This is a post I just wrote over at Yves Smith’s site Naked Capitalism in response to a reader request. Marshall Auerback has already written a reply as well and I will post this later today.

A reader at Naked Capitalism asked us to respond to a recent article from the Christian Science Monitor asking Does US need a second stimulus to create jobs?

Marshall Auerback has already done some heavy lifting. He says emphatically yes. Now I want to take a crack at this. My short answer is no. But before I go into this, as an aside, I wanted to mention Marshall’s new smiling, happy picture up at the great blog New Deal 2.0 where he now writes.  Earlier, when Credit Writedowns was hosted at Blogger, he used a picture best described as a mug shot in his profile, but he has changed that one too (although he smiles there a little less). He thinks we haven’t noticed this sleight of hand.  Well I have! Once upon a time, Marshall wrote with a man I called all bearish, all the time this summer. Take a look at that post; you don’t see him smiling now do you? We have Lynn Parramore, New Deal 2.0’s editor to thank for making Marshall Auerback into an optimist.

Different policy choices

But all teasing aside, I do want to take the opposite side of this trade.  You see I too was a deficit hawk. And while I may have been backing fiscal stimulus, I have felt conflicted for doing so. Here’s how I see it. 

You have four options:

1. No stimulus. Let the chips fall where they may. Yves Smith calls this the ‘Mellonite liquidationist mode.’ The thinking here is that trying to avoid the inevitable bust only makes it that much larger. And the economic policies during recessions in 1991 and 2001 seem to bear that out. The Harding Recession of 1921 is commonly seen as gold standard response.
2. Monetary stimulus only. Quantitative easing mania. My understanding is this is what Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has been advocating.   The thinking here is that the flood of money and the low rates will eventually jump start the economy. No deficit spending needed.
3. Monetary and fiscal stimulus.  Full tilt Keynesian. This is the Krugman view. The thinking here is that one needs to credibly commit to higher inflation and close the output gap to avoid a deflationary spiral. If that is insufficient, then one needs to go full bore on fiscal stimulus aka deficit spending. And if that doesn’t work, subsidize jobs. The New Deal is commonly seen as the gold standard response.
4. Fiscal stimulus only. Deficit spending. I have been talking up this view. The thinking here is that we need to both close the output gap to prevent a deflationary spiral and revive private sector savings in order to promote deleveraging.

There is no magic bullet here.  We are living through a situation unique in time with few historical precedents. And there are a lot of competing ideas being tossed about. So policy makers are groping around, desperately seeking the holy grail of depression-busting economic policy.  In that regard, I don’t envy them. They are certainly going to make a lot of mistakes. It may seem at times that I don’t realize this given the harshness of my critiques, but I do.

Deficit hawks are misguided

However, there are some policies which could work and others which are flat out wrong.  One policy which is flat out wrong is the concept that we need to reduce deficit spending in order to avoid a double dip recession. This flies in the face of basic economics which says that more spending and less taxes equals greater demand and recovery/boom. More taxes and less spending equals less demand and recession/depression.

Now, it’s not as if we didn’t see this line of argument coming. As far back as November 2008, I heard the chatter (see my post here). So you knew this we-have-to-stop-or-we’ll be-bankrupt nonsense was coming. The problem is it’s just not true.  Here are a few data points:

• Private sector debt (incl. financial firms) was 292% of GDP as of Q2 but public sector debt (incl. state and local municipalities) was 67.2%. Who’s more indebted – the private sector by a factor of 4.
• Adding unfunded liabilities to any public debt number when talking about spiking treasury rates is inaccurate and artificially inflates the number. A lot of people do this to make the public debt scenario look worse. The issue at hand is whether a supply/demand imbalance in Treasury securities spikes interest rates. Unfunded liabilities have absolutely nothing to do with this.
• Cash and bonds are fungible. They are both obligations of the federal government to be repaid in full with a specific sum of fiat money. The Treasury could literally stop issuing government debt altogether and just start crediting accounts electronically to ‘fund’ its purchases. There is no operational constraint to government spending. The U.S. government is not going broke involuntarily. See my post here.

The real issue with deficits causing a double-dip has to do with inflation and overheating. If inflation increases because the economy begins to overheat, interest rates spike and the Fed raises rates to choke off inflation. That’s not going to happen any time soon – although it may be a problem down the line.  The issue at hand now is deflation not inflation. At least Morgan Stanley understands this when they take a deficit hawk position.

And as for the Chinese, they are not going to pull the plug on Treasuries unless they want to tank their export boom. The reason they must buy Treasuries is the dollar peg; they must re-invest in U.S.-based assets in order to prevent their currency from appreciating. This has caused a huge rise in their U.S. dollar reserves. If they changed the peg, their currency would almost certainly rise and this would choke off exports.

No more stimulus, just jobs

I have said my piece about the need for stimulus in the past. So I won’t repeat it here. If you are interested, see my December 2008 posts “Confessions of an Austrian economist,” “What does Mises say about trying to stimulate the economy out of recession,” and “A brief philosophical argument about the role of government.”

But, on the whole, I look at long-term deficits in a dubious light. There are practical constraints to deficit spending – and they lead to inflation, currency depreciation and lower standards of living. This is not national bankruptcy, but it is what Murray Rothbard called default by inflation and it makes you and me less well off.

This, of course, is over the long-run. In the short run, it is the spectre of a deflationary spiral we care about. Stimulus was important to stop this. I said in February that Obama was making a big mistake with his stimulus measures.

My view here is that Obama is forging a middle path that leads to a dead-end. The stimulus is not nearly enough by half to get the job done. The proposed deficit reduction measures for 2013 are outright scary as they risk repeating a mistake from the 1930s. And the banking sector and mortgage plans, both of which I failed to mention, are dubious half-measures as well. One needs to act aggressively and proactively or not at all.

If you are going to deficit spend you need to do it in a big way. You need to stop the deflationary spiral.  That means hitting the reset button by promoting private sector savings and deleveraging and purging all built-up malinvestments. The risk in addressing the situation this way, of course, is replacing the imperfect invisible hand of markets with the imperfect hand of politicians and legislative fiat.

This is a risk I no longer see as worth taking. I have bailout and deficit fatigue just like most Americans. It is abundantly clear that this Administration has absolutely zero intention of purging any malinvestment or promoting any deleveraging. All they want to do is continue business as usual and go back to the asset-based economy that caused this mess. This is why we have seen bailout after bailout coupled with easy money. It makes for record profits on Wall Street but it does nothing for the unemployed.

Moreover, the political process in the U.S. is such that any stimulus money will be diverted to pet projects and used to pay off political constituents. While this may increase aggregate demand, it does so at the risk of serious social unrest as the outrage will certainly spill over into populism.

So I say no to a second (third) stimulus package.  What the President needs to focus on is jobs. The reason Obama’s poll numbers are shrinking is because he now owns this economy.  And people are not benefitting from this fake recovery.  They are angry at the bailouts and distrustful of government – and with good reason.

Cut payroll taxes, subsidize job creation, divert some military spending to direct job creation by ending the foreign wars. But stop the madness.

Related posts:

• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Don’t underestimate the power of printing money, part 2
• Inflation: The strategy that dare not state its name
• The inflation-deflation debate
• Barack Obama: “if we keep on adding to the debt… that could actually lead to a double-dip”

I have written extensively about how I believe the bank bailouts were the worst of all possible solutions – fixes that perpetuate too big to fail, moral hazard and crony capitalism.  That ship has sailed, but the questions still linger – in large part because the fix has not trickled down to common folk to better their lot.  Rising unemployment is but one demonstration of this.

Arnold Kling writes a post that goes beyond banking to AIG, mortgages and Fannie and Freddie. He offers real world solutions that don’t require creating special resolution authority, buying toxic assets or orchestrating bailouts.  While there would certainly be costs to these solutions as well, they would be far less than what we are paying now.

The interesting bit is he proposed them in the moment when the bailouts were ongoing. Don’t let anyone tell you that there weren’t other options available because there were in spades.

1. Existing Mortgages and home owners.

Actual policy: attempts to implement loan modification programs

My policy: pay the moving expenses of homeowners who default on their mortgages. But do not interfere with the foreclosure process.

2. Mortgage Markets

Actual policy: keep Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae going, and we now have 90 percent of mortgage loans made by federal agencies.

My policy: Limit Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae to their existing book of mortgage loans (I wrote this in September of 2008) and not allow them to purchase any new mortgages. Let banks take up the slack in mortgage lending.

3. AIG

Actual policy: creditors bailed out 100 percent.

My policy: Send in a "stern sheriff" to protect the liquid assets of AIG from creditors making "collateral calls." I was thinking of a government-suggested mediator, perhaps a former bankruptcy judge. If the parties did not like it, they could go to court. But my guess is that the parties would have preferred a mediated solution.

4. Big banks

Actual policy: bailouts of nearly all of them

My policy: Triage. Shut down the ones that have clearly failed, using FDIC procedures. Those that are clearly solvent should be allowed to proceed. Those that are neither clearly failed nor clearly solvent should be given forbearance, but with tight supervision to ensure that they do not use this forbearance to expand their risk-taking. Again, this was what I advocated in September of 2008.

Why proposals of this sort were not followed is the subject of much debate.

Source

Was TARP Necessary? – Arnold Kling

Related posts:

• Fannie, Freddie to get $15 Billion from U.S. government
• Federal takeover of GSEs now in the works
• A quick note on corporate bankruptcy and bailouts
• Treasury to Consider Further Measures to Halt Housing Slide
• Dean Baker: I saw this scenario in 2002

The Obama Administration is captured. To understand why it has acted as it has, one doesn’t have to take the view that its efforts to save the banking industry were a deliberate attempt to line bankers’ pockets by transferring money from taxpayers to the banking industry. One need merely read the last post I wrote on this topic.

In their wildly optimistic view, the banking industry is solvent and always has been. All that was needed to ‘solve’ than banking crisis was a lot of liquidity, government backstops and, most importantly, time. This blinkered view sees a looting of taxpayer money to bailout the banking industry as necessary to save banks whose credit is the ‘lifeblood of our economy.’

They are wrong. The banks did not need to bailed out. The banking industry industry needed to made solvent again. There is a big difference between those two sentences (banks versus banking industry and liquidity versus solvency) that goes to the core of the captured and politically damaging world view we have seen on display by the Obama Administration.

Change you can believe in

Think back some 18 months when Senator Obama was in a horse race with Hillary Clinton to see who would go up against John McCain in the Presidential election. If you asked any reasonable individual who had the least experience and the thinnest political resume of the three, he or she would have said Barack Obama. If Americans wanted someone long on inside-the-beltway experience, they would have chosen John McCain – or, at a minimum, Hillary Clinton, not Barack Obama.

So, Barack Obama did not best both Hillary Clinton and John McCain and get to the White House because Americans felt him more qualified for the job.  Rather, Americans believed the U.S. was on the wrong path and wanted a qualified person to lead the country who would also change course. They believed that person was Barack Obama.

And when it came to the economy, the presence of two men, Paul Volcker and Warren Buffett, born some 80 years ago, gave one the sense that, despite Barack Obama’s perceived relative youth or inexperience, he had the ablest of wise old men who would be his and our counsel in resolving this crisis.

