and published, Michael Shermer used the presentation by Dr. Westen as the basis for his July 2006 Skeptic column[4] in the magazine Scientific American.

In essence, political partisans with a well-developed political world view were confronted with data that did not fit their particular view.  This created cognitive dissonance and mental stress (remember, the brain areas for reason were not activated here, emotions were at play).  Their brains, rather than trying to resolve the conflict objectively, looked for ways to incorporate the new information into the previous pre-conceived view. When the subjects successfully accomplished this back flip, they were massively rewarded by the areas of the brain for pleasure.

In sum, our brains are NOT hard-wired for non-confirmatory evidence. We are not rewarded for seeking non-confirming data. Therefore, we generally seek confirmatory evidence after we have made any decision.

When you read the narratives of the recent election results, you should realize that confirmation bias is very much at play in tweaking the conclusion to fit a preconceived world view.  A perfect example is a recent piece by Charles Krauthamer in the Washington Post.

Speaking of a huge Democratic loss in Virginia, Krauthamer says:

In the aftermath of last year’s Obama sweep, we heard endlessly about its fundamental, revolutionary, transformational nature. How it was ushering in an FDR-like realignment for the 21st century in which new demographics — most prominently, rising minorities and the young — would bury the GOP far into the future. One book proclaimed "The Death of Conservatism," while the more modest merely predicted the terminal decline of the Republican Party into a regional party of the Deep South or a rump party of marginalized angry white men.

This was all ridiculous from the beginning. The ‘08 election was a historical anomaly. A uniquely charismatic candidate was running at a time of deep war weariness, with an intensely unpopular Republican president, against a politically incompetent opponent, amid the greatest financial collapse since the Great Depression. And still he won by only seven points.

Exactly a year later comes the empirical validation of that skepticism. Virginia — presumed harbinger of the new realignment, having gone Democratic in ‘08 for the first time in 44 years — went red again. With a vengeance. Barack Obama had carried it by six points. The Republican gubernatorial candidate won by 17 — a 23-point swing. New Jersey went from plus-15 Democratic in 2008 to minus-four in 2009. A 19-point swing.

Obama also benefitted in 2008 from unique circumstances with the recession and economic crisis favoring a change candidate. That uniqueness can be seen in the huge drop in young and black voters last week as well as the switch in independent voter allegiance from Democrat to Republican. I guarantee you we would have seen similar results in favor of George W. Bush had the recession of 2001 and 9/11 occurred one year earlier. None of these factors favored Democrats in 2009.

Krauthamer goes on to make some partisan claims about left-leaning agendas, hubris and taxation that I found unconvincing (Clive Cook also does this). I wished he had stopped here because he makes a valid point: the 2008 election was not some magical moment in American history in which we saw a sea change in political alignment at one moment in time. That’s confabulation, pure and simple.

What happened is Americans voted for those people who they felt would change course because they felt the country was headed in the wrong direction. That’s certainly what exit polling told us in November 2008.  Making up some other explanation is not necessary.

I know change when I see it and this is not it

So, what Charles Krauthamer and Clive Cook are doing along with Frank Rich and Paul Krugman is filling the explanation void. I agree with the analysis, but some of the conclusions are more dubious. I have done my share of filling that void (I see Frank Rich’s narrative as the one closest to mine).

But, for a moment, let’s leave the explanations aside. The great thing is humans are capable of complex decision-making and thought without having to explain those decisions. We know how to distinguish a frog from a prince and a pig from a princess – no explanation required.

And so it is here again. If you asked 1000 people in those exit polls from November 2008 – or even last week, “what would make you know America was headed in the right direction,” you probably would have gotten 700 different answers.

But, one thing is clear: Since January 20th, a lot of people are saying to themselves, “I know change when I see it and this is not it.” That’s what all polls are saying. So, whatever Obama and the Democratically-controlled Congress are doing, it’s not working.

Enter the Demagogue

That’s where demagoguery comes into play. Demagogues love an explanation vacuum.  Since time immemorial, where there has been public disenchantment with the status quo, there has always been some demagogue waiting in the wings with a ready-set explanation of what’s wrong and how they were going to fix it. These are people who are considered fringe elements in good times, but when economic hardship comes their ready-made explanations and confabulation become a toxic mix which propels them to prominence. (For the record, I am not connecting the gentlemen mentioned above with demagoguery. I am making a separate point here).

I would argue, that’s where we are right now. The global economy has just experienced an incredible shock. In the United States, more than one in six is unemployed or underemployed. Personal bankruptcies and foreclosures are still happening in record numbers. The economic situation is, in a word, grim.

Therefore, people are going to more open to a wider range of ideas and this is a prime opportunity for demagogues to advantage themselves and their allies. It also should make any incumbent politician very afraid of losing their job.

With this in mind, I look back to the early days of Barack Obama’s tenure and I can’t help but conclude that his economic strategy was too timid, too much aligned with the status quo. It’s not as if this should be a shocker; I pointed this out in January and again in February. His economic team erred in believing, as the Bush Administration had done, that the economic and financial situation was better than it was.  Remember, Obama’s stimulus plan was based on a forecast of 8.0% unemployment.

Future policy decisions

But that ship has sailed and here we are a year after Obama’s election in a technical but unsatisfactory statistical recovery. What should Obama do going forward?

Well, first of all, what he needs to do is give voters a sense that the recovery is for real. And that means unemployment, foreclosures, and stagnant personal income must be attacked. On some level, the health care debate is a net negative in that it consumes a lot of political capital without any obvious and immediate economic benefit. The bailouts and financial reform agenda also have been net negatives as well for similar reasons but also because they have not been seen as fundamental change and they further disenchantment.

Moreover, we know that the explanation vacuum is being filled by voices decrying big government and socialism. If you listen to people like Charles Krauthamer, you are likely to see Obama as a dangerous shift in America to the left. He makes a compelling argument which will sway those who are constitutionally predisposed to hating big government or deficit spending. So this means Obama is now constrained. In my view, fiscal stimulus is a political non-starter.

So, I see jobs as the first area for Obama to attack. The question is whether he does this directly via some modified private-sector controlled W.P.A.-type program or indirectly via something like a payroll tax cut. After jobs comes foreclosure. Personal income and taxes are the least important area going forward (especially as any tax cuts will either increase deficit spending or have to be made up by tax increases elsewhere).

If the economy turns up vigorously and permanently, we can put some of these thoughts to rest. You have to believe many fewer people would be yelling socialism or corporate communism if we were in a robust upturn. However, I don’t think that is a likely economic scenario. Even so, the unique circumstances of 2008 are unlikely to be repeated. That spells trouble for the Democrats in 2010 and 2012 unless they start doing something dramatically different.

Other sources

People Sometimes Seek The Truth, But Most Prefer Like-minded Views – Science Daily

Humans prefer cockiness to expertise – NewScientist (think demagogue here)

Related posts:

• Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere
• Loss aversion and finding a bottom
• What motivates Hillary? Part 2
• Peer pressure and bubbles
• US Senate passes Economic Patriot Act 74-25

I had a feeling there was an energy component to the Berkshire Hathaway decision to buy Burlington Northern Santa Fe. And now comes the evidence via coal, a major freight on BNSF’s tracks. But, there is a lot more to this acquisition than just hauling coal.

Warren Buffett has been increasing his energy plays in recent years, both in the U.S. and abroad.  he has said repeatedly that he likes energy and power. His chief asset in the U.S. is Mid-American Energy, a major utility company whose CEO is often touted as one of the eventual successors to Buffett at the helm of Berkshire.

On the other hand, Berkshire was on record as hating the railroad business.  When I was a panellist on BNN TV in Canada at noon today, fellow panellist Brian Milner, business columnist at the Globe & Mail in Toronto, mentioned that Charlie Munger, Buffett’s right-hand man at Berkshire, said two years ago he and Buffett hated the fundamentals of the railroad business.  Rolfe Winkler has a good post showing that the BNSF acquisition is fully priced. So, what gives – why is Berkshire paying top dollar for a company in an industry with what it used to describe as poor fundamentals?

The answer is coal.

This comes via MarketWatch (hat tip PapaSwamp):

Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s $44 billion deal to buy Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corp. is basically a huge bet on coal, a fuel that powers Warren Buffett’s power plants at his MidAmerican Energy utility and plays a major role in the railroad business.

While regulatory delays and uncertainty over climate-change legislation has slowed the addition of new U.S. coal plants, plenty of new facilities are expected to come on line in the United States, becoming prospects for future growth for the railroads.

Nine new coal plants have been permitted in the United States and 25 are under construction for a combined generation capacity of nearly 15,000 megawatts, according to an Oct. 9 report by the National Energy Technology Laboratory.

Moves by the Obama administration to curb emissions in proposed climate-change legislation are also anticipated to push the generation industry toward wider use of carbon-capture and storage technology at coal plants, which still supply nearly half of America’s electricity.

With the U.S. economy poised for a rebound, both the coal-fired electricity industry and the railroads that haul the black rock are primed for growth, leading Buffett to describe his huge purchase as "an all-in wager on the economic future of the United States."

Moreover, Munger’s comments in regards to coal were more to the effect ‘we hated railroads for decades. But we love them now because the industry has consolidated, affording the remaining players monopoly-like rents.’ Given the fact that BNSF gets a quarter of revenues from hauling coal and this is a major feedstock for MidAmerican, there are a lot of synergies.

The Motley Fool talks about Munger’s change regarding railroads in a December 2007 post on Charlie Munger’s 10 Rules for Investment Success:

9. Be ready for change
Accept unremovable complexity.

Investing success requires us to accept inevitable changes. Munger and Buffett hated railroads for decades, but as the times changed, they threw their old thoughts out the door and invested billions. The world around us won’t always conform to our preferences and prejudices, and sometimes our best ideas will prove incorrect. If you aren’t willing to roll with a changing market, you may find yourself fighting a lost cause.

The Wall Street Journal’s Matt Phillips also believes Buffett has waited until the turn to buy these assets as freight traffic is off its lows earlier this year – something Buffett tracks as a proxy for aggregate demand. But, this is not a market call alone. When Berkshire buys a business outright, they are making a long-term investment .

Let’s see how this call turns out because Buffett’s record over the last few years has been less stellar than in the past as ‘largeness’ makes earning high returns more difficult.  If you look at the timing of his Conoco Phillips and General Electric calls last year, there is ample room for doubt (Berkshire has since rotated out of COP).  On the other hand, his Goldman preferreds are looking quite nice.

Note: Goldman Sachs was also BNSF’s advisor on this deal.

Other sources

Catching up: Buffett bought railroads, J&J, Comcast – USA Today, May 2007

Buffett’s Berkshire buys more shares in railroad – USA Today, Jan 2008

Related posts:

• Buffett buys up Burlington Northern and does 50-1 split at Berkshire
• Warren Buffett backs Goldman
• Buffett to invest in General Electric
• Quote of the day: Warren Buffett
• Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting this weekend

Christopher Wood, the well-noted market strategist at CLSA and writer of the classic Japan crash warning book “The Bubble Economy,” is now warning of a market correction in the West.  According to CNBC India, Wood believes that the markets’ extreme upward move is increasing the chances of a major correction.

Wood is still cautious. He says there is some initial indication of a technical breakdown in the US. "The US market will be vulnerable early next year the US market. If it becomes clear, after this inventory cycle, that consumption, employment is not really recovering, then the market will go down. You will then get renewed stimulus in the US and measures trying to generate growth. The key variable in the West is government policy." CLSA’s best case scenario is 1,200 on the S&P 500 by year-end, he added.

I agree with Wood that underlying economic demand may indeed be weak and all we may be seeing is an inventory and stimulus induced cyclical upturn (see my July post “ISM: Is this the mother of all inventory corrections?”). Of course, the worry is about the employment cycle not turning up before these measures’ positive effect wears off.  This is the question for 2010. If this happens, we get  a double dip and a huge market-sell off. Even if the employment situation starts to improve slowly while stimulus and the inventory cycle recede, this will lead to a muddle-through scenario, again inducing a correction. This is the heart of Van Hoisington and Lacy Hunt’s call about partial recoveries and stock market weakness.

For those of you who want to believe and want to load up on junk, there’s a clap for that too, via bear turned bull Richard Bernstein:

Richard Bernstein of Richard Bernstein Capital Management is a lot more bullish. "Right now, there is a blurring between the secular issues and the cyclical ones. There are people, including me, who are concerned about the secular issues, but we can’t ignore the fact that the economy is getting better, employment is improving. When that happens you will see a cyclical rebound."

Just in September, Bernstein was saying America “practically invites another catastrophe.” What happened to that guy? He better be right on his bullish turn or he is going to have a lot of egg all over his face.

Source

Chances of a deeper correction are rising: Chris Wood – CNBC TV18 India

Related posts:

• Whitney Tilson: "A pullback of some sort is likely"
• Richard Bernstein: Once a huge market bear, now a bull
• Bill Gross: Sell equities and buy Treasuries
• Marc Faber: “Monetary policy in the United States will stay expansionary”
• Partial recovery will mean new lows for stocks

Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway has been making some very significant moves of late.  Selling of Moody’s shares is one.  But, the latest is sure to cause a stir amongst Buffett watchers because he is definitely making some “bets” on economic recovery with his purchase of Burlington Northern Santa Fe (BNI). It is unclear as yet what precipitated the share split (Hat tip Roula).

From Business Wire:

The boards of directors of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE: BRK.A; BRK.B) and Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation (BNSF; NYSE: BNI) today announced a definitive agreement for Berkshire Hathaway to acquire for $100 per share in cash and stock the remaining 77.4 percent of outstanding BNI shares not currently owned to increase its holdings to 100 percent. Based on the number of outstanding BNI shares (including shares currently owned by Berkshire) on Nov. 2, 2009, the transaction is valued at approximately $44 billion, including $10 billion of outstanding BNSF debt, making it the largest acquisition in Berkshire Hathaway history.

“Our country’s future prosperity depends on its having an efficient and well-maintained rail system,” said Warren E. Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway chairman and chief executive officer. “Conversely, America must grow and prosper for railroads to do well. Berkshire’s $34 billion investment in BNSF is a huge bet on that company, CEO Matt Rose and his team, and the railroad industry.

“Most important of all, however, it’s an all-in wager on the economic future of the United States,” said Mr. Buffett. “I love these bets.”

Railroad freight traffic is often used as a proxy for aggregate demand in the economy when looking for substitutes to government measures of GDP or consumption. So, clearly Buffett is making a bet on American prosperity going forward as the last paragraph I quoted says.

However, the announcements today at Berkshire were a twofer as Berkshire also announced a 50-1 stock split. Berkshire couches the rationale for the split in terms of making the transaction viable for small stockholders of Burlington Northern Sante Fe, but I suspect there is a bigger plan.  The press release on Berkshire’s site says:

The great majority of the stock issued by Berkshire in the BNSF acquisition announced today will be “A” shares. “B” shares, however, will also be needed to accommodate holders of smaller amounts of BNSF shares who opt for a share exchange rather than a cash payment.

By splitting Berkshire “B” shares 50-for-1, we can accommodate even the smallest holdings of BNSF shares that elect a tax-free exchange.

Berkshire Hathaway “A” shares last traded for a massive $98,750.00, putting it clearly out of reach for the average retail investor except through participation in a fund. Berkshire created the B-class of shares to accommodate more retail-oriented investors. So, I suspect this is a move to put “B’ shares further into the reach of retail investors. The B-shares last traded for $3,265, so a 50-1 split puts them at $65.30, a price any retail investor would find reasonable.

Related posts:

• Buffett: Is Berkshire’s Burlington move all about coal?
• Warren Buffett backs Goldman
• Buffett to invest in General Electric
• Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting this weekend
• Quote of the day: Warren Buffett

If one wants to see what happens when you use stimulus to help keep zombie companies alive and to resist reform efforts, look no further than Japan. 

For twenty years now, Japan has been dealing with the consequences of a burst asset bubble in shares and property. And for twenty years, the body politic has been unwilling to make the necessary reforms which would eliminate zombie companies while still helping to repair balance sheets in the private sector. Instead, the Japanese have piled government deficit upon deficit like Sisyphus trying to get consumers to reflate the economy. It has not worked.

Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), told the US Congress last week that the debt path was out of control and raised "a real risk that Japan could end up in a major default".

The IMF expects Japan’s gross public debt to reach 218pc of gross domestic product (GDP) this year, 227pc next year, and 246pc by 2014. This has been manageable so far only because Japanese savers have been willing – or coerced – into lending for almost nothing. The yield on 10-year government bonds has been around 1.30pc this year, though they jumped to 1.42pc last week.

"Can these benign conditions be expected to continue in the face of even-larger increases in public debt? Going forward, the markets capacity to absorb debt is likely to diminish as population ageing reduces saving," said the IMF.

The savings rate has crashed from 15pc in 1990 to near 2pc today, half America’s rate. Japan’s $1.5 trillion state pension fund (the world’s biggest) has become a net seller of government bonds this year, as it must to meet pay-out obligations. The demographic crunch has hit. The workforce been contracting since 2005.

Japan Post Bank is balking at further additions to its $1.7 trillion holdings of state debt. The pillars of the government debt market are crumbling. Little wonder that the Ministry of Finance has begun advertising bonds in Tokyo taxis, featuring Koyuki from The Last Samurai. If Japan’s bond rates rise to global levels of 3pc to 4pc, interest costs will shatter state finances.

What this illustrates is that stimulus cannot be seen as a cure-all in an economy which lacks in domestic demand or in which debt burdens are high. I see this as a cautionary tale for The Europeans and Americans looking at stimulus as some magic bullet which will make structural problems disappear.