Bailing out the banks

So when Barack Obama took office, it came as a rude awakening for many that he chose to bail out the too big to fail institutions with little or no strings attached, allowing them to later make record profits and pay record bonuses, while the economy was in a deep slump and ordinary Americans were being bankrupted and losing their jobs and homes at record rates. This was not change you can believe in.

What could or should the Obama Administration have done?

If you had listened to the chatter inside the beltway early this year, you would realize that Obama’s team believed it was not politically feasible to ‘nationalize’ Citigroup or Bank of America and force top executives to resign as was done at RBS, Bradford and Bingley or Northern Rock in the UK. This was a blinkered view which can only be described as captured (if not outright disingenuous).  We need look no further than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to see that nationalization was an option.

But this is not the kind of solution we needed.  What we needed was a solution by the Administration to take prompt corrective action in seizing bankrupt institutions, dismissing management, punishing any misdeeds and setting up a timetable to sell off the institution’s assets. That is change you can believe in.

I laid this out fairly comprehensively in February in my post “America needs a pre-privatization plan.” So I am not going to cover that ground here except to quote the key relevant passage in that post:

To my mind, there are three ways to deal with an insolvent financial institution:

• Bankruptcy. Allow the  institution to collapse (like Lehman Brothers)
• Nationalization. Seize the assets of that institution and nationalize it (like Northern Rock, AIG, or Fannie Mae)
• Bailout. Inject capital into the institution in order to allow it breathing room until it can meet capital adequacy levels.

As you can see, governments have tried all three solutions.  However, there are vast differences between the three.

The bailout solution is the most ‘anti-free market’ choice and seems to be the favored solution of governments everywhere.  It props up organizations, giving them an unfair advantage at the expense of other more prudent institutions.  It also acts as a subsidy, which favors domestic institutions over foreign rivals.  Bailouts increase moral hazard by rewarding risky and reckless lending practices.  And they are often the result of crony capitalism due to the power of the financial services lobby. There are many other problems with bailouts. All around, bailouts are a poor solution.

So what we have here is a case of crony capitalism and kleptocracy, plain and simple – whether by design or not is immaterial. And the American people are on to this. That is why people are resistant to other changes this Administration has put forth.

Don’t let the media’s spin fool you: Washington insiders are on to this too. Politicians in Congress realize that Obama’s bailouts have cost him political capital  and they are challenging his policy agenda as a result. This is why the health care bill, which Obama wanted passed before the summer recess, may not see the light of day before year’s end.

Are we home safe?

I would advise the Obama Administration not to run any victory laps about having slayed the beast. The lingering effects of crisis are still there. The Fed’s liquidity is still liquid. Impaired assets are still impaired. And zombie banks are still zombies. As I indicated in my depression piece:

In reality, the problems of high debt levels in the private sector and an undercapitalized financial system are still lurking, waiting for the government to withdraw its economic support to become realized.

Since I covered this ground in that article, I will leave you to read my further thoughts there. What I want to turn to now is the ‘why.’

The Cheney-Rumsfeld replay

Now, I am not writing off Barack Obama’s presidency. I do worry he still could see a recessionary relapse which would cause him to seem more Herbert Hoover than Franklin Roosevelt.  But, despite his Nobel Prize, it is much to early to know what his legacy will be.

Nonetheless, I believe he has wasted a lot of political capital and this will make ushering through a meaningful legislative agenda very difficult.

Why did Obama throw it all away?

Here’s my answer: I call it the Cheney-Rumsfeld replay.

When historians look back at the Bush 42 presidency, it will be defined by 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While George W. Bush was politically pre-disposed to the Neo-con world view, it was really advice from Dick Cheney and Don Rumsfeld which made Afghanistan and Iraq possible. George W. Bush was famously not well-versed in foreign affairs, having almost never travelled abroad.  He was completely dependent on Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld to make foreign policy (although he could have listened more to Colin Powell, his actual Secretary of State; again it goes to predisposition).

So, I see George W. Bush’s presidency as having been defined by foreign policy and the War on Terror and, by extension, on Rumsfeld and Cheney.

Fast-forward to Barack Obama’s presidency and you have an almost identical situation, this time with the economy instead of foreign policy and Tim Geithner and Larry Summers instead of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney.

But, as with George W. Bush, it goes to pre-disposition. Paul Volcker was a critical member of the Obama 2008 campaign. He also was a key member of Obama’s economic policy team. But, he has been speaking a very discordant message that is not in sync with team Obama. So, as with Bush and his marginalization of Powell, one has to believe Barack Obama has chosen to side with Geithner and Summers over Volcker. Why anyone would do so given Volcker’s experience is beyond my comprehension.

The obvious conclusion, therefore, is that Barack Obama shares the blinkered and captured view of his policy makers and that this is why he has decided to go down this chosen path. And when it comes to Obama’s other ‘change’ decisions on the Guantanamo closure, torture, rendition, state secrets, and health care, the same logic also applies.

Is this change we can believe in? I will leave that for you to decide.

Related posts:

• The wildly optimistic view of Treasury’s handling of the crisis
• Bush Administration turns the TARP over to Obama
• The 3 a.m. moment – McCain blows it
• Greenspan: “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big”
• Automakers likely to be bailed out

I was reading Kid Dynamite’s account of the recent Treasury – Finance Blogger meeting after having read a bunch of others (see them all in Abnormal Returns’ Nov 4th links). And I was struck by his characterization of the thinking at Treasury in regards to the financial crisis. I want to highlight two points and ask the question: didn’t the Treasury plan work as designed?

I will try not to editorialize and let you draw your own conclusions based on my (hopefully neutral) narrative of their goals.

Here is point #1 I want to highlight:

The first point that caught my ear was the description of the stress tests as having been designed to restore a level of confidence in the banking system.   The STO mentioned that the focus was now on reducing the footprint of economic intervention cautiously, quickly and prudently…

a number of STO’s present in the room, who quickly banded together to clarify that no one knew the results of the stress tests before they happened, and that they were designed to restore confidence by identifying the levels of capital needed by the banks, and requiring them to raise such capital.  I said that if they wanted to restore confidence, they should require banks to mark assets to market, and depict the true financial situation.

As I read it, Treasury wanted to show that it had a credible plan to identify any capital shortfalls amongst our biggest banks and to take corrective action.  Their belief is this would restore confidence.

Here is point #2 to highlight – why the need for secrecy:

I [Kid Dynamite] mentioned that the problem was that even if we had a "Counterparty Risk Czar" who somehow managed to magically quantify the exposures of each firm (which may be quite a difficult task in itself), we’d see the same problems we saw when the government went to give out the TARP funds. The government didn’t want to "bail out" select firms (ie, BAC and CITI) because they feared that the stigma attached to such assistance would create panic and runs on the bank – so they asked a large pool of financial institutions to take the money to hide the truly sick cows.

I read this to say that Treasury feared identifying ‘loser’ institutions would have a negative impact and cause bank runs (think Washington Mutual). therefore, they had to hide the ball, so to speak.  The same philosophy is behind the Fed’s refusal to release more information to Bloomberg on the Fed’s emergency lending counterparties.

The overall gist of the strategy was that Treasury wanted to identify the weak, give them time to grow stronger, and, in so doing, allow the panic phase to subside so that corrective action could be taken in a more normal economic environment.

Wasn’t the plan wildly successful? Blogger Accrued Interest thinks so.

Now, before you give a knee-jerk response, please read the following from a post I wrote in April called “Channeling my inner Larry Summers,” which was my attempt to read the intentions of Obama and his economic team (in the voice of Larry Summers). I think it dovetails nicely with what Kid Dynamite says were the actual goals of Treasury.

the question is how do we deal with this crisis.  The first priority must be  to forestall a deflationary spiral because that induces a dead-weight loss and extracts a cost of incalculable consequences.  The best way for government to end the spiral is to temporarily increase spending or temporarily induce more private sector spending.  Is this re-flating the bubble?  No, because deflationary forces will continue to extract a price even with these measures in place.  The key is to avoid a negative feedback loop, a spiral downward, and the easiest way for government to do this is to increase spending.

But, spending alone won’t get it done.  Ultimately, we will need to increase credit availability.  Just because people are spending more, does not mean the economy will grow.  Growth depends critically on increasing credit in line with the growth of the economy.

I am not one for nationalization of banks or other coercive, non-market based mechanisms of getting lending flowing.  The concept that nationalizing banks and re-privatizing them should be a first port of call for a government imperiled by a weak banking system is contrary to the need for limited government.  What we need to do is put a number of government-assisted programs into play — cognizant of that healthy tension between limited government and necessary government — and get credit flowing this way.

Let me enumerate some mechanisms:

• First we should try bank re-capitalization.  Our first priority must be to have an adequately-capitalized banking system. Absent that, increases in lending are impossible and the system will continue to be doubted. So that’s number one. We can do this through preferred equity so that the government is senior to common equity and receives some compensation for taxpayer money.  What’s more is it limits government interference. Remember – most of these institutions are having temporary problems.  With enough capital, they can weather the storm.  There is no need for heavy-handed government interference.
• If re-capitalization proves inadequate because of depreciated legacy assets, we will need to remove those assets from banks’ balance sheets in a way that promotes price discovery, increases asset liquidity and respects the tension between government involvement and government’s limitations. The PPIP and TALF can help achieve this.
• Moreover, by allowing financial institutions to borrow with a government guarantee, we can ease the funding liquidity constraints as well.

Ultimately, the jump start from stimulus and quantitative easing will start to kick in while all of this is ongoing. The result will be a growing economy and healthier banks. Nevertheless, we should implement some stress tests on institutions to gauge how much capital each institution would need in a worst-case scenario. Those banks faring poorest will need to take remedial action as soon as possible. However, under no circumstances should we ever imply that any individual institution is insolvent. This creates doubt and during times of stress it is not the wisdom of crowds, but the panic of crowds that is on display. Doubts about one institution are likely to have knock-on effects for others creating a systemic problem. This must be avoided at all costs.

So have Geithner and his team not avoided the pitfalls and accomplished their goals?

Related posts:

• The less optimistic view of Treasury’s handling of the crisis
• Will banks exiting TARP take back their toxic waste now?
• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• Ackman and Stigliz talk Stress Tests with Charlie Rose
• GMAC has been nationalized

At the weekend I wrote about Alistair Darling’s about-face on breaking up to big to fail financial institutions. Apparently, this was not a case of labour changing tack and finding regulatory religion, but rather of the European Union imposing its will on the British government. The EU is also dictating policy in Germany, the Netherlands and elsewhere.

The Telegraph reports:

RBS said in a statement on Monday it was in the final stages of talks with the European Commission about "some divestments not initially contemplated" to get EU approval for the billions of pounds it has received in state aid.

Selling Citizens, which has 26,000 employees, is said to be one of the options raised by Neelie Kroes, the EU competition commissioner.

She is also said to want the sale of the Churchill, Green Flag and Direct Line insurance businesses, more than 312 RBS branches in England, Global Merchant Acquiring, a card payments processing arm, and a reduction of the investment banking operations.

And RBS shares were down as the effects of the EU’s dictates became clear for that institution. Job losses were the most negative storyline and unions are expected to resist these moves vigorously. But asset sales were also part of the equation.

The Guardian reports:

Royal Bank of Scotland’s woes deepened tonight after unions condemned 3,700 branch job cuts as "absolute madness" on the eve of an announcement of a dramatic restructuring of the bank imposed by Brussels.