I increasingly ask myself whether any advanced democracy has the foresight to implement a targeted monetary stimulus campaign without knee-capping efforts to induce more private sector savings – fiscal stimulus is a whole different affair. Right now, the savings rate in Japan is even lower than in the United States, a direct result of easy money.

In my view, fiscal or monetary stimulus are bridges to a sustainable economic future built on the back of deleveraging, a purge of malinvestments and industry consolidation. Right now, the stimulus in Japan is looking more like a bridge to nowhere.

It is Japan we should be worrying about, not America – Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Telegraph

Related posts:

• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Pushing on a string and similar notions on monetary policy ineffectiveness
• The new Japan, domestic consumption, and the neo-liberal thought machine
• Don Kohn says Fed policy has kept rates down 100 basis points
• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck

If you have been wondering whether a statistical recovery is at hand, today’s ISM manufacturing report should be the clincher.  The report was definitely bullish with the ISM index rising to 55.7 and sub-components supporting the understanding that the manufacturing sector is expanding. This is quite a contrast to last month’s weak data and demonstrates that last month was a one-month aberration in what should now be seen as a full-blown technical recovery.

I want to talk about this recovery briefly in the context of the signs that came before it, my own forecasting psychology and what the future holds.

The ISM data

The key data points to see as evidence of a fairly broad-based expansion in manufacturing come from new orders, production and inventories.  The production number came in at an incredibly bullish 63.3, marking the fifth consecutive month of increase. New orders slipped slightly, but were also in striking distance of the 60 range. (50 represents the demarcation between expansion and contraction).

But, from my perspective, it is inventories which are the most bullish data points. The inventories data show that inventories in the manufacturing sector were still being purged in October even while production is increasing.  That means that inventories are likely to make a huge contribution to GDP going forward in Q1 and Q2 of 2010. GDP could again surprise to the upside.

My mea culpa on forecast herding

All of this suggests the economy has been growing since the beginning of Summer. In the early Spring, I indicated that jobless claims were peaking (which added to my stock market bullishness at the time). This call turns out to have been accurate. However, at the time, this post produced very negative sentiments, albeit more from readers on Naked Capitalism than Credit Writedowns – in my opinion because most people erroneously extrapolate a current trend into the future (see my reaction to this from a post weeks later, “Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere”)

Nevertheless, a piece from NBER guru Robert Gordon that I reported demonstrated to me that I was not alone in seeing the trend reversal in jobless claims. Eventually, in May I indicated that the jobless claims data were pointing to an imminent recovery and remarked that the data had usually been fairly accurate in the past.

And for the record, I have said I see a recovery happening probably in Q4 2009 or Q1 2010 (see my post “The Fake Recovery”).

The real question is how robust a recovery are we going to have and this is directly related to why the jobless claims series has been sending a false signal.  Now, initial claims has been sending a recovery signal since January. Yet, continuing claims continued to rise more quickly until last week.  In the past, one had seen these two series as harbingers of imminent recovery.  But, I am talking Q4 here.  Why? Deleveraging.

In the end, consumers are going to be forced to reduce debt and save more in this more cautious financial environment.  Team Obama does seem intent on re-kindling animal spirits but the personal savings rate has gone up nonetheless.  This will be a drag on GDP growth going forward and means that the economy’s rebound will be more tenuous and slower to develop.  In my view, this means recovery will be delayed and once it gets going it will be weak.  The potential for a double dip is very high.

So, to be clear, first derivatives are starting to turn up and since recession is a first derivative event, we are probably going to see an end to this recession soon enough.  But, with structural problems still remaining, the U.S. economy will be weak for a long time to come.

Why do I bring this up?  Because, despite the data pointing to recovery, I decided the start of the recovery process would be delayed until this quarter or Q1 2010 by consumers repairing their balance sheets – and, in retrospect, in part due to a desire to avoid being too far out of step with the consensus.

I must admit to falling prey to forecast herding, something I talked about in June (admittedly without mentioning my own culpability which I should have done). At the time, I said:

No one wants to go out on a limb with a bold call only to see this prediction proved wrong.  If one fails, it is better to fail conventionally.  The necessary corollary of that statement is this: market forecasters and analysts play it safe by making sure their forecasts are not often far from the consensus forecast.  Think of the consensus forecast as an anchor which restricts the outlook of any individual forecaster afraid of failing unconventionally.

In Roubini’s case – and this logic also applies to media darlings like Meredith Whitney – it does NOT pay to up the ante.  What Faber is saying is that they have already benefitted from the bold and unconventional contrarian market call they initially made.  There is little payoff and much risk from continuing on that path.  A bearish analyst who misses the turn gets the stick.  Just ask the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman.

Roubini is not running with the herd

The one thing that makes me think about my error in tweaking my bullishness has to do with Nouriel Roubini. In the quote above, I said he has little incentive to double down on a bearish forecast at this point in time.  Both he and Meredith Whitney, two voices of caution leading into crisis, have been much more upbeat of late. Are they hedging as I did?  Hard to say.

But, with Nouriel Roubini’s recent FT Op-Ed, this is over. Roubini decried the easy money policy he believes is leading to a dollar carry trade and an increase of risk appetite across a wide variety of asset classes. He believes this experiment will not end well. I share his view.

Roubini, in going public in this way, is officially departing from a more hedged nuanced position he has been using over the last few months as the recovery has taken hold. Yves Smith says:

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp.

I applaud him for coming out with this piece and suggest you read it because it may come to be seen as the make or break call in determining his reputation as economic soothsayer.

Recovery is happening, but watch asset prices

For my part, I will look to avoid a repeat of the ‘jobless claims incident.’ Hopefully, I have done by writing my depression post at the beginning of last month, which outlines my view that we are in a cyclical recovery in the middle of a longer-term depression.

I would like to make some amendments to my thinking at the time though. First and foremost, I have come to doubt whether we are seeing a balance sheet recession right now. One reason I am writing this post is because the ISM manufacturing data turned up in May at precisely the same time that the credit revulsion-induced savings rate turned down. Translation: there is no balance sheet recession in the U.S., at least not yet. (see my post “Americans are not increasing savings”). This means the recovery could surprise to the upside. Moreover, the ISM data point to potential upside surprises from inventories, leading to an even more robust outlook.

What I believe is happening has much to do with Nouriel Roubini’s comments. U.S. economic policy is geared toward reproducing the status quo ante via reflation of asset prices (something Bill Gross thinks is the right policy and even Dilbert has made fun of). The policy has been wildly successful so far, with asset prices bubbling over globally. I have called this the fake recovery, but as recently as September I was on the fence about how much uptick we were to get. I never dreamed the recovery process could be so robust given the headwinds we faced.

However, reflation has also given investors a license to take risk. Look at the return of John Meriwether as a telltale sign.  Reflation policies are inflating assets far and wide: European high yield, American high yield, Swedish house prices, London house prices, Chinese property prices, and inducing reckless lending. The list is endless. Even Bill Gross’ piece pointed to inflated prices, a view shared by Jeremy Grantham.

The long and short is we are seeing another asset bubble inflating courtesy of easy money. While Morgan Stanley worries easy money will lead to inflation, former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie fears this will end in a double dip. To make matters worse, there is a dollar carry trade now spreading a liquidity seeking return dynamic abroad. This is the additional risk of which Roubini writes, believing it could precipitate another crunch or crash. Ironically, a strong recovery is not necessarily bullish.

Is a double dip or crash a baseline scenario? No, not necessarily – but it is increasingly likely. So, as bullish as I believe the data are, I am more worried about a bad outcome, not less.

Related posts:

• ISM shows manufacturing sector close to recovery
• Both initial claims and continuing claims now pointing to recovery
• Jobless claims may signal the end is near
• ISM: September manufacturing data disappoint; market sells off
• Morgan Stanley: Recession will ‘end by mid-to-late summer’

(H/T Prieur du Plessis)

Source

Walt Handelsman – Newsday

Related posts:

• Kass: Bearish on equities
• News from around the web: 2009-10-13
• Jobless claims back to 551,000; employment missing link to recovery
• News from around the web: 2009-07-31
• Average U.S. jobless claims top 600,000

This photo from Yves Smith’s antidote du jour was too good to pass up. You can think of the cat as the recovery stalking its prey and the bear as, well, a bear. The cat looks pretty tame though. Let’s hope this bear doesn’t come right back down and maul it.

Related posts:

• How did economists get it so wrong (parody version)?
• News from around the web: 2009-07-23
• Links: 2009-06-20
• Household debt as an indicator of secular bull and bear markets
• CNBC denies culpability in Roubini as bull saga

There is an enormous dichotomy in foreign exchange markets that has wide-ranging implications for the global economy.  In Europe, most currencies float freely against the U.S. dollar. In Asia and the Mideast, most do not.

What this has meant in practice is two things. First, as the U.S. dollar has weakened, it has done so only against those currencies which are free floating. This has meant the lion’s share of any adjustments in global imbalances have fallen on the likes of Japan and Germany. Second, those countries which are pegged have had to resort to currency intervention and a massive build-up of foreign reserves to stop their currencies from appreciating.  This is inflationary for those countries, and is one reason there is a housing and equities boom in Asia right now.

But, as the dollar continues to weaken, those countries with pegs will be under pressure to drop their peg or to revalue their pegs higher.  The Bloomberg video linked below explains. The dichotomy whereby the adjustment process is done only through free-floating currencies is inherently unstable – and invites a nationalistic response.

A busted peg in any major U.S. trading partner’s currency is likely to have a very negative psychological impact on currency markets and severe knock-on effects.  These are what I call digital events.  It’s all or nothing, on or off. Either the peg is revalued enormously or there will be continuing pressure.

As an example, look back to 1998 when the Russians attempted to devalue the ruble.  The immediate effect was a sense that the ruble was not devalued enough, leading to an all-out assault on the currency and a much more massive devaluation which in turn triggered default.

I would anticipate a similar albeit less pronounced dynamic were the Chinese or the Saudis to revalue significantly.  There would be tremendous downward pressure on the greenback globally, more pressure on the busted pegs and increasing pressure on other pegged currencies to revalue. The result, of course, would be higher interest rates in the United States and a likely double dip.

Busted pegs are not something I necessarily expect. However, this is the type of exogenous shock that is a clear downside risk to my more benign muddle through baseline scenario – and one reason to prefer gold over bonds in reducing exposure to equities.

Currencies Pegged to Dollar May Abandon Greenback: Video – You Tube

Related posts:

• The dollar is rising against floating currencies
• The Big Mac Index
• The Dollar
• Is the Fed just jawboning?
• U.S. Dollar: Cliff Diving Again

Last year at this time I posted “The Economy’s Four Horsemen,” which described macro cause and effect leading into and out of recessions.  When looking at income, spending, output and employment, it is income which is the steer variable going into a downturn.  Year-on-year changes in income precede changes in spending, output, employment and recession. So, in order to gauge what is likely to occur in any business cycle downturn and plan your business spending accordingly, you need to know what is happening to personal income.

To get a grip on this, I am going to look back at prior monthly data series on personal income dating to 1929.  What I am looking for is to pinpoint when in the economic cycle the change in personal income reverses course and whether this presages recoveries as well as recessions.

Here goes.

(click on image to enlarge)

*Note on data: I am using a six month average of the year-on-year change in inflation-adjusted personal income.

Top in personal income growth precedes recession. What I found is that a downturn in the change in personal income almost always precedes recession – and often by a large margin.  This proves that an individual business could look at the data on personal income and get a hint of an impending downturn – and react accordingly.

War used to stoke domestic income growth. There were a few false tops, however.  Most of them were war-related. For example, during World War II, there was a false top in 1941. But, by mid-1942, wartime production caused a renewed boom in personal income. the lag between the false top of Sep 1941 and the renewed turn in Jun 1942 was pretty significant. But, this was a clear aberration. As were the false tops in Dec 1950 associated with the Korean War and the ones in Feb 1966 and Nov 1968 associated with the Vietnam War. It seems post-depression, the ginning up of the military industrial complex was a significant factor in preventing economic bust.

Near-recessions in the mid-1970s and 1980s. After the Wars, a mid-1970s and mid-1980s dip were evident as well. However, in neither case did the change in inflation-adjusted personal income go negative.  Think of these as almost-recessions.  The markets went lower as well. In the mid-1970s, the near-recession personal income trough came in Jul 1977. The Dow peaked in Dec 1976 and kept falling until Feb 1978. In the mid-1980s, the numbers hit a trough of 1.9% in September 1987 when the stock market crashed. There were relapses in 1993 and 1996 as well. But, markets did not fall.

Recovery seems to precede uptick in income growth. While incomes suffer before recession on the way to recession, they lag on the way out, making recessions that much more painful. (See chart above). An increase in the change in personal income does not presage recovery.

Income-less recoveries in 1991, 2001, and 2009.  In each of the last three recessions, average year-on-year real income changes were negative. It is still negative now (-2.6% year-on-year, –2.5% average year-on-year, and –1.3% year-on-year adjusted for inflation).

So what does this say about the current cycle?

There are no false bottoms in the real income data. So,the data suggest that we are in recovery (maximum decline in personal income was November 2008), but that we are still in a very weak period in which a double dip is possible (average real personal income change is still –1.3%). Also, average real personal income losses have been less than they were in 1980 when we were in the first dip of the last double dip recession – one benefit of not having high inflation.

As far as I can ascertain, the data don’t really reveal any patterns between the stock market and personal income.

Related posts:

• Do the personal income data demonstrate unbalanced reflation?
• US personal income data for September shows pullback
• Why the personal consumption data is important to the stock market
• Recession: How Long and How Deep?
• Data on past consumer deleveraging during recessions

The Reserve Bank of Australia unexpectedly raised rates by 25 basis points to cool down its economy. It will “gradually reduce stimulus” in anticipation of sustained recovery. Australia has probably been the major economy least affected by the global economic slowdown, so one would expect the RBA to be the first major central bank to increase rates. However, the question now is whether other central banks will follow.

In the U.S., Donald Kohn and Richard Fisher have made fairly hawkish statements suggesting that the Federal Reserve is going to be more anti-inflation now than in the Greenspan era.  However, New York Federal Reserve Chairman William Dudley obviously didn’t get the memo about jawboning the market in a hawkish way.  Yesterday, he indicated that the U.S. Federal Reserve is likely to keep rates very low for a prolonged period for fear of choking off a tenuous recovery.

So while the RBA is raising rates, the Fed and the ECB may not follow anytime soon. That is certainly supportive of the Australian dollar.

Below is a CNBC video that gives you a chance to see the real-time reaction to the RBA’s decision and another with some commentary on the Aussie dollar.

Related posts:

• Reserve Bank of Australia lifts rates again
• The ECB cuts rates 50 basis points to 2 percent
• Is the Fed just jawboning?
• Chart of the day: interest rates
• Norway makes three

For the last few months I have been casting around looking for bullish data points as counterfactuals to my more bearish long-term outlook. I have found some, but not enough. If you recall, early this year, I stated that we are in depression, making the case for the ongoing downturn as a depression with a small ‘d.’ Nevertheless, I was quite optimistic about the ability of policymakers to engineer a fake recovery predicated on stimulus and asset price reflation and I certainly saw this as bullish for financial shares if not the broader stock market. But, I saw these events as temporary salves for a deeper structural problem.

As a result, I have been on a quest to find data which disproves my original thesis – signs that the green shoots that everyone keeps talking about (and a term I had banned from my site) are part of a sustainable economic recovery. Unfortunately, I have concluded that they are not. This post will discuss why we are in a depression, not a recession and what this means about likely future economic and investing paths. I will try to pull together a number of threads from previous posts, add some context via Wikipedia links and draw in some good discussion via recent posts by Prieur du Plessis on balance sheet recessions and Marshall Auerback on the sector financial balances model of economics which completed the picture for me.

This post is very long and I have had to shorten it in order to pull all of the ideas into one post. Please do read the linked posts for background as I left out some of the detail in order to create this narrative.

Let’s start here then with the crux of the issue: debt.

Deep recession rooted in structural issues

Back in my very first post in March of 2008, I said that the U.S. was already in a recession, the only question being how deep and how long – a question I answered in the next post saying “we are definitely in recession. And according to Gary Shilling, this recession is going to be a big one. Worse than 2001, 1990-91 or the double dip recession of 1980-82.” This has certainly turned out to be true.  The issue was and still is overconsumption i.e. levels of consumption supported only by increase in debt levels and not by future earnings. This is the core of our problem – debt.

I see the debt problem as an outgrowth of pro-growth, anti-recession macroeconomic policy which developed as a reaction to the trauma of the lost decade in the U.S. and the U.K.. This was a period of low growth, high inflation and poor market returns, in which the U.K. became the sick man of Europe and labor strife brought that economy to its knees.  It is a period that saw the resignation of an American President and the humiliation of the Iran Hostage Crisis.

In essence, after the inflationary outcome that many saw as an outgrowth of the Samuelson-Keynesianism of the 1960s and 1970s, the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1990s ushered in a more ‘free-market’ orientation in macroeconomic policy. The key issue was government intervention. Policy makers following Samuelson (more so than Keynes himself) have stressed the positive effect of government intervention, pointing to the Great Depression as animus, and the New Deal, and World War II as proof. Other economists (notably Milton Friedman, and later Robert Lucas) have stressed the primacy of markets, pointing to the end of Bretton Woods, the Nixon Shock and stagflation as counterfactuals. They point to the Great Moderation and secular bull market of 1982-2000 as proof. This is a divisive and extremely political issue, in which the two sides have been labelled Freshwater and Saltwater economists (see my post “Freshwater versus saltwater circa 1988”).