RBS is tomorrow expected to admit that it is being forced by the EU to make major commitments to cut back the size of its balance sheet and sell off some of its highest profile businesses in return for more than £40bn of state aid.

The bank acknowledged for the first time today that the EU was demanding more draconian measures than it had first envisaged, driving RBS shares down sharply. They closed at 38.65p, down 8%, giving the taxpayer a paper loss on its investment which breaks even at 50.5p share.

Analysts were concerned that the new chief executive, Stephen Hester, would need to redraw his business plan which is only eight months old, and that the profits of the bank could tumble by as much as £1.5bn a result of the EU’s intervention.

As the Treasury prepared to admit it was putting another £25bn into RBS to take the taxpayer’s stake up to 84% to help it participate in the government’s toxic asset protection scheme, unions reacted angrily to the front-line job cuts.

So, far from appearing forward-looking, Labour look quite reactionary here. Not only are they having to bend to the will of Neelie Kroes in Brussels, they also are being forced to top up their stakes in the banking black hole even while job cuts are being made. This is not the sort of thing that is likely to lead to more votes at the ballot box. (By the way, why do the British media insist on always using this picture of Darling in articles. I find it pretty comical.)

The UK is not the only country coming under pressure for state subsidies (a weak form of protectionism). In the Netherlands, ING was forced to break in two and reduce its balance sheet because of the EU’s policy on subsidies. In Germany, Commerzbank (in large part because of sick child Dresdner) is also going to have to reduce the size of its balance sheet. Commerzbank reported more than 1 billion euros in losses today, a sum which was a negative surprise (thinking back to Halloween, it was more trick than treat). Expect asset sales here too. I know that Fortis and Natixis are other institutions with problems. What is the EU doing there?

The situation is very fluid right now and many details are expected to emerge in the coming days.  Expect the EU actions to put pressure on the U.S. which is also subsidizing its banks in an anti-competitive way.

Related posts:

• European banks have hands out for more capital
• European banks: still undercapitalised
• $5 trillion to go on balance sheets again?
• No one gets a bonus at Commerzbank and no dividend either
• The Germans get tough with the state banks

If you have been wondering whether a statistical recovery is at hand, today’s ISM manufacturing report should be the clincher.  The report was definitely bullish with the ISM index rising to 55.7 and sub-components supporting the understanding that the manufacturing sector is expanding. This is quite a contrast to last month’s weak data and demonstrates that last month was a one-month aberration in what should now be seen as a full-blown technical recovery.

I want to talk about this recovery briefly in the context of the signs that came before it, my own forecasting psychology and what the future holds.

The ISM data

The key data points to see as evidence of a fairly broad-based expansion in manufacturing come from new orders, production and inventories.  The production number came in at an incredibly bullish 63.3, marking the fifth consecutive month of increase. New orders slipped slightly, but were also in striking distance of the 60 range. (50 represents the demarcation between expansion and contraction).

But, from my perspective, it is inventories which are the most bullish data points. The inventories data show that inventories in the manufacturing sector were still being purged in October even while production is increasing.  That means that inventories are likely to make a huge contribution to GDP going forward in Q1 and Q2 of 2010. GDP could again surprise to the upside.

My mea culpa on forecast herding

All of this suggests the economy has been growing since the beginning of Summer. In the early Spring, I indicated that jobless claims were peaking (which added to my stock market bullishness at the time). This call turns out to have been accurate. However, at the time, this post produced very negative sentiments, albeit more from readers on Naked Capitalism than Credit Writedowns – in my opinion because most people erroneously extrapolate a current trend into the future (see my reaction to this from a post weeks later, “Through a glass darkly: the economy and confirmation bias in the econoblogosphere”)

Nevertheless, a piece from NBER guru Robert Gordon that I reported demonstrated to me that I was not alone in seeing the trend reversal in jobless claims. Eventually, in May I indicated that the jobless claims data were pointing to an imminent recovery and remarked that the data had usually been fairly accurate in the past.

And for the record, I have said I see a recovery happening probably in Q4 2009 or Q1 2010 (see my post “The Fake Recovery”).

The real question is how robust a recovery are we going to have and this is directly related to why the jobless claims series has been sending a false signal.  Now, initial claims has been sending a recovery signal since January. Yet, continuing claims continued to rise more quickly until last week.  In the past, one had seen these two series as harbingers of imminent recovery.  But, I am talking Q4 here.  Why? Deleveraging.

In the end, consumers are going to be forced to reduce debt and save more in this more cautious financial environment.  Team Obama does seem intent on re-kindling animal spirits but the personal savings rate has gone up nonetheless.  This will be a drag on GDP growth going forward and means that the economy’s rebound will be more tenuous and slower to develop.  In my view, this means recovery will be delayed and once it gets going it will be weak.  The potential for a double dip is very high.

So, to be clear, first derivatives are starting to turn up and since recession is a first derivative event, we are probably going to see an end to this recession soon enough.  But, with structural problems still remaining, the U.S. economy will be weak for a long time to come.

Why do I bring this up?  Because, despite the data pointing to recovery, I decided the start of the recovery process would be delayed until this quarter or Q1 2010 by consumers repairing their balance sheets – and, in retrospect, in part due to a desire to avoid being too far out of step with the consensus.

I must admit to falling prey to forecast herding, something I talked about in June (admittedly without mentioning my own culpability which I should have done). At the time, I said:

No one wants to go out on a limb with a bold call only to see this prediction proved wrong.  If one fails, it is better to fail conventionally.  The necessary corollary of that statement is this: market forecasters and analysts play it safe by making sure their forecasts are not often far from the consensus forecast.  Think of the consensus forecast as an anchor which restricts the outlook of any individual forecaster afraid of failing unconventionally.

In Roubini’s case – and this logic also applies to media darlings like Meredith Whitney – it does NOT pay to up the ante.  What Faber is saying is that they have already benefitted from the bold and unconventional contrarian market call they initially made.  There is little payoff and much risk from continuing on that path.  A bearish analyst who misses the turn gets the stick.  Just ask the original Dr. Doom, Henry Kaufman.

Roubini is not running with the herd

The one thing that makes me think about my error in tweaking my bullishness has to do with Nouriel Roubini. In the quote above, I said he has little incentive to double down on a bearish forecast at this point in time.  Both he and Meredith Whitney, two voices of caution leading into crisis, have been much more upbeat of late. Are they hedging as I did?  Hard to say.

But, with Nouriel Roubini’s recent FT Op-Ed, this is over. Roubini decried the easy money policy he believes is leading to a dollar carry trade and an increase of risk appetite across a wide variety of asset classes. He believes this experiment will not end well. I share his view.

Roubini, in going public in this way, is officially departing from a more hedged nuanced position he has been using over the last few months as the recovery has taken hold. Yves Smith says:

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the “hedging your bets on the economy” camp.

I applaud him for coming out with this piece and suggest you read it because it may come to be seen as the make or break call in determining his reputation as economic soothsayer.

Recovery is happening, but watch asset prices

For my part, I will look to avoid a repeat of the ‘jobless claims incident.’ Hopefully, I have done by writing my depression post at the beginning of last month, which outlines my view that we are in a cyclical recovery in the middle of a longer-term depression.

I would like to make some amendments to my thinking at the time though. First and foremost, I have come to doubt whether we are seeing a balance sheet recession right now. One reason I am writing this post is because the ISM manufacturing data turned up in May at precisely the same time that the credit revulsion-induced savings rate turned down. Translation: there is no balance sheet recession in the U.S., at least not yet. (see my post “Americans are not increasing savings”). This means the recovery could surprise to the upside. Moreover, the ISM data point to potential upside surprises from inventories, leading to an even more robust outlook.

What I believe is happening has much to do with Nouriel Roubini’s comments. U.S. economic policy is geared toward reproducing the status quo ante via reflation of asset prices (something Bill Gross thinks is the right policy and even Dilbert has made fun of). The policy has been wildly successful so far, with asset prices bubbling over globally. I have called this the fake recovery, but as recently as September I was on the fence about how much uptick we were to get. I never dreamed the recovery process could be so robust given the headwinds we faced.

However, reflation has also given investors a license to take risk. Look at the return of John Meriwether as a telltale sign.  Reflation policies are inflating assets far and wide: European high yield, American high yield, Swedish house prices, London house prices, Chinese property prices, and inducing reckless lending. The list is endless. Even Bill Gross’ piece pointed to inflated prices, a view shared by Jeremy Grantham.

The long and short is we are seeing another asset bubble inflating courtesy of easy money. While Morgan Stanley worries easy money will lead to inflation, former Morgan Stanley economist Andy Xie fears this will end in a double dip. To make matters worse, there is a dollar carry trade now spreading a liquidity seeking return dynamic abroad. This is the additional risk of which Roubini writes, believing it could precipitate another crunch or crash. Ironically, a strong recovery is not necessarily bullish.

Is a double dip or crash a baseline scenario? No, not necessarily – but it is increasingly likely. So, as bullish as I believe the data are, I am more worried about a bad outcome, not less.

Related posts:

• ISM shows manufacturing sector close to recovery
• Both initial claims and continuing claims now pointing to recovery
• Jobless claims may signal the end is near
• ISM: September manufacturing data disappoint; market sells off
• Morgan Stanley: Recession will ‘end by mid-to-late summer’

And you thought the bailouts were over and market discipline might be restored.  Not a chance – the bailouts will continue, come hell or high water. The latest demonstration of this is GMAC, where the government will now be majority owner. GMAC has officially been nationalized. Now the government is running auto financing in addition to running the companies making the cars.

Below is a quote from the Financial Times. Notice the parts I have bolded.

GMAC, the car financing company, is set to receive up to $5.6bn in a new capital injection from the Treasury, filling a hole identified in the “stress tests” earlier this year and paving the way for the government to become the majority shareholder.

The company, formerly the financing arm of General Motors, was one of 19 institutions to submit to a capital adequacy programme led by the Federal Reserve and completed in May. That determined that GMAC had a shortfall, which will now be provided by the government in the form of preferred equity, according to two people familiar with the situation.

As widely expected, GMAC has been unable to raise the necessary capital in the market and the company – which will take on fresh lending responsibilities when it merges with Chrysler Financial – was seen as vital to the government-led restructuring of the US automotive industry and deserving of more funds from the $700bn troubled asset relief programme.

“When we laid out the stress tests, we expressly said that some additional Tarp capital may be needed given the severity of the downturn – this capital need is not new information,” said an administration official.

“But the transparency brought about by the stress tests allowed all other institutions to raise the capital required by the stress tests to ensure these firms could withstand a more severe economic scenario than anticipated,” the official said.

What you should be reading from this statement is the following:

• All the firms identified as lacking capital under the stress tests were given time to raise funds in the capital market to meet the shortfall.
• Some firms did meet the shortfall and they are now free to do as they please.
• Others have not and we the government are now going to take a more muscular approach in dealing with them.
• GMAC is the first public example of our flexing our muscles.
• But there surely are/will be other examples; some may already be happening in secret.

If the US government is going to throw its weight around to deal with financial firms short of capital, I would personally prefer they try a process which allows these firms to fail whereby equity and debt holders suffer consequences that are consistent with taking market risk.  Bailing out GMAC is a moral hazard plain and simple.