However, just as the policy of the 1950s to the 1970s was not really Keynesian (read Keynes’ General Theory as Richard Posner did and you will see why), the 1980s-2000 was not really an era of true ‘free markets.’ I call it deregulation as crony capitalism.  What this has meant in practice is that the well-connected, particularly in the financial services industry, have won out over the middle classes (a view I take up in “A populist interpretation of the latest boom-bust cycle”). In fact, hourly earnings peaked over 35 years ago in the United States when adjusting for inflation.

Remember, the 1970s was a difficult period in which the U.K. and the U.S. saw jobs vanish in key industrial sectors. To stop the rot and effectively mask the lack of income growth by average workers, a new engine of growth had to be found. Enter the financial sector. The financialization of the American and British economies began in the 1980s, greatly increasing the size and impact of the financial sector (see Kevin Phillips’ book “Bad Money”). The result was an enormous increase in debt, especially in the financial sector.

This debt problem was made manifest repeatedly during financial crises of the era. Not all of these crises were American – most were abroad and merely facilitated by an increase in credit, liquidity, and international capital movement. In March 2008, I wrote in my third post on the US economy in 2008:

From the very beginning, the excess liquidity created by the U.S. Federal Reserve created an excess supply of money, which repeatedly found its way through hot money flows to a mis-allocation of investment capital and an asset bubble somewhere in the global economy. In my opinion, the global economy continued to grow above trend through to the new millennium because these hot money flows created bubbles only in less central parts of the global economy (Mexico in 1994-95, Thailand and southeast Asia in 1997, Russia and Brazil in 1998, and Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil in 2001-03). But, this growth was unsustainable as the global imbalances mounted.

Eventually, the debt burdens became too large and resulted in the housing meltdown and the concomitant collapse of the financial sector, a looming problem that our policymakers should have seen. This is why my blog is named Credit Writedowns. But, make no mistake, the housing and writedown problems are only symptoms. The real problem is the debt – specifically an overly indebted private sector (note the phrase ‘private sector’ as I will return to this topic).

This is a depression, not a recession

When debt is the real issue underlying an economic downturn, the result is a period of stagnation and short business cycles as we have seen in Japan over the last two decades.  This is what a modern-day depression looks like – a series of W’s where uneven economic growth is punctuated by fits of recession. A recession is merely a period of recalibration after businesses get ahead of themselves by overestimating consumption demand and are then forced to cut back by making staff redundant, paring back inventories and cutting capacity. Recessions can be overcome with the help of automatic stabilzers like unemployment insurance to cushion the blow. Depression is another event entirely. Back in February, I highlighted a blurb from David Rosenberg which summed up the differences between recession and depression quite well.

Depressions marked by balance sheet compression
Recessions are typically characterized by inventory cycles – 80% of the decline in GDP is typically due to the de-stocking in the manufacturing sector. Traditional policy stimulus almost always works to absorb the excess by stimulating domestic demand. Depressions often are marked by balance sheet compression and deleveraging: debt elimination, asset liquidation and rising savings rates. When the credit expansion reaches bubble proportions, the distance to the mean is longer and deeper. Unfortunately, as our former investment strategist Bob Farrell’s Rule #3 points out, excesses in one direction lead to excesses in the opposite direction.

The next day, I highlighted Ray Dalio’s version of this story because it takes a historical view and rightly emphasizes the debtor instead of the lender as the crux of the problem. Notice the part about printing money and devaluing the currency if the debt is in your own currency.

… economies go through a long-term debt cycle — a dynamic that is self-reinforcing, in which people finance their spending by borrowing and debts rise relative to incomes and, more accurately, debt-service payments rise relative to incomes. At cycle peaks, assets are bought on leverage at high-enough prices that the cash flows they produce aren’t adequate to service the debt. The incomes aren’t adequate to service the debt. Then begins the reversal process, and that becomes self-reinforcing, too. In the simplest sense, the country reaches the point when it needs a debt restructuring…

This has happened in Latin America regularly. Emerging countries default, and then restructure. It is an essential process to get them economically healthy.

We will go through a giant debt-restructuring, because we either have to bring debt-service payments down so they are low relative to incomes — the cash flows that are being produced to service them — or we are going to have to raise incomes by printing a lot of money.

It isn’t complicated. It is the same as all bankruptcies, but when it happens pervasively to a country, and the country has a lot of foreign debt denominated in its own currency, it is preferable to print money and devalue…

The Federal Reserve went out and bought or lent against a lot of the debt. That has had the effect of reducing the risk of that debt defaulting, so that is good in a sense. And because the risk of default has gone down, it has forced the interest rate on the debt to go down, and that is good, too.

However, the reason it hasn’t actually produced increased credit activity is because the debtors are still too indebted and not able to properly service the debt. Only when those debts are actually written down will we get to the point where we will have credit growth. There is a mortgage debt piece that will need to be restructured. There is a giant financial-sector piece — banks and investment banks and whatever is left of the financial sector — that will need to be restructured. There is a corporate piece that will need to be restructured, and then there is a commercial-real-estate piece that will need to be restructured.

Commence the fake recovery

So where are we, then?  We have left the fake recovery and are entering a new era of growth that could last as long as three or four years or could peter out very quickly in a double dip recession. By now, you have seen my post on the fake recovery, so I won’t cover that ground here.  However, I do want to highlight how I came to believe in the fake recovery and how asset prices have played into this period (the S&L crisis played out nearly the same way).  I see writedowns as core to the transmission mechanism of debt and credit problems to the real economy via reduced supply and demand for credit. Again, this is why my site is called Credit Writedowns.

In March, at the depths of the downturn I wrote:

The problem is the writedowns. You see, if you get $30 billion in capital from the government, but lose another $40 billion because of credit writedowns and loan losses, you aren’t going to be lending any money. To me, that says the downturn will only end when the massive writedowns end, not before.

The U.S. government has finally realized this and is now moving to stem the tide. Their efforts point in four directions:

1. Increase asset prices. If the assets on the balance sheets of banks are falling, then why not buy them at higher prices and stop the bloodletting? This is the purpose of the TALF, Obama’s mortgage relief program and the original purpose of the TARP.
2. Increase asset prices. If assets on the balance sheet are falling, why not eliminate the accounting rules that are making them fall? Get rid of marking-to-market. This is the purpose of the newly proposed FASB accounting rule change.
3. Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not reduce interest rates so that the debt payments which are crushing debtors ability to finance those assets are reduced? This is why short-term interest rates are near zero.
4. Increase asset prices. If asset prices on the balance sheet are falling, why not create Public-Private partnerships to buy up those assets at prices which reflect their longer-term value? This is what Geithner’s Capital Assistance Program is designed to do.

So I lied, there is only one direction the government is headed: increase asset prices (or, at least keep them from falling). Read White House Economic Advisor Larry Summers’ recent prepared remarks to see what I mean. (Summers on How to Deal With a ‘Rarer Kind of Recession’ – WSJ)

I was more on target in my thinking here than I could have known. Within two weeks, the mark-to-market model was dead and mark-to-make believe had begun. It was then that I knew a recovery was likely to take hold. And it was going to be bullish for bank stocks and the broader market. What you should realize is that, despite the remaining problems in credit cards, commercial real estate or high yield loans, limiting credit growth, the changes instituted by government definitely have meant 1. that banks will earn a shed load of money and 2. that house price declines have stalled, underpinning the asset base of lenders. This necessarily means an end to massive writedowns, a firming of banks’ capital base, and a reduction in private sector deleveraging.

As an aside, I should mention that this dynamic called the asset-based economy, where economic well-being is dependent on asset prices, is far more pronounced in Anglo-Saxon countries like the U.S. and the U.K. (and Australia, Ireland, and Canada to a degree). While the free market ideal has gained sway globally, it is viewed with much more skepticism elsewhere. In Germany, for example, the term Anglo-Saxon is often bandied about as an epithet for political demagoguery to represent free market ideology. These cultural differences are something I explored in my post “Cultural attitudes on work, leisure and wealth in Europe and America.”

As for the recent asset-based economic reflation, be under no illusion that these measures ‘solve’ the problem. The toxic assets are still impaired and banks are still under-capitalized. But the increased asset value and the end of huge writedowns has underpinned the banks and led to a rise in the broader market in a feedback loop that has been far greater than I could have imagined at this stage in the economic cycle.

The double dip or the economic boom?

So what’s next?  A lot of the economic cycle is self-reinforcing (the change in inventories is one example). So it is not completely out of the question that we see a multi-year economic boom.  Higher asset prices, lower inventories, fewer writedowns all lead to higher lending capacity, higher cyclical output, more employment opportunities and greater business and consumer confidence. If employment turns up appreciably before these cyclical agents lose steam, you have the makings of a multi-year recovery. This is how every economic cycle develops. This one is no different in this regard.

However, longer-term things depend entirely on government because we are in a balance sheet recession. Ray Dalio and David Rosenberg make this case well in the previous quotes I supplied, but it was a recent post about Richard Koo from Prieur du Plessis which got me to write this post. His post, “Koo: Government fulfilling necessary function” reads as follows:

According to Koo, American consumers are suffering from a balance sheet problem and will not increase consumption until their personal finances are back in order. The banks are not lending mainly because nobody wants to borrow and, furthermore, the banks want to build their own balance sheets (raise cash) and get rid of toxic garbage…

Again, when asked what would happen if the government cuts back on its fiscal stimulus, Koo replies: “Until the private sector is finished repairing its balance sheets, if the government tries to cut its spending, we’re going to fall into the same trap Franklin Roosevelt fell into in 1937 (a crushing bear market) and Prime Minister Hashimoto fell into in 1997, exactly 70 years later.

“The economy will collapse again and the second collapse is usually far worse than the first. And the reason is that, after the first collapse, people tend to blame themselves. They say, ‘I shouldn’t have played the bubble. I shouldn’t have borrowed money to invest – to speculate on these things.’

This view of a second, more serious downturn mirrors the one I wrote of when I wrote about high structural unemployment last week. And, again, it is predicated on what government does.  I wrote last November that if government stops the support, recession is going to happen.

The U.S. economy cannot possibly work itself out of the greatest financial crisis in some 70-odd years in a mere 4 years and then expect to raise taxes on the middle class without a major recessionary relapse.

So, when you hear policy makers talking about reducing the deficit as soon as possible, what you should think is 1938 and continued depression.

Right now, if you listen to what President Obama is likely to do when we see more economic growth, you know that the government prop for the economy is going to be taken away. Koo again:

So the fact that Larry Summers was talking about ‘temporary’ fiscal stimulus had me very, very worried. That whole Larry Summers idea that one big injection of fiscal stimulus will get the US out of the recession, and everything will be fine thereafter, probably led to President Obama’s saying he’s going to cut his budget deficit in half in four years.”

Get ready because the second dip will occur. It will be nasty: unemployment will be higher and stocks will go lower than in 2009. I am convinced that it is politically unacceptable to have the government propping up the economy as Koo suggests it should. The question now is one of timing: when will the government stop propping up the economy? The more robust the recovery, the quicker the prop ends and the sooner we get a second leg down.

So to recap:

1. A depression was borne out of high levels of private sector debt, the unsustainability of which became apparent after a financial crisis.
2. The effects of this depression have been lessened by economic stimulus and government support.
3. Government intervention led to a reduction in asset price declines, which led to stock market increases, which led to asset price stabilization and more stock market increases and eventually to asset price increases. This has led to a false sense that green shoots are leading to a sustainable recovery.
4. In reality, the problems of high debt levels in the private sector and an undercapitalized financial system are still lurking, waiting for the government to withdraw its economic support to become realized
5. Because large scale government deficit spending is politically impossible, expect a second economic dip within three to four years at the latest.

Why is government spending necessary?

The government plays a crucial role here because of the huge private sector indebtedness.  In the U.S. and the U.K., the public sector is not nearly as indebted. So while, the private sector rebuilds its savings and reduces debt, the public sector must pick up the slack.  Why do I say must? It’s because of an accounting identity which comes from the financial sector balances model. Marshall Auerback says it best in a recent post:

We’ve said it before and we’ll say it again. As a matter of national accounting, the domestic private sector cannot increase savings unless and until foreign or government sectors increase deficits. Call this the tyranny of double entry bookkeeping: the government’s deficit equals by identity the non-government’s surplus.

So, if the US private sector is to rebuild its balance sheet by spending less than its income, the government will have to spend more than its tax revenue. The only other possibility is that the rest of the world stops saving on a massive scale — letting the US run a current account surplus. But that is highly implausible and socially undesirable, since it means we export our economic output, rather than consume it domestically. And if the government deficit does not grow fast enough to meet the saving needs of the private domestic sector, national income will decline, which, given the size of the private sector’s debt problem, will generate a huge debt deflation.

This is the foundation of modern monetary theory. Would that the IMF and the G20 understood these basic facts.

If the private sector is a net saver, the public sector must, I repeat must, run a deficit. That’s the law of double entry book-keeping. The only other way to prevent the government from running a deficit when the private sector is net saving is to run huge current account surpluses by exporting your way out of recession – what Germany and Japan tried in the 1990s and in this decade. But, of course, the G20 and the IMF are all talking about global re-balancing. This cult of zero imbalances is something Marshall first brought forward back in April. And it ignores the accounting identity inherent in the financial sector balances model. I highlighted this model in my post, “Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head.” However, I must admit to having a preternatural disaffection for large deficits and big government which is what Koo and Minsky advise respectively – a recent cartoon shows why.  It is this knee-jerk aversion to what is viewed as fiscal profligacy which is at the core of the cult of zero imbalances.

So, what does this mean for the American and global economy?

1. The private sector (particularly households) is overly indebted. The level of debt households now carry cannot be supported by income at the present levels of consumption. The natural tendency, therefore, is toward more saving and less spending in the private sector (although asset price appreciation can attenuate this through the Wealth Effect).  That necessarily means the public sector must run a deficit or the import-export sector must run a surplus.
2. Most countries are in a state of economic weakness. That means consumption demand is constrained globally. There is no chance that the U.S. can export its way out of recession without a collapse in the value of the U.S. dollar. That leaves the government as the sole way to pick up the slack.
3. Since state and local governments are constrained by falling tax revenue (see WSJ article) and the inability to print money, only the Federal Government can run large deficits.
4. Deficit spending on this scale is politically unacceptable and will come to an end as soon as the economy shows any signs of life (say 2 to 3% growth for one year). Therefore, at the first sign of economic strength, the Federal Government will raise taxes and/or cut spending. The result will be a deep recession with higher unemployment and lower stock prices.
5. Meanwhile, all countries which issue the vast majority of debt in their own currency (U.S, Eurozone, U.K., Switzerland, Japan) will inflate. They will print as much money as they can reasonably get away with.  While the economy is in an upswing, this will create a false boom, predicated on asset price increases. This will be a huge bonus for hard assets like gold, platinum or silver.  However, when the prop of government spending is taken away, the global economy will relapse into recession.
6. As a result there will be a Scylla and Charybdis of inflationary and deflationary forces, which will force the hands of central bankers in adding and withdrawing liquidity. Add in the likely volatility in government spending and taxation and you have the makings of a depression shaped like a series of W’s consisting of short and uneven business cycles. The secular force is the D-process and the deleveraging, so I expect deflation to be the resulting secular trend more than inflation.
7. Needless to say, this kind of volatility will induce a wave of populist sentiment, leading to an unpredictable and violent geopolitical climate and the likelihood of more muscular forms of government.
8. From an investing standpoint, consider this a secular bear market for stocks then.  Play the rallies, but be cognizant that the secular trend for the time being is down. The Japanese example which we are now tracking is a best case scenario.

Not particularly uplifting, but hopefully well-documented. Your comments are very greatly appreciated.

Related posts:

• We are in depression
• Household debt as an indicator of secular bull and bear markets
• What is an economic depression?
• Some tidbits about stimulus, recovery, and the Great Depression
• What’s different about 2008?

As a follow-up to my post on debt and it’s exclusion as a subject of merit amongst several schools of economic thought, I wanted to bring a New York Times article from 1988 to your attention. This article by Peter Kilborn, a Washington, D.C. based and long-time former correspondent for the New York Times, is timeless.

It reads like an article right out of 2008 or 2009 and highlights how little has been decided in the debate about the economic effect, size and role of government. Many of the key players – Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, and Robert Lucas to name a few – are the same. At issue is the divide between freshwater and saltwater economists that has been raging for at least a generation now. Kilborn says:

To tinker or not to tinker? For decades most politicians and professors of economics have taken it for granted that the Government must adjust the engines of the economy to avoid recessions and create jobs. But lately, a long-belittled school of skeptics who think the Government usually just gums things up is gaining attention and influence.

The skeptics are known as ”fresh water” economists, less for the purity of their thought than for their origins at universities along the shores of the Great Lakes.

The school’s views are filtering into such lofty citadels of mainstream ‘’salt water” economics as Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton and Stanford. Its theories also appeal to economists who are advising the Presidential election campaign of George Bush, and, to a lesser extent, those working for Michael S. Dukakis.

The fresh-water people build their case for minimal intervention on the view that workers, consumers, business executives and investors anticipate changes in the economy faster than the Government and can adjust to them better on their own.

On some level, one could say this divide is manifest in how the political fault lines in the U.S. are forming. Larry Summers, President Obama’s chief economic advisor, is a saltwater type with definite freshwater sympathies. 

On the other side of the political spectrum are those who want small government, a view championed by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Republicans are drawn to this positioning because it invokes the Reagan presidency, which was a high point for the post-Nixonian Republican Party. 

You will have noticed my post earlier today on Sarah Palin walking in the small government, Libertarian mantle as she crafts a strategy to take control of the party.

In the article, Krugman sums up the crux of the divide nicely, with Robert Lucas taking the other side:

”The basic distinction,” he said, ”is do you think recessions present a problem? And do you think the Government can do something to avert them? The fresh-water people say that recessions either are nothing to worry about or that in any case, the Government can’t do anything about them.”