But, what’s done is done. The GMAC case does, however, give a lot more credence to my view that Citigroup’s actions are being dictated by government. As I indicated when the stress tests were done in April, firms were going to get some time to raise capital and if they didn’t, the government was going to move on to Plan B (debt-for-equity swaps, nationalization, and FDIC seizure). Expect to see more indications that other financial companies with capital shortfalls are falling under the government umbrella.

Related posts:

• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• GMAC: Loosening credit standards in the teeth of recession
• GMAC gets a helping hand
• GMAC chairman resigns effective immediately

This is a post I wrote in response to an ongoing debate about financial crises, credit revulsion and deficit spending over at Naked Capitallism. See the four links in the first paragraph for the precursor articles.

DoctoRx, Rob Parenteau and Marshall Auerback have each written articles here to bring clarity to some issues I first raised at the beginning of the month in my post, “The recession is over but the depression has just begun.”

As I see it, the issue we are debating has to do with how the government responds when large debts in the private sector constrain demand for credit in the face of a severe economic shock and fall in aggregate demand. In short, if private sector debt levels are so high that a recession precipitates private sector credit revulsion, how should government respond?

Frankly, this question is as much philosophical and political as it is economic.  So I want to wait to answer it and first frame the monetary system in a way which reveals the political nature of the question. Afterwards, I hope it is apparent that there is no one answer to this question and that any society’s answer depends on and reveals its priorities as a people. I will try to make some concluding marks about government debts and taxes in a fiat currency system given the analysis Marshall’s post.

Money and the sectors of the economy

Money is a tool, a medium of exchange, which derives its value from its utility in allowing individuals in an economy to trade goods and services. It eliminates the need to barter and make direct exchanges of goods and services in order to trade. Think of any economy as a collection of individuals or groups which trade goods and services with each other and with the outside world in exchange for a money-value of those goods and services. Each transaction is an exchange of a good or service for a equivalent value amount of money.

So, in any country, the flow of goods and services should be a one for one mirror image of the money flows. Now, if you break an economy down into sectors like the government sector, the private sector, and the foreign sector, the same is also true. Two accounting identities flow from this.

• In any particular time period, the changes in both money value of goods and the changes in the financial balances must sum to zero.  As Rob, illustrated: Household FB + Business FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0
• One sector’s deficit is another sector’s surplus. Think of it this way, if you and I are the only ones in the economy. If I spend more than I earn in, say, one particular month to buy your goods and services, you must have spent less than you earned in that same month to buy my goods and services.

If you take Rob’s formula and combine the two sectors of households and businesses into one sector, the private sector, you are left with Private FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0. What this means is that in any given time period, the private sector financial balance is offset by the government and foreign sectors’ balance such that they all sum to zero.

Private sector debts and credit revulsion

Given the framework above, it should be clear that when the private sector has a net surplus, the government and foreign sectors must have a combined net deficit.

So what happens when the economy lapses into recession because of a financial crisis caused in large part by excessive leverage and debt?

The answer is credit revulsion, also known as deleveraging. And this is what we have just seen in the U.S. economy.  Credit revulsion means that the private sector (businesses and households) reduce or are forced to reduce their debt burdens. This change in behavior induces a net surplus in the private sector; the private sector increases savings.

I’m sure you know where this is going. If the private sector moves to a net surplus, the combined government/foreign sectors must axiomatically move to a deficit. 

A foreign sector deficit means that we are net exporting i.e. foreigners are buying more stuff from us than we are from them. We are talking money flows here not goods and service: more money coming in than going out (FB deficit) means fewer goods coming in than going out (current account surplus). Since the U.S. is not going to run a current account surplus, I am going to leave this out of the discussion to focus on the real issue: Government.

We can try and reduce private sector savings

So, the result for the U.S. of a private sector which is net saving is government deficits – this what naturally flows from a credit-revulsion induced private sector deleveraging. By saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against deficit spending.

However, this is where the political/philosophical discussion starts. Two questions come to mind.

• Do we want the private sector to net save at this point in time?
• If so, do we want this savings to occur in an environment of more aggregate demand or less?

Policymakers today have answered no to the first question. They have said, “we do not like credit revulsion and our preferred policy choice is to work against it by reducing private-sector savings.” How do they do this? They lower interest rates in such a way that there is less incentive to save. Policymakers are in effect voting to continue the asset-based economic model.

But, there are several problems with this policy decision: it rewards debtors over savers, it prevents deleveraging from occurring, it creates asset bubbles, it keeps zombie companies and overcapacity alive, and it misallocates resources by artificially lengthening time preferences for money. In short, it is poor policy and it will end poorly as well.

Or we can maintain it and decide to either increase or decrease aggregate demand?

If you reject this policy path, you then have two options. In one, aggregate demand is reduced. In the other aggregate demand is increased.  Which option we choose, again, depends on politics.

In a July post, I outlined the choices. (Note the labels ‘surplus’ and ‘deficit’ should really be labeled ‘financial balance.’ For simplification the foreign sector isn’t depicted but one could assume it is aggregated with the government sector.):

In the Minsky world, the increase in net savings in the private sector and reduction of the current account deficit is axiomatic when the government is increasing deficits.  The point is that the private sector net saving and current account deficit must equal the government deficit.  So, when the combined private savings and current account deficit increases, the government’s financial balance must become more negative.

What this implies is this (diagram from Paul Krugman’s post with the unfortunate title “Deficits saved the world”):

To make the graph easier to follow we start with sector balances at zero i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both the private sector including the current account deficit and for the government sector. And just to be clear, points above the line show private sector savings or public sector deficit.

1. We start where the red circle is.
2. When an economic shock hits which precipitates a massive deleveraging, the entire demand curve shifts to the left to a new lower GDP level, everything else being equal. Thus, deleveraging equals recession. And we now see the private sector curve hitting the public sector curve where the blue circle is. The private sector is now saving and the public sector is in deficit. That is where we are today.
3. However, to bring things back to neutral i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both sectors, one could cut government spending dramatically.  That shifts the entire government curve to the red line on the left, leaving us where the green circle is: in a deep, deep depression. Krugman calls this the Great Depression outcome.

The cult of zero imbalances

In the depression post which kicked off this debate, I said “I must admit to having a preternatural disaffection for large deficits and big government which is what Koo and Minsky advise respectively.” Consider me a card-carrying member of the cult of zero imbalances. My preference is to see a neutral state where the sectors are balanced as the average long-term outcome. We may deviate from a zero imbalance state over the short-term, but we should be working toward it over the longer-term.

However, in the interim, what we want is to get back to that red circle in the chart and higher GDP and stay away from the green circle and lower GDP – also known as depression.  The difference between these two is government deficit spending.

Depressions are downward economic spirals. And when I invoke the term spiral, you should not be thinking of some stable equilibrium like the Great Moderation, Goldilocks economy, Nash equilibrium or some other close facsimile of economic Nirvana. You should be thinking war, famine and pestilence because those are the events which are historically associated with periods of high deflation and depression.

For me, the choice is clear.

The key is liquidation of overcapacity

While the picture I presented above represents a single point in time, what we want to know is how we get back to the green circle over time. In the depressionary example, we contract immediately and violently as aggregate demand is reduced in both the public and private sectors. The result is a liquidation of overcapacity and a depression. In the pro-growth example, aggregate demand is boosted by government spending whilst the private sector deleverages. In this scenario, liquidation of overcapacity also occurs if the government allows it to do so.

And this is the key: to the degree that government deficit spending is used as a vehicle for channeling funds to so-called systemically important businesses to prevent them from failing, we are merely kicking the can down the road. With the deleveraging, malinvestment must be purged for the economy to right itself on a sustainable growth path.

Government’s hidden debt?

That brings me to the last point: government debt. The first issue I want to address is unfunded liabilities.  This is something of great concern to many (including myself).  However, when we are talking about debt and credit, it is not particularly relevant. I mention this because of my statement in the original post:

The government plays a crucial role here because of the huge private sector indebtedness.  In the U.S. and the U.K., the public sector is not nearly as indebted.

A lot of people want to bolt the unfunded liabilities onto government debt to make the government’s debts appear larger than they actually are.  But when talking about the credit system, we have to be careful and distinguish between obligations and actual debt – related but different terms.

In a period of credit revulsion, the key issue is the overall credit in the system. At issue is a debtor’s inability to meet large existing obligations such that the debtor defaults, the obligation is written down, and the overall credit in the system contracts by the amount of capital that has been allocated to that writedown. The issue is credit writedowns and how they suck capital out of the system, reducing credit and leading to a potential deflationary spiral. It has absolutely nothing to do with unfunded obligations.

The governments unfunded liabilities for social security and healthcare are akin to General Motors’ unfunded pension liabilities. GM’s unfunded liabilities are germane to a credit crisis only to the degree they flow through the income statement and, thus, require credit financing in real time.

Government and its money

The difference between GM and the federal government is vast, however. General Motors is a private organization which must fund its obligations by selling products.  To quote Ben Bernanke’s now infamous words:

the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.

The U.S. government has monopoly control of the currency and no other entity can print money as a medium of exchange in the United States (see my post “The origin of the U.S. dollar as legal tender and its link to Depression” for how this came to be.)  When anyone else attempts to print money, it is called counterfeiting. In saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against legal tender laws.

This is a problem for states – which cannot print their own money – and for Eurozone countries – which also cannot print their own money (as I laid out in my post, “Depressionary bust in Ireland is echoed in California”) – but it is not a problem for the U.S. government. If the U.S. government so chooses, it can ‘fund’ any purchase with additional money it prints. It is not constrained in the same way private sector actors or even states and local municipalities are.

It is disingenuous for economic pundits like Marc Faber to suggest the U.S. is going to go bust. The United States will not literally be declared insolvent as long as it issues debt in its own currency. Countries that have gone bust, Russia, Mexico, and Argentina were borrowing in foreign currency because of interest rate differentials. No sovereign nation which prints and issues debt in its own fiat currency can ever involuntarily be made insolvent.  

Inflation is another issue altogether.  When the economy is operating at potential, money printing leads to consumer price inflation. But this is not the case right now, there is an enormous output gap that is not going to be closed anytime soon.  So the government can print all the money it wants and buy all the Treasuries it wants; none of this will lead to consumer price inflation in the short run except via dollar depreciation and import prices. Again, I have to remind you that in saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against quantitative easing.

I should point out that the output gap is why money printing is leading to an asset price bubble both in the U.S. and globally and one reason we should reject QE even in the absence of consumer price inflation.

I hope this post adds to the debate Marshall, Rob, and DoctoRx have taken on.

Related posts:

• Barack Obama: “if we keep on adding to the debt… that could actually lead to a double-dip”
• Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head
• Will Asia’s downturn be worse than America’s?
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• What are the consequences of the huge U.S. deficit?

In one of my latest posts I said “greed is not good.” Quite frankly, I looked at this statement as self-evident in the wake of an economic catastrophe where greed was a defining element.  Yet, a remarkable number of people commented in defense of greed; they seem to believe greed is a good thing. So, I would like to clarify a few things about greed in the context of the recent financial crisis and prudent regulation of the financial industry.