Robert E. Lucas, the undisputed dean of the fresh-water school and chairman of the economics department at the University of Chicago, said, ”What we’re turning against is the idea that you can fine-tune the economy with any policy at all.” The university has long been the home of monetarist economics, which maintains that steady, noninflationary growth results from steady growth of the money supply and of which the newer theory is an offshoot.

So, if you are wondering where all of the back and forth is coming from on economic theory and why it has failed us, take a step back in time to the late 1980s. The debate is pretty much the same today.

Source

‘Fresh Water’ Economists Gain – NY Times

Related posts:

• Links: 2009-01-18
• The Fed wants inflation
• Why the personal consumption data is important to the stock market
• A brief philosophical argument about the role of government, stimulus and recession
• The Fed is on the easy money trip

Today, Moody’s warned that Iceland, Latvia and Hungary were stabilizing but that their economies remained fragile. The problem is high debt levels, which is restraining consumer spending. Recovery in the Eurozone has been the main aid to stabilization, the report said. Absent this support, the outlook is considerably worse.

Moody’s re-affirmed Iceland and Hungary’s ratings of Baa1 and Latvia’s of Baa3, one notch above junk. But, Moody’s refused to remove its negative outlook to the countries’ credit ratings.

The Wall Street Journal reported:

"These three countries are the only ones whose government ratings have experienced multiple downgrades over the past two years," says Kenneth Orchard, vice president in Moody’s sovereign-risk group. The ratings of these countries still carry negative outlooks, signaling the possibility of further downgrades in the next 12 to 18 months.

As I mentioned in my last post, it is the debt that is holding these countries back. The report states:

The domestic sides of the economies remain weak as households and corporates struggle with elevated debt levels, the aftermath of housing bubbles in the cases of Latvia and Iceland, and weak banking sectors that are unable or unwilling to extend credit.

As a result, the FX Team at brown Brothers Harriman think these countries are over-rated. In a note released today Win Thin said:

All three of these countries saw improvements in their sovereign risk profiles this past quarter, but all three still remain overrated.  Our model puts Iceland at B, Hungary at BB, and Latvia at B.  Moody’s has always been too generous with its Eastern European ratings, and we have to question why all three remain investment grade still…

All three are also likely to contract in 2010, so the stresses on their economies and their social fabric won’t be going away anytime soon.  Downgrade risks are likely to persist for these three well into next year, as well as for Estonia and Lithuania.

I can’t help but see this as yet another data point demonstrating that this whole house of cards is being stitched together via fiscal and monetary stimulus. Absent this stimulus, the U.S., the U.K., the Eurozone, Japan, and China would all relapse into recession, dragging weaker economies like Latvia or Spain deeper into Depression.

Watch for any signs of premature policy normalization in the the Eurozone or the U.S. as a prelude to a double-dip. The silver lining here is that Moody’s also upgraded Brazil to investment grade today, showing that the emerging markets outside of eastern Europe are doing quite well (story here).

Related posts:

• Hungary cut to a notch above junk by S&P
• More trouble in the Baltics as S&P downgrades
• Baltics: Fitch downgrade and more downgrades to come
• A bearish view on Eastern Europe
• The EU promises to bail out eurozone members

Back in April I told you I anticipated an uptick in GDP in part because of changes in inventories – massive change in the inventories. At the time, I thought I was going out on a limb by suggesting we could see positive GDP numbers in Q3 and Q4.  However, this is now the consensus. My calculations were not aggressive enough, if anything. The economy has definitely picked up considerably.

But, I am still worried about consumption growth because of the poor employment picture.  I could see a scenario where we have a relapse into recession because of weak consumer demand which fails to justify an increase in output or inventories. And we are definitely seeing output rise.

As a result, I have written about the present business cycle as the mother of all inventory corrections.  Erroneously, I suggested we were going to see a re-stocking of inventories. That’s overstating the case. What I meant to say was that inventories were being purged so much in the first half of the year that it would lead to GDP growth even in the absence of re-stocking. This is something I stated correctly in May.

Thinking about production as opposed to sales again, you have to look at inventories.  The NBER is not fooled by inventory builds because they look at both industrial production and retail sales.  But, since GDP is a pure production statistic, inventory builds distort the picture.  For example, say your economy produces $980 worth of stuff one quarter that gets sold. But it also sells a lot of stuff, $20 worth, out of inventory.  If next quarter, you need to sell just as much stuff ($1000), guess what, GDP growth goes up automatically (Remember, we are not talking about GDP, but GDP growth). The inventory purge means you are producing less to meet demand than you would otherwise need to. So, when comparing one quarter to the next, unless you purge just as much stuff or unless demand goes down, you need to produce more. Therefore, you get an automatic uptick in GDP growth.

This is what is happening now.  The positive impact that inventories is having on GDP growth has to do with the fact that GDP growth is a first derivative statistic where even subtracting a less negative number is positive.

Let me give you an example to illustrate.  Let’s say you are running a road race and you do a bunch of practice runs with a coach who docks you seconds for not keeping a consistent pace or having bad form.  After your first run, he docks you 35 seconds.  In the second run, you have the same time. But, you make a concerted effort to stick to your pace and form. So the coach docks you only 15 seconds. Your time is the same but you are now subtracting a less negative number. The net effect is a better time.  That’s what is happening with inventories.

So, after a massive inventory purge in Q1 and Q2, inventories are set to add to GDP growth in Q3 and Q4 regardless of whether inventories are restocked or not.

Related posts:

• ISM: Is this the mother of all inventory corrections?
• Highlights from report with Q1 U.S. GDP down 6.1%
• Does positive growth in Q2 or Q3 mean the recession is over?
• GDP revised to down 5.7% for Q1 2009
• US GDP comes in at minus 1%

via the Hartford Courant (Hat tip Scott).

Related posts:

• Jobless claims may signal the end is near
• When will the U.S. recover?
• Morgan Stanley: Recession will ‘end by mid-to-late summer’
• What does a double dip recession look like?
• Recession while GDP is growing?

This comes via TheStreet.com and Doug Kass, a noted market strategist:

Many strategists (both bullish and bearish) assume that a fair value P/E multiple — based on interest rates and inflation — rests at about 15.5 times. Averaging the 2009 and 2010 S&P consensus forecasts produces a melded $67.50 S&P EPS, a year-end target of 1045 and a mid-2010 S&P target of 1130 on an EPS of $73 a share — against the current S&P level of 1043.

Bearish strategists such as David Rosenberg (this weekend’s Barron’s interview) believe the current S&P level is discounting a 40% increase in 2010 earnings over 2009, but the consensus believes (above) that about 10% growth is being discounted.

Bearish strategists (again) like Rosie expect real GDP growth of about 1% to 2% next year, but the consensus now anticipates 3% to 3.5% growth in 2010.

The market’s P/E multiple is up by 5.5 points, or more than 40%, since equities bottomed in early March. So, even for the bullish strategists, the phase in which expanding price-to-earnings multiples contribute to the market’s advance is largely over and future stock market gains will be dependent upon the achievability of a healthy growth in S&P operating earnings toward the consensus.

As Kass later points out, the anticipated earnings growth fuelling this rally must be predicated on continued leverage. The present multiple and earnings growth has come from cost-cutting which lowers employment and income – and, thus, aggregate demand in the absence of more leverage (See Tom Toles’ not-so-funny depiction of this via Prieur du Plessis).

According to Kass, other headwinds include poor commercial real estate fortunes, lower local government spending, and higher taxes. All of this makes the market rally seem more bear market rally than secular bull.

And I can think of no secular bull markets that began with a 40% surge in earnings multiples.

More here.

Related posts:

• Rosenberg: Market rally is just multiple expansion
• Getting bearish again
• Overbought?
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Back in February, I asked you if we were experiencing a recession or depression.  A plurality said it was a depression with a small ’d.’ I agreed and went on to explain why. Since then, things have changed and we seem to be on the verge of what I call a technical recovery (or a fake recovery – take your pick).  We may even be on the verge of a multi-year economic expansion – something bears like David Rosenberg should not rule out. But vigilance is still required. I will explain why.

Since the recovery talk has gathered steam, a lot of well-respected economists and policy makers have begun to construct what I consider a revisionist history of events. It goes something like this:

We have just experienced a major economic downturn. Coupled with a financial panic of major proportions, the global economy suffered a severe shock.  However, we have learnt how to deal with such crises due to our experiences during the Great Depression. The liquidity crisis was overcome through deft monetary policy. And fiscal expansionary policy aided a return to business as usual much sooner than many would have believed.

As a result, it is quite obvious we have been through a severe contraction, but nothing more than a garden-variety recession complicated – of course – by a financial panic. Back in February, a lot of economists made alarmist predictions of woe, foretelling a global Depression. This was wrong-headed and reckless as we see today. GDP has likely turned up in this third quarter and will continue rising for the foreseeable future. With the worst of things behind us, we can normalize monetary and fiscal policy and return to a more robust economic path.