Greed is not good

Greed is defined as:

• A selfish and excessive desire for more of something (as money) than is needed (Merriam Webster)
• An excessive desire to acquire or possess more than what one needs or deserves, especially with respect to material wealth (Free Online Dictionary)
• The selfish desire for or pursuit of money, wealth, food, or other possessions, especially when this denies the same goods to others. It is generally considered a vice, and is one of the seven deadly sins in Catholicism. (People who do not view unconstrained acquisitiveness as a vice will generally use a word other than greed, which has strong negative connotations.) (The Free Dictionary)
• The obsession with accumulating material goods (Access-Jesus)

Do you notice the commonalities in all these definitions? Excessive, selfish, more than what one needs or deserves, unconstrained, obsessive.  You can make the non-judgmental argument as I did that greed is neither good nor bad. But, in what twisted world view is any of this good?  Greed is not ambition or hunger or drive. Greed is by definition excessive and unconstrained, and, thus, leads to unstable and suboptimal outcomes. Greed is not good.

This version of the definition was quite telling:

Greed is something that can never be satisfied. Greed and slothfulness have similarities in definition. The greedy and slothful both crave material goods as well as they have no desire to work for or to exchange anything of value for the object of their desires. The slothful will not work even for basic necessities much less add value to the world around them. The greedy will use deception to acquire material goods. The greedy will lie and use false pretenses to acquired goods at the expense of others.

For more on this, see the Seven Deadly Sins.  And just to make it clear, greed is antithetical to the core beliefs of all major religions in the Indo-European world. Why Americans who are ostensibly religious think ‘excessive wealth accumulation’ is in keeping with the tenets of their faiths is beyond me.

Free market ideology is a religion

This is where the financial system comes into play. Back in 1987 when Oliver Stone made the movie “Wall Street,” he intended Gordon Gekko to be an anti-hero emblematic of a period of excess. Yet, for some reason Gekko has since become a hero worthy of emulation amongst Wall Street’s entrants. Why has this ‘greed is good’ anti-hero become the man to emulate?

Let’s go back to what Jared Diamond says about how kleptocracies maintain power:

“1. Disarm the populace, and arm the elite.”

“2. Make the masses happy by redistributing much of the tribute received, in popular ways.”

“3. Use the monopoly of force to promote happiness, by maintaining public order and curbing violence. This is potentially a big and underappreciated advantage of centralized societies over noncentralized ones.”

“4. The remaining way for kleptocrats to gain public support is to construct an ideology or religion justifying kleptocracy.”

Method number four, construct an ideology or religion justifying kleptocracy, should stand out for you. The religion, of course, is free market ideology. Now, I happen to believe quite fervently in the primacy of liberty and freedom over the the coercive power of the state. However, I see the free market as a means to an end not as an end unto itself.

In my post “Deregulation as crony capitalism” I said:

Obviously, if some always have more power and wealth than others, there is never a situation in which the economic playing field is level. Moreover, it is axiomatic that those with the means and access will always have greater influence over government than those without. So, in a very real sense, the socioeconomic elite of any advanced, stratified society will always  have disproportionate control of the economic and political system.

By that, I meant that a society with a perfectly free market is a fiction which is used to justify the theft from those with less access and power by those with more. It is an ideology which has never had any real world manifestation in any stratified society in history. To believe that markets are or should be completely free is to de facto believe that those with greater access and wealth should be free to use this access and wealth to bend the system in their favor.

Trust but verify

Regulators are there much as police officers, sports referees or teachers on schoolyard playgrounds are: to make sure people follow the rules or suffer the consequences. 

When I wrote the ‘Greed is not good’ post, one reader responded that regulation was unnecessary; market discipline is the only regulation we need.

Is market discipline alone going to prevent mortgage finance companies from engaging in predatory lending?  Is market discipline alone going to prevent mortgage originators from making bad loans, knowing they can offload the risk in the securitization market? Is market discipline alone going to prevent bank holding companies from retaining excessive leverage? No, it is not. The credible threat of the regulator is necessary.

“Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far."

So what about Lehman?

The Lehman decision was disastrous because it produced anarchy that resulted from the uncertainty of government action. I wrote a detailed post to this effect. When Lehman Brothers failed, I said the day after:

Yesterday was a volatile day in the global financial markets. With the Nikkei down 5% and European bourses down 2% in overnight trading, we should understand that more volatility awaits us in the coming days and weeks.

As I survey this situation in serene tranquility away from market turmoil, I realize that I am very troubled by how the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy was handled. In my estimation, it was like putting the cart before the horse – allowing a financial institution to fail before you have worked out a mechanism of how to deal with that failure.

This one action will expose the global financial system to enormous additional risk.

Hank Paulson at the U.S. Treasury and Ben Bernanke at the U.S. Federal Reserve wanted to avoid the moral hazard of supporting the acquisition of a failed institution with government funds as it had done when JP Morgan Chase bought Bear Stearns. Therefore, Paulson and Bernanke were both fairly adamant about not offering any backstops for a Lehman Brothers takeover.

This is the principal reason both Bank of America and Barclays decided not to pursue a takeover of the firm. And this is also the reason Lehman Brothers failed. Had the U.S. government offered guarantees on Lehman’s debt, Barclays or Bank of America would have bought Lehman Brothers. In fact, I reckon BofA would have preferred to buy Lehman Brothers over Merrill Lynch as the price tag was much lower.

Were Paulson and Bernanke correct? After some time to digest events, I must answer no. They were wrong.

They were wrong for three principal reasons:

1. The U.S. government has failed to provide a framework and process for dealing with failed institutions of this size and the impending wave of future bankruptcies it should expect.
2. Failure will lead to asset liquidation, depressing asset prices further and putting further pressure on the remaining solvent financial services firms to writedown asset values.
3. This will potentially result in a Great Depression-like chain of failures, credit contraction and asset liquidation.

Rather than learning from the Great Depression, we are likely to repeat it.

Why we need a framework and process
It is clear from the difficulties facing AIG and Washington Mutual right now that further large failures are likely to occur.

In the case of AIG, we are presented with a potential derivatives nightmare as this $1 trillion firm has its tentacles in all manner of Credit Default Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations and insurance products generally. AIG represents a much more ominous case of potential systemic risk than either Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers.

Washington Mutual is a large bank with $300 billion in assets. It is very leveraged to Alt-A and pay-option mortgages. Unlike subprime mortgages, which have seen the maximum number of interest rate resets, the majority of these products are resetting to higher interest rates now and in the future. This means a significant number of defaults in the sector will occur and that Washington Mutual will be stressed by these events. That may create liquidity or capital concerns which would force WaMu into insolvency. Were WaMu to be declared insolvent, the FDIC would need to be bailed out as it does not have adequate funds to deal with the likes of Washington Mutual.

These two institutions are suffering even more as a result of the uncertainty that allowing Lehman Brothers to fail has created. Due to investor and counterparty jitters, AIG and WaMu are now more likely to fail than had Lehman Brothers been rescued. This fact and the systemic risk that AIG represents and the threat to the FDIC’s adequacy that WaMu represents makes the need for a government bankruptcy framework and process more evident.

A too big to fail resolution process is needed

By and large this is exactly how things played out. AIG and WaMu both went bust and a Great Depression-like chain of events unfolded. Only due to herculean efforts and extreme government intervention was worse averted.

The problem with Lehman was not that Lehman was declared insolvent and put into bankruptcy, but rather that no adequate resolution process for the firm was in place to address this too-big-to-fail institution’s collapse without precipitating a market panic.

When a systemically important institution faces collapse there are three potential avenues a resolution can take:

1. Anarchy. Allow the company to fail spectacularly without any planning whatsoever so that the whole financial system faces financial Armageddon. The hope is that this solution does not produce despotism, war or famine. Let’s call this unpreparedness. This is what was originally tried with Lehman Brothers.
2. Crony Capitalism. Prop the institution up through bailouts, government backstops and guarantees, creating a moral hazard so that other banks know they too need to be too big to fail in order to avoid the consequences of market discipline. Let’s call this kleptocracy. This is what happened to AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America after Lehman’s failure created panic.
3. Free market. Stop poor or potentially illegal lending and excess credit growth and risk through prudent regulation in order to prevent a spectacular bust and crisis. But, if presented with a bust, allow the institution to fail and potentially be liquidated in a controlled resolution process. This is what I am advocating. I see this as a more realistic free market solution.

What was needed when Lehman failed is also what is still needed today: a robust too big to fail resolution process. This should be priority one for regulatory reform in order to restore market discipline and reduce moral hazard. The heads of Standard Chartered, JPMorgan Chase and the FDIC understand this. Yet, there has been zero discussion of this issue in Congress.

What might this process look like?

1. Lay out specific rules regarding the provision of liquidity by the central bank at a penalty rate of interest or collateral to prevent bankruptcy if the true problem is liquidity and not solvency.
2. Set up a special court for adjudicating bankruptcies of large financial institutions quickly.
3. Mandate guidelines on haircuts equity and subordinated debtholders must take before any taxpayer money is used.
4. If liquidation is necessary, require a strict timetable for milestones in the process.
5. Set strict guidelines on what if any government guarantees a bankrupt or soon to be liquidated organization should receive and what the government should receive in return as compensation.

These are just a few ideas.  The point is that a robust TBTF resolution process can definitely be crafted if the effort is made. Future Lehmans can happen in the future without bringing the whole system down.

Lehman will happen again

Below is a 40-minute panel interview I did with Canadian TV station TVO and its program “The Agenda with Steve Paiken” just over two weeks ago. The questions: Saving Wall Street but forgetting Main Street? One year after the financial sector came close to collapse; could it happen again?

The answer is yes and yes.

Alan Greenspan was right when he reviewed lessons learned from Lehman’s collapse and said about the excesses leading up to the crisis:

It’s human nature, unless somebody can find a way to change human nature, we will have more crises and none of them will look like this because no two crises have anything in common, except human nature.

But let’s not absolve ourselves of the need to take action to prevent the negative fallout as Greenspan attempts to do. If we set the right course, we can also prevent a future economic crisis from being as severe as this one has been.

Related posts:

• Quote of the day: Gordon Gekko – greed is good
• Why Lehman failed
• The U.S. financial system is effectively insolvent
• Greed is not good
• Lehman missed out on $5 billion from Korea

Kyle, a long-time reader, recently asked why I think mark-to-market accounting actually matters.  After alI, savvy investors know that accounting does not necessarily change cash flows.  I think his question has a lot to do with not just accounting, but also with the stress tests.

Kyle writes:

My point is that it has really NOT changed, and people are trying to make it seem like it did. To be honest, I’m glad most people do feel that way, because it means those idiots in Congress will hopefully leave well alone. The capital raising that just occurred due to stress test mumbo jumbo has no connection to FSP 157-4. It is a requirement of GAAP to disclose when an accounting change has affected reporting, in order to explain the change. Out of the probably fifty different financial institution 10-Q’s that I’ve looked at, only one, Wells Fargo, indicated that 157-4 had a material impact on their reporting, which it did to the tune of 4B. The other 49 explicitly state, “157-4 had no material impact on our reporting, and we do not expect it to in the future.” It’s in the notes for anyone to read. I just do not understand how an accounting change which explicitly has had no impact on reporting (this is the ultimate point I am trying to make, the rule change was and has been almost completely meaningless), could lead to changes in whether or not a bank is undercapitalized.

Here is my thinking on that issue. I understand what Kyle is saying: FAS 157 guidelines will have no impact on reported earnings. I think it will and that this will alter behaviour. Wells and the Home Loan banks are just two early uses of the 157-4 alterations. Others may follow.

But more important is the affect on future writedowns.  A bank only has to attribute its actions to 157-4 if it is amending prior accounting to reflect a change in asset designation to ‘holding to maturity.’ However, if it marks assets today as ‘holding to maturity’ and then is later forced to write down those assets, these writedowns will not be attributed to changes in the FAS 157 guidelines. So, anticipated future writedowns that would have gone through the income statement from marking to market will now be accounted for as held to maturity. This means the guidelines are affecting accounting and causing the company to report differently. In short: future writedowns for 2009 will be less because of FAS 157.

In my view, it is future credit card, jumbo loan and CRE exposure which will be most affected by this. These are areas where you should expect heavy pressure from securitized assets on bank balance sheets due to deterioration in income from credit card receivables,prime mortgage loans, and commercial real estate loans. What mark-to-market guidelines effectively mean is that banks will not have to reduce capital by nearly as much as had they not marked these assets as hold to maturity.

That is where the stress tests come into play. The stress tests are seen as the make or break for banks i.e. banks that don’t raise enough capital to meet the TCE requirements will be seized by the FDIC and treated to a BankUnited outcome. So the stress tests tell investors what the likely outcome is to be in regards to nationalization. Translation: if you raise enough capital or are well-capitalized enough already to pass the stress test, we’ll leave you alone. You might even be able to pay back your TARP funds. But, if you can’t make the grade in a few months, you will be seized, cleansed, management thrown out, equity reduced to zero, and we will sell you on to private equity concerns or another bank or chop you up into little pieces. This is the IndyMac/BankUnited solution.  Notice that bondholders did not lose any money here.

So, the stress tests and the capital raising exercise have revealed that no one is going to be nationalized unless they can’t come up with the capital.  But since even Citi and Bank of America have been raising capital, few big banks are going to be seized.  You probably saw Huntington (HBAN) and Fifth Third (FITB) coming to market and their shares coming under pressure as a result. But, HBAN said it was going to repurchase $470 million in preferreds immediately after it raised the common equity capital.  Why?  Tangible Common Equity.  This is the measure by which the stress tests are being conducted.  Preferred shares don’t count, so why not issue common and retire preferreds in order to boost your TCE? Remember, pass the stress test and you’re good to go.  Fail and Sheila Bair plays the Grim Reaper on you, your management team, and your shareholders.

My conclusion from all of this building from March on was that bank shares would pop and I said so in April.  Now, the rally has been way over the top and shares have come under pressure as these companies have gone to market for capital.  However, if writedowns from CRE, Prime and Credit Card loans turn out to be less horrible in Q2 and Q3 as I anticipate, shares can rally again and again.  Note, Meredith Whitney takes the opposite view i.e. that major losses are coming for banks – so I am aware of the other side of this argument.

I am left concluding that accounting alters behaviour and has an appreciable impact on share prices, especially when it dictates government intervention.  This is why mark-to-market, tangible common equity, and the stress tests are all significant for the financial services industry.

Related posts:

• What Home-Loan Banks reveal about the effects of mark-to-market
• At least six banks need more capital under stress tests
• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• Black: Stress tests and the Big Lie

I forgot to add this to my links.  Very funny Saturday Night Live clip spoofing Timothy Geithner.  See the link here.

Related posts:

• Sarah Palin on “Saturday Night Live”
• SNL skewers Barack Obama
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• The SNL version of the Palin-Biden debate
• Geithner is open to suggestions

I found this story and video of Bill Black on Tech Ticker (hat tip Larry Doyle). Basically, Black thinks the stress tests were a joke, a common theme heard from those in the know. Listen to what he says about a really difficult stress test we gave Fannie Mac ten years ago.

Results of the stress test brought a collective sigh of relief from Washington D.C. to Wall Street Friday, and stocks were rallying again on a growing sense the financial crisis has past. Don’t you believe it, says William Black, an Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City.

“It’s in the interest of the financial community to send this propaganda out,” Black says. “It’s remarkable not that they do it but that it still works.”

In other words, this isn’t the first time we’ve been told “the crisis is over” and that “banks are well capitalized” – and probably won’t be the last.

The professor and former financial regulator foresees another wave of foreclosures and future bank losses of more than $2.5 trillion vs. the government’s $599 billion estimate.

Simply put, the stress tests weren’t strong enough to be considered “wimpy,” Black says. Furthermore, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG and IndyMac were deemed to have “passed” much more stringent government stress tests before their respective failures, he notes, recalling the grim history…

Related posts:

• Reinhart: Not everybody can be above-average in stress tests
• Ackman and Stigliz talk Stress Tests with Charlie Rose
• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• What the stress tests reveal about Obama’s thinking on banks

In case you missed it, this is Tim Geithner talking stress tests this past Wednesday on Charlie Rose.

Related posts:

• Ackman and Stigliz talk Stress Tests with Charlie Rose
• Reinhart: Not everybody can be above-average in stress tests
• Tim Geithner on Charlie Rose
• Saturday Night Live Grades the Stress Tests
• Forstmann on Charlie Rose: easy money caused crisis

In the CNBC video below, Ken Lewis defends his company’s performance on the stress test and answers some pointed questions in the John Thain – Ben Bernanke – Ken Lewis – Hank Paulson he said she said match.  He also details how Bank of America plans to raise the $34 billion in capital to deal with the government’s plans.  All in all, despite looking very stressed, it was a good performance from Lewis.  Take a look. By the way, Lewis says Countrywide “is on fire in a positive way.”

Related posts:

• Countrywide is the real problem at Bank of America
• Ken Lewis is out as Chairman of Bank of America
• Bank of America cuts its dividend
• Ken Lewis points the finger at Bernanke and Paulson
• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results

This came to me in my inbox seconds ago:

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Chairman Sheila C. Bair today commented on the release of the results of the Capital Assessment Program.

Chairman Bair said: "I want to commend the Federal Reserve for leading the stress assessment exercise and believe that this effort will serve to strengthen the capital positions of our largest financial institutions. A well-capitalized banking system instills market confidence and assures economic growth and development. In addition, bank funding remains stable because insured depositors continue to be fully protected by the full faith and credit guarantee of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

"I look forward to working with the Federal Reserve in reviewing capital plans and corporate governance structures to ensure that institutions that require higher capital buffers take appropriate steps such as conserving cash, issuing new equity, converting existing capital securities, and selling assets and non-core business lines.

"I support Treasury’s decision to make this program voluntary for the vast majority of regional and community banks that might have an interest and the systems in place to conduct this type of evaluation. Community banks have used their superior capital positions to fuel economic growth in their local communities. I continue to support efforts to broaden their participation in the Capital Purchase Program because they have a proven track record of putting those dollars to work by providing prudent credit to consumers and small businesses."

Related posts:

• FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair Statement on the Legacy Loans Program
• Should GE be a AAA company?
• U.S. has begun to drain liquidity
• The FDIC to draw on its line of credit at Treasury soon
• The FDIC acknowledges it is to run out of money

If you haven’t noticed, the Treasury department seems to be leaking the results of the stress tests to reporters at the Wall Street Journal.  Richard Bove, a well-known bank analyst was on Bloomberg Radio this morning talking to Tom Keene and said he knows they have been leaking.  Yves Smith was on top of this a few days back.  With the results to be released tomorrow, we now pretty much know who the winners are and who the losers are.

The losers are Citigroup, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and GMAC. Bloomberg reports:

Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. and GMAC LLC are among the companies judged to need additional capital according to results of regulators’ stress tests on the 19 largest U.S. banks.

Bank of America has the biggest shortfall, at $34 billion, according to people familiar with the matter. Citigroup’s requirement for deeper reserves to offset potential losses over the coming two years is about $5 billion, people with knowledge of that bank’s results said. Wells Fargo requires about $15 billion, while GMAC’s need is $11.5 billion, one person said.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley, MetLife Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Bank of New York Mellon Corp. and American Express Co. were deemed not to need additional funds, the results show.

Stocks rallied after the news, sending the Standard & Poor’s 500 Financials Index to its highest level in four months. The results are the culmination of weeks of investigations, led by the Federal Reserve, into the banks’ lending practices, funding strategies and securities and loan portfolios.

“The markets are telling us we’re in a recovery and the banks are beginning to heal,” William Isaac, former chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., said in an interview today. The end of the stress tests after “three months of water torture” is providing investors some relief, he said.

The regulators put an emphasis in their reviews on tangible common equity. Citigroup’s assessment reflects the New York- based bank’s previously announced plan to convert some of its preferred shares into common stock.

Spokespeople for all of the 10 banks declined to comment.

It’s not as if any of these banks really are losers here.  This charade was pretty predictable. I said as much last week. 

Just one look at the credit ratings and stock prices of the 19 banks and financial institutions in the stress tests will tell you which are the weak institutions. So, why the charade?

Based on what Summers is saying, the stress tests are not designed to really test anything. They are designed to make it seem like the government has things well in hand so that we can grow our way out of this crisis with the help of government stimulus and debt.

Now, Summers and Geithner are not stupid. They do have a backup plan here. As I said in a recent post, not everyone is going to pass, and indeed, some banks have failed. What does that mean? It means these banks will be given some time to come up with the capital necessary to be adequately capitalized. If they cannot do so, the government will have to explore other options. This Plan B could include debt-for-equity swaps, nationalization, and FDIC seizure.

Of those banks that need more capital, Bank of America was up 15%, Citi 14%, and Wells 13%.  Only GMAC suffered.  The word on the street is that investors are happy with the results and relieved that more capital is not needed. Congress and taxpayers won’t need to pony up either.  That’s a relief!

Bove doesn’t seem to think this is good news however.  Another Bloomberg story quoted him as seeing this as negative for expanding credit:

Forcing banks to boost capital in the midst of a recession will cripple lending and may delay a recovery, said Richard Bove, vice president and equity research analysts at Rochdale Securities in Lutz, Florida.

“How are they going to assist the American economy if they are shrinking?” Bove said today in an interview on Bloomberg Radio. “If you make all those banks shrink, which is what you’re really doing by forcing them to add capital, how are they going to lend money?”

Regulators determined Bank of America Corp. requires about $34 billion in new capital, the largest need among the 19 biggest banks subjected to government stress tests, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. Other institutions require capital as well.

“If you go beyond these 19 banks to the next 20, which is what they are going to do, you’re going to knock some of those banks out of business,” Bove said.

“By the time you finish, my guess is you will at least knock at least 150 banks out of business in the United States, shrinking the banking industry in the middle of a recession at a time when you want them to provide more lending to grow the economy,” Bove said. “It makes no sense at all.”

In theory, Bove is correct, but there have been significant reports that Bank of America is selling non-core assets and that they will convert all of their preferred stock into common in order to meet the tangible common equity guidelines laid out in the stress tests.  So, ultimately, even Bank of America, the most under-capitalized of the banks is not going to have to raise any outside capital.  This is why bank shares were up big-time.

But, wait a minute.  Isn’t the preferred, equity that Bank of America already has on its balance sheet?  Why is moving items around like a massive shell game going to make this organization better capitalized?  Paul Kasriel has the answer. It’s called accounting alchemy (pdf):

Congress currently is in no mood to authorize more funds to help recapitalize the financial system. The Treasury says this will not be a problem. If financial institutions need additional capital from the taxpayers to remain solvent, the Treasury will simply shift the preferred shares it already owns in financial institutions to common equity shares. Voila – capital adequate financial institutions! Really?