On the surface, this narrative is compelling.  But, I believe it is based on a flawed analysis.  I would like to present a different narrative here for you to dissect.

GDP is a poor measure of growth

As Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote, GDP is a very poor measure of growth and economic health.  And he is right. There are many questions of statistical accuracy in its measurement. But, more than quantity, I have problems with GDP as a measure because of quality. Robust 4% growth that is underpinned by savings and capital investment is not the same as robust 4% growth underpinned by debt and consumption.

The problem I have with the recent history of growth in the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland in particular is that the growth was underpinned by high debt accumulation and low savings.  As debt is a mechanism through which we pull demand forward, the debt and consumption has meant we have been growing today at the expense of future growth.

Low quality growth can go on for a long time

This dynamic can continue for a very, very long time. In the United States, by virtue of America’s possession of the world’s reserve currency, an increase in aggregate debt levels has been successfully financed for well over twenty-five years. Mind you, there have been a number of landmines along the way. But, time and again, these pitfalls have been avoided through asymmetric monetary policy and counter-cyclical fiscal expansion.

So, poor quality growth can continue for very long indeed. And it is this fact which allows the narrative of easy money and overconsumption to gain sway.

The boy who cried wolf

A soothsayer who counsels against this type of economic policy, but who warns of impending collapse will surely be seen as the boy who cries wolf. Think back to 2001 or 2002. Did we not witness then the same spectacle whereby the bears and doomsdayers were let out of their holes to warn of impending doom from reckless economic policy? By 2004, unless these individuals changed their tune, they were long forgotten or even laughed at – only to resurface in 2007 and 2008 with their new tales of woe. Knowing this shapes the psychology of economic forecasting and is why missing the turn is disastrous for one’s career. Efforts to avoid missing the turn are also part of a very large pro-cyclical psychological force underpinning a cyclical bull market.

The fact is: low quality growth does not lead to immediate economic calamity. It can continue through many business cycles. Even today, it is wholly conceivable that we could experience a multi-year economic expansion on the back of renewed monetary and fiscal expansion.

Marc Faber: “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money”

You will recall that I wrote a post at the depths of the market implosion highlighting a phrase by Marc Faber, “Don’t underestimate the power of printing money.”  This quote has stuck with me as asset markets have soared in the intervening time.  What Faber was alluding to was the fact that printing money works.  It does goose the economy as intended and it can induce a cyclical recovery.

Nevertheless, the recovery is likely to be of poor quality due to significant malinvestment. Debt levels will rise and capital investment will be directed toward riskier enterprises. Look at what’s happening in China.  Are you telling me stimulus is not working? It most certainly is.

In the west, stimulus is also working. It is designed to stop people from hoarding cash and to consume. It is also designed to get people out of savings accounts and into riskier asset classes. it is doing just that. In response to a Spanish-language article on just this topic, I wrote in today’s links:

Europeans are abandoning savings accounts in favour of riskier assets as low interest rates have created a liquidity-seeking-return dynamic. This is true as much in the US as it is in Europe and it proves that a wall of liquidity can induce a cyclical recovery based on asset price inflation aka the fake recovery. The question is what comes next?

Liquidity is seeking return. It is pure speculation whether the upturn that underpins this dynamic has legs. I see an even chance that it does, which is why, despite my recent mild bearishness, I am a lot more upbeat about the economy and markets than a lot of others in the blogosphere.

So where does that leave us?

The outlook is unclear.  The Obama Administration looks ready to take a victory lap judging from recent statements. Officials say they are also withdrawing liquidity in anticipation of an upturn in the economy (though some believe these claims exaggerated). So, that is the one side – which Goldman’s Jim O’Neill takes.

On the other side of the argument is the fact that employment is still weak and incomes are down – the most since the Great Depression. After a decade with no income gains and still weak employment prospects, the ability of households to refuel a debt-induced upturn seems limited – as the recent data on consumer credit demonstrates. This is the side that David Rosenberg takes.

I take neither side. I am just not that clairvoyant. Both scenarios are plausible outcomes. But, I am still very worried about the low quality of any growth we will get in an upturn and the widening gulf of economic fortunes that result. I am equally worried about how even a low quality upturn will sap the will for reform in the financial arena. Mostly, I am worried that the eventual collapse – if it doesn’t happen now – will be much worse when it does happen.

Background

Please listen to the half-hour audio clip with Marc Faber from yesterday.  He does an excellent job of giving voice to some of the ideas I just laid out in his usual semi-apocalyptic style.  The clip comes via Bloomberg’s On the Economy podcast, a show I recommend highly. Click here for the show’s webpage and instructions on how to listen to broadcasts.

(mp3 Audio embedded below)

Related posts:

• When Giants Fall: No green shoots here
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The U.S. Department of Labor released the Unemployment Insurance Weekly Claims Report showing that initial jobless claims decreased 10,000 in the latest week to 570,000 from an upwardly revised 580,000 the week prior. The 4-week moving average is now 566,250, less than 100,000 off the April peak.

Since the week ended Jul. 18, the average initial claims figure has been hovering in the 560-570,000 range. So, this marks six straight weeks during which we have seen no discernible improvement in the employment picture painted by jobless claims data.

It is now 20 weeks since initial jobless claims peaked and we are shedding only 92,500 fewer jobs. I found this quite worrying until I compared it to previous recession, demonstrating that the last two jobless recoveries had a similar dynamic. Even in the recessions of 1970 and 1974-75, jobless claims were slow to fall.

Below is a comparison of the 20-week fall during previous recessions:

• 2001: 92,750. Oct. 20, 2001 peak of 489,250 vs. Mar. 9, 2002 figure of 396,500.
• 1991: 68,500. Mar. 30, 1991 peak of 501,250 vs. Aug. 17, 1991 figure of 432,750.
• 1982: 185,500. Oct. 9, 1982 peak of 674,250 vs. Feb. 26, 1983 figure of 488,750.
• 1980: 179,750. May 31, 1980 peak of 629,000 vs. Oct. 18, 1980 figure of 449,250.
• 1974: 61,250. Feb. 1, 1975 peak of 560,750 vs. Jun. 21, 1975 figure of 499,500.
• 1970: 25,250. May 9, 1970 peak of 343,750 vs. Sep. 26, 1970 figure of 318,500.

If one looks at these numbers in percentage terms, the fastest job recovers in order are:

• 1980:  28.6%
• 1982:  27.5%
• 2001:  19.0%
• 2009:  14.0%
• 1991:  13.7%
• 1974:  10.9%
• 1970:  7.3%

So, contrary to my expectations, the fall in unemployment claims is very much in line with what we have seen in recessions over the previous 40 years.

Related posts:

• Are jobless claims peaking?
• Data on past consumer deleveraging during recessions
• U.S. unadjusted jobless claims fourth highest in history
• U.S. jobless claims foreshadow an ugly unemployment number
• A note on government statistics and unemployment

You may have heard the reports that US auto dealers were swamped on Monday night as the car scrappage scheme dubbed “Cash for Clunkers” expired. American taxpayers were eligible for a tax rebate of up to $4500 for trading in an older gas guzzler for a new vehicle.  And all evidence shows that they took the government up on the offer – in droves.  According to the U.S. Department of Transportation, there were in excess of 625,000 transactions for $2.58 billion in rebates.

While I tend to think this scheme is pulling forward demand for vehicles, it is going to mean a huge boost to Q3 GDP.  Unless we get a relapse in Q4 or Q1 2010 when I had expected the recession to end, the recession is technically over right now in all likelihood.

Related posts:

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• ISM shows manufacturing sector close to recovery
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• What is the recent increase in U.S. jobless claims telling us?

This comes via the Financial Post:

Oil rose above US$74 a barrel on Monday, extending its rally to trade near a 10-month high, on optimism that an economic recovery will spur a rebound in energy demand.

A string of positive economic data from various countries and rallying stock markets helped lift oil prices by 9.5% last week. Crude is up more than 65% in 2009 and may head higher still.

"We could now easily move toward the US$80 mark if the growing enthusiasm about the budding economic recovery continues to dominate sentiment," said Edward Meir of MF Global.

"A breakout is taking root as the previous high of US$73.38 has now been taken out on a closing basis," he said of U.S. crude.

If you recall, oil prices didn’t hit $74 until 2007.  I certainly think this breakout that eventually peaked at $147.30  in 2008 was a major contributing factor to the severity of the downturn.

And here we are again with prices having more than doubled since they bottomed early this year. I certainly see this as a potential transmission mechanism for what is now asset price inflation into what could soon become consumer price inflation.

If you are worried about a double dip, this trend bears watching.

Related posts:

• Oil price rise is accelerating
• Blame Bernanke, the dollar and oil
• Brent – WTI disconnect
• Partial recovery will mean new lows for stocks
• George Soros warns UK on economy, oil and inflation