Consider Balance Sheet One of hypothetical Gotham City Bank. Assets equal liabilities plus common equity. That is good for starters.

But suppose the Treasury believes that Gotham should have a ratio of common equity to total assets of 10% rather than the 5% it currently has. No problem. Treasury will just convert $5 of the preferred shares it owns in Gotham to $5 of common equity. This is shown in Balance Sheet Two. Now Gotham is well capitalized, right? Wrong. The depositors and the bond holders always were in line in front of the preferred shareholders in case Gotham had to be liquidated. So, moving $5 from the preferred equity category to the common equity category does not make the depositors and bond holders any better off. Are taxpayers any worse off? Not really. If Gotham’s original $5 of common equity was not going to be enough of a cushion to protect depositors and bondholders, then taxpayers were not going to get all of their preferred-share holdings back anyway.

Now suppose that $30 of Gotham’s loans and investments become uncollectible, as shown in Balance Sheet Three. This means that all of Gotham’s common equity has been wiped out. In fact, Gotham now has an equity "deficiency" of $20. No problem, according to Treasury. It will simply convert its remaining $10 of preferred equity to common equity. That won’t cut it in this case. As shown in Balance Sheet Four, Gotham still has a common equity deficiency of $10. In other words, if Gotham were to be liquidated, there are only $70 of assets to pay off $60 of deposits and $20 of bonds. Either the Treasury would have to come up with $10 of new funds or bondholders would have to take a 50% haircut. If the Treasury wanted to keep Gotham open and with a ratio of common equity to total assets of 10%, Treasury would have to inject $17 of new funds, all of which would be common equity. In other words, Treasury, meaning us taxpayers, would own 100% of Gotham.

In sum, Treasury’s plan to enhance the capitalization of some financial institutions by beating preferred equity shares into common equity shares is accounting alchemy.

Problem solved. There will be no train wreck. Move along, nothing to see here.

Related posts:

• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• At least six banks need more capital under stress tests
• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• What the stress tests reveal about Obama’s thinking on banks
• GMAC has been nationalized

Last week I wrote a post suggesting that the Germans were getting tired of bailing out their banks and had moved to more draconian solutions to ‘fix’ the banking sector. Nationalizing Hypo Real Estate this week will be the first move in that direction.

But the Germans are not nearly finished in their effort to clean house. Next on the list are the state banks, the Landesbanken.

The Financial Times reports:

The German government has issued an ultimatum to the country’s seven Landesbanken to agree by July to consolidate the troubled state-owned banking sector or face exclusion from Berlin’s plan to take toxic assets off banks’ books.

Government officials told the Financial Times that four of the banks held so many troubled assets that it was “impossible” to see how their owners – German regional governments and municipal savings banks – could save them without Berlin’s help.

For the first time, Berlin had “a very good chance” of forcing the Landesbanken to shrink their balance sheets and merge into “one, two or three” banks by 2012, an official said. They would be “German players with some European scope”.

The merger of the sector into one federally-owned Landesbank would create one of the world’s biggest banks by assets, although any resultant entity would have to shrink rapidly.

For those like me who have been very critical of the slowness of European governments to take matters in hand in this banking crisis, this should be viewed as good news. In a recently leaked document, it was HRE, the Landesbanken and Commerzbank with the lion’s share of potentially crippling toxic asset exposure.

Now, it looks as if HRE and the Landesbanken, have been taken care of.  Commerzbank is the only problem child left to solve.

Source
Berlin issues ultimatum to Landesbanken – FT.com

Related posts:

• Germans must get their head out of sand on banks
• German banks loaded with 816 billion in toxic paper
• Commerzbank gobbles up Dresdner
• The German $400 billion toxic asset time bomb
• Germany partially nationalizes second-largest bank

Warren Buffet speaks with CNBC in the lead up to the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.  He talks a bit about stress tests and Citigroup.  When asked about Wells Fargo, he says he administers his own stress tests and that Wells passes “with flying colors.”

He also uses an analogy of a commodities producer selling copper for $2.00, but then must accept $1.00 for its copper. If your production costs are $1.00, that is tolerable. If they are $1.50, not so much. Wells, he says, is better situated in terms of ‘raw materials costs’ than any large bank.

Take a look.

Related posts:

• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• Reinhart: Not everybody can be above-average in stress tests
• Black: Stress tests and the Big Lie
• JPMorgan has record revenue and $2.7 billion in profit

This comes via Bloomberg:

At least six of the 19 largest U.S. banks require additional capital, according to preliminary results of government stress tests, people briefed on the matter said.

While some of the lenders may need extra cash injections from the government, most of the capital is likely to come from converting preferred shares to common equity, the people said. The Federal Reserve is now hearing appeals from banks, including Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp., that regulators have determined need more of a cushion against losses, they added.

Related posts:

• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• Bank by bank breakdown of stress test results
• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• Meredith Whitney: Regardless of stress tests, banks will still need more capital
• What the stress tests reveal about Obama’s thinking on banks

This is a thought experiment, so bear with me.

I have written repeatedly how I felt that the U.S. Government’s plans to save the banking system were not adequate in the face of a severe capital shortfall in banking.

On one level, I cannot understand the seemingly blinkered view now being taken in Washington by the Obama Administration.  However, I do have immense respect for the intelligence and experience of the Obama economic team, which includes Tim Geithner, Christina Romer, and, critically, Larry Summers.

Summers is nominally the Director of the White House’s National Economic Council for President Barack Obama. But, I imagine he has much more influence given his experience in government and finance. Therefore, I have decided to take a different tack and write a post as if I were Larry Summers thinking out loud and laying out a plausible and logical framework which underpins the banking plans of the Obama Administration.

What follows is me channeling my inner Larry Summers. I hope to conclude with some closing thoughts after I step ‘out of character’ and review what my inner Summers has written.

Cue Larry.

In Character

Last year, we witnessed a breakdown in the fabric of the global financial system of a severity that few have anticipated.  To be sure, there are those who had prognosticated a calamity of this type.  Yet, the large majority of us in economics, finance and government simply did not imagine anything as severe as we have witnessed.

The question I asked myself before taking on my present role is this: Can I help the President restore full confidence in our banking system with a minimum of cost and a minimum of government intervention, cognizant of enormous political constraints. I believe I can. In order to do so, I have to lay out a mental map of what my key assumptions about the global financial system and deflationary environments are and what the key political and legal constraints are as well.

Assumptions

1. The economy is self-equilibrating.  That means I reject Hyman Minsky. It also means that market forces will naturally bring the (U.S. and maybe the global) economy into line over time.  In the interim, some pretty terrible human suffering can take place, but the pain of recession/depression is temporary. Equilibrium will return.
2. The natural course of the economy is up.  Humans will continue to progress over time.  We will use our intelligence to collectively become more productive, grow richer, and increase wealth.  As a result, in most instances, time is our friend. We can grow our way out of economic difficulty.
3. Government is necessary. The essence of government is to do for its citizens what they cannot do for themselves.  In my view, one of those things is to ease (though not eliminate) the suffering associated with economic downturns. This means that it is necessary for government to intervene in periods of severe economic dislocation, not to right self-equilibrating markets, but to hasten the return to equilibrium.
4. Government should be limited.  By that I mean we must respect a healthy tension between the necessity of government and the limits of government.  Government intervention, while often necessary, distorts market forces, and must, therefore, be limited.  This certainly means that competitive, deregulated markets are preferable to over-regulation and anti-competitiveness. In finance, we probably got the regulatory mix wrong during the 1990s and that fostered an industry climate which contributed to excesses. This will change, but not in a way that will lead to over-regulation.
5. Government stimulus is effective in a deflationary environment.  It stops a potentially devastating deflationary spiral, eliminating worst case outcomes that result from dead-weight economic loss.  Yes, this stimulus can pull demand forward or crowd out the private sector, both of which are bad. But, ultimately, the priority of government must be to end a deflationary spiral because of the attendant dead-weight loss it creates. (dead-weight loss being economic destruction that should not and would not take place in a non-deflationary environment).
6. The U.S. banking system is fundamentally solvent and is suffering from liquidity problems.  The last 25 years did see excess where the financial industry in the U.S. grew to outsized proportions.  Asset prices rose too high. But, things have overshot. The U.S. is more productive and wealthier than at any time in the past.  Our banking system should reflect this.  However, liquidity constraints and asset price falls driven now by fear are making our system look weaker than it actually is.

Constraints

1. The checks and balances of democracy necessarily lead to a sluggish response in crisis. So be it.  That is democracy in action. If I had the power to dictate, I might be able to fashion a financial crisis plan which would work.  However, the legislative and judicial branches are going to slow what could be an optimal response by effecting the system’s necessary checks.  It is incumbent upon the President to respond to crisis in a manner both respectful and cognizant of these constraints but using all available resources available to him.
2. The government cannot fund itself with deficit spending ad infinitum. Contrary to what Dick Cheney claimed, deficits do matter.  Debt is a claim on future income and an increase in these claims erodes future growth at the expense of current consumption.  To the degree that government finances current expenses with debt — and not tax and income — we should expect an erosion of future growth.  This fact sets up a tension between the need for government to spend in crisis and the erosion of future growth this spending might create.  When push comes to shove, I choose deficit spending in crisis.

Banking system

So given those assumptions and constraints, the question is how do we deal with this crisis.  The first priority must be  to forestall a deflationary spiral because that induces a dead-weight loss and extracts a cost of incalculable consequences.  The best way for government to end the spiral is to temporarily increase spending or temporarily induce more private sector spending.  Is this re-flating the bubble?  No, because deflationary forces will continue to extract a price even with these measures in place.  The key is to avoid a negative feedback loop, a spiral downward, and the easiest way for government to do this is to increase spending.

But, spending alone won’t get it done.  Ultimately, we will need to increase credit availability.  Just because people are spending more, does not mean the economy will grow.  Growth depends critically on increasing credit in line with the growth of the economy.

I am not one for nationalization of banks or other coercive, non-market based mechanisms of getting lending flowing.  The concept that nationalizing banks and re-privatizing them should be a first port of call for a government imperiled by a weak banking system is contrary to the need for limited government.  What we need to do is put a number of government-assisted programs into play — cognizant of that healthy tension between limited government and necessary government — and get credit flowing this way.

Let me enumerate some mechanisms:

• First we should try bank re-capitalization.  Our first priority must be to have an adequately-capitalized banking system. Absent that, increases in lending are impossible and the system will continue to be doubted. So that’s number one. We can do this through preferred equity so that the government is senior to common equity and receives some compensation for taxpayer money.  What’s more is it limits government interference. Remember – most of these institutions are having temporary problems.  With enough capital, they can weather the storm.  There is no need for heavy-handed government interference.
• If re-capitalization proves inadequate because of depreciated legacy assets, we will need to remove those assets from banks’ balance sheets in a way that promotes price discovery, increases asset liquidity and respects the tension between government involvement and government’s limitations. The PPIP and TALF can help achieve this.
• Moreover, by allowing financial institutions to borrow with a government guarantee, we can ease the funding liquidity constraints as well.

Ultimately, the jump start from stimulus and quantitative easing will start to kick in while all of this is ongoing. The result will be a growing economy and healthier banks. Nevertheless, we should implement some stress tests on institutions to gauge how much capital each institution would need in a worst-case scenario. Those banks faring poorest will need to take remedial action as soon as possible. However, under no circumstances should we ever imply that any individual institution is insolvent. This creates doubt and during times of stress it is not the wisdom of crowds, but the panic of crowds that is on display. Doubts about one institution are likely to have knock-on effects for others creating a systemic problem. This must be avoided at all costs.

Obviously, if these plans do not work out because the economy declines more than expected, we can always fall back to the more coercive, interventionist mode of nationalization. However, that is Plan B only – measures to be taken only if necessary.

I am confident these plans will work. We are already seeing some faint signs of recovery. Mind you, unemployment will continue to rise at a devastating clip. But, by the second half of 2009, we should see some many more signs of recovery and with all of these plans in place, the liquidity crisis will be recede into the past.

Stepping out of character

Whew. Now I can step out of Larry Summers mode and move back to Edward Harrison mode – I was starting to believe this stuff.

The truth is that I sympathize with the logic above. There is much to believe in the preceding paragraphs. In a best-case scenario, Summers would be right if this is the line he is taking.

But what about worst-case scenarios? Where I differ is the one line ” in most instances, time is our friend. We can grow our way out of economic difficulty.” The whole edifice depends critically upon that one statement. If this statement turns out to be false, the whole logical construct collapses. I prefer to go — as the Germans would say — “auf Nummer sicher (with the sure thing)” and not have my plan hinge critically on one potentially false assumption.

Time is NOT our friend. Time is our enemy.

1. The economy will worsen considerably more. The stress tests indicate a worst-case scenario which is unrealistically optimistic. The necessary corollary of this statement is that the legacy assets which are already impaired will become more impaired. In a worst-case scenario, many institutions will be insolvent.
2. Balance sheets will worsen because of commercial real estate loans, credit card loans and other real economy effects as well. This double whammy of deteriorating legacy assets and new asset impairments in a worst-case scenario will overwhelm the programs now in place.
3. Political capital will be consumed over time. Americans will tire of this crisis. And, therefore, the natural checks and balances in the system will stymie further efforts. The legislative branch will re-asset itself in the government budget process and in the financial sector oversight process. The judicial branch will be called on to take issue with the turn of events. Obama is not going to get more stimulus. He is not going to get additional funds to re-capitalize banks. And he will not get a free hand in administering these programs already in place. Moreover, the Fed’s quasi-fiscal role will cause a backlash from Congress and risk its independence.

I have other objections but this post is getting much too long in the tooth. So I will leave it to you to make others.

What worries me is that behind Summers’ (and Geithner’s) calculus is a belief that the system is fundamentally sound and that we should not upset the cart. In my view, the last 25 years of U.S. growth have rested mostly on the creation of debt in complete disproportion to the economic growth the debt has engendered. This has meant we have consumed more in the last generation than we could possibly afford without cutting back our standard of living for at least the next generation.

Add in the belief that this is about asset prices overshooting to the downside and a banking system which is fundamentally sound and you have mental constraints which could prove catastrophically limiting.

I will have more to say about this in upcoming posts, but I do hope you enjoyed seeing the other side of the debate.

Related posts:

• Obama White House: Add Larry Summers and Robert Gibbs
• Geithner and Summers consolidate power
• Did Larry Summers fire derivatives whistleblower at Harvard
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• Crony capitalism in U.S. banking bailout should end

The leaks about who failed the stress tests are already starting.  Who got a big fat ‘F’?  Apparently, Citi and BofA for starters.  But is that any surprise?

Regulators have told Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. that the banks may need to raise more capital based on early results of the government’s so-called stress tests of lenders, according to people familiar with the situation.

The capital shortfall amounts to billions of dollars at Bank of America, based in Charlotte, N.C., people familiar with the bank said.

Executives at both banks are objecting to the preliminary findings, which emerged from the government’s scrutiny of 19 large financial institutions. The two banks are planning to respond with detailed rebuttals, these people said, with Bank of America’s appeal expected by Tuesday.

The findings suggest that government officials are using the stress tests to send a tough message to struggling banks. Bank of America and Citigroup have been the highest-profile problem children in recent months, but it is unlikely that they are the only banks the Federal Reserve has determined might need more capital.

Just three months ago these two mega-banks were on the verge of collapse and needed yet more cash to sustain them.  So, the ’stress tests’ haven’t provided any new information.  But, ah, there’s that last sentence: “it is unlikely that they are the only banks the Federal Reserve has determined might need more capital.”  Who else might need more dosh?

Industry analysts and investors predict that some regional banks, especially those with big portfolios of commercial real-estate loans, likely fared poorly on the stress tests. Analysts consider Regions Financial Corp., Fifth Third Bancorp and Wells Fargo & Co. to be among the leading contenders for more capital. Wells Fargo declined to comment. Representatives of Regions and Fifth Third didn’t respond to requests for comment made late in the day.

Government officials say their meetings about the stress tests with bank executives over the past few days conveyed preliminary results and that discussions were expected to continue this week about specific findings. They also say that banks directed to raise more capital shouldn’t be viewed as insolvent.

Come again? Banks directed to raise more capital shouldn’t be viewed as insolvent? Then what is the purpose of the stress tests, pray tell?

Instead, the capital is intended to cushion the banks against potential future losses under dire economic conditions. Federal officials say they won’t allow any of the top 19 banks to fail.

Still, it is unclear how flexible the government will be about adjusting the results, especially as banks plead their cases individually. Banks have until the middle of this week to lodge their formal responses to the tests. Bankers expect that will set the stage for several days of intense negotiations between the banks and their examiners.

Ah, I see, it is all a sham.

It sounds a lot like a test where the student banks who just failed go to the teacher regulator with mommy and daddy bank lobbyists in tow to see if they can get their grades changed higher. See, the stress are just a scheme to make us think the Federal government is actually doing something about the under-capitalized banking system in the U.S.. In reality, the Obama Administration is just buying more time in order to let us grow our way out of this problem.

According to MIT Professor and former IMF Chief Economist Simon Johnson, this is very nearly what Larry Summers said in a Feb 24th speech at the Inter-American Development Bank. Summing up Summers’ statements, Johnson says:

Summers made five points that reveal a great deal about his personal thinking – and the structure of thought that lies behind most of what the Administration is doing vis-a-vis the crisis. Some of this we knew or guessed at before, but it was still the clearest articulation I have seen.

1. All crises must end. The “self-equilibrating” nature of the economy will ultimately prevail, although that may take massive one-off government actions. Such a crisis happens only ”three or four times” per century, so taking on huge amounts of government debt is fine; implicitly, we will grow out of that debt burden.
2. We will get out of the crisis by encouraging exactly the kind of behaviors that “previously we wanted to discourage” two years ago. It is “this insight, this view” particularly with regard to leverage (overborrowing, to you and me) that “undergirds the policy program in the United States.”
3. There is a critical need to support financial intermediation and to ensure it is adequately capitalized, with a view to the risks inherent in the current situation. He then said, with a straight face, that the current bank stress tests are designed with this in mind.
4. Growth in the 1990s and more recently was based too much on finance (this appears to be a relatively new thought for Summers). The high and rising share of finance in corporate profits “should have been a warning”. The next expansion should be based less on asset bubbles and more on investment in key public services.
5. The financial regulatory system “in fundamental respects has been a failure”. There have been too many serious crises in the past 20 years (yes, this statement was somewhat at odds with the low frequency of major crises statement in point 1).

Just one look at the credit ratings and stock prices of the 19 banks and financial institutions in the stress tests will tell you which are the weak institutions. So, why the charade?

Based on what Summers is saying, the stress tests are not designed to really test anything. They are designed to make it seem like the government has things well in hand so that we can grow our way out of this crisis with the help of government stimulus and debt.

Now, Summers and Geithner are not stupid. They do have a backup plan here. As I said in a recent post, not everyone is going to pass, and indeed, some banks have failed. What does that mean? It means these banks will be given some time to come up with the capital necessary to be adequately capitalized. If they cannot do so, the government will have to explore other options. This Plan B could include debt-for-equity swaps, nationalization, and FDIC seizure.

So, Geithner and Summers are hoping FDIC-subsidized funding, toxic asset removal, fiscal stimulus, quantitative easing and all the other measures now in place will kick in and provide a recovery – and solve the banking problem. However, if the problem is not solved, there is plan B – debt-for-equity swap, nationalization, or asset seizure.

In my view, we should be going to Plan B right from the start rather than going through this jerry-rigged sham of a stress test.

Sources
Fed Pushes Citi, BofA to Increase Capital – WSJ
Larry Summers’ New Model – The Baseline Scenario

Related posts:

• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• At least six banks need more capital under stress tests
• Reinhart: Not everybody can be above-average in stress tests
• Ackman and Stigliz talk Stress Tests with Charlie Rose
• What the stress tests reveal about Obama’s thinking on banks

In this much-talked about Charlie Rose roundtable with Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz joined by Bill Ackman of Pershing Square, Andrew Ross Sorkin of the New York Times and Kate Kelly of the Wall Street Journal, these experts discuss the government-administered stress tests. Joseph Stiglitz has been particularly negative about the Obama Administration’s banking crisis plan.

If you want to know what is going on in the U.S. banking system and how the Federal Government plans to deal with big banks, this is a must-see video. Nationalization, debt-for-equity-swaps, bailouts, capital, leverage, everything you want to know is in this discussion. Ackman does a good job in arguing that the bailouts are NOT going to increase lending and that debt-for-equity swaps are necessary.

These stress tests are supposed to tell us who’s strong and who’s not among the 19 largest financial institutions in the United States.

Stiglitz has the money quote here.

“The issue is who is going to bear the risk of the uncertain valuation [of assets on bank balance sheets] and is it the people who gave the money to the bank [bondholders] or is it the U.S. taxpayer.”

Related posts:

• Reinhart: Not everybody can be above-average in stress tests
• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• GMAC has been nationalized
• At least six banks need more capital under stress tests
• Black: Stress tests and the Big Lie

It looks pretty clear that the U.S. regulators are going to clean house this year — at least with small banks.  Hundreds of small banks and credit union will go into receivership in 2009.  However, big banks are getting a free ride. First there was the juxtaposition of the kid gloves treatment of too big to fail financial institutions versus the iron fist meted out for the soon to be bankrupt Chrysler and General Motors.

Now, on a day when 4 small banks and one credit union are going bust, the difference in what is happening with big banks versus smaller financial institutions is equally dramatic. The stress tests are complete for the Golden List of 19.  But, rest assured, the Feds won’t be doing a damn thing. This is all just for show. Nationalization is now for small institutions only.

So, with our regulators in mind, I give you the distraction of the day.  This is for you American Southern Bank, Michigan Heritage Bank, First Bank of Beverly Hills and First Bank of Idaho. (Bank failures 26, 27, 28 and 29) – and for you too Eastern Financial Florida Credit Union.

Long live small banks! All your bank are belong to us:

Related article
All your base are belong to us – Wikipedia
all your base are belong to us – Urban Dictionary

Related posts:

• Two largest wholesale credit unions seized
• Florida credit union put into conservatorship
• Fifth Third takes on assets of Freedom Bank
• The FDIC acknowledges it is to run out of money
• IndyMac: Another Banking Bankruptcy

Irrespective of whether one thinks the stress tests used to test the U.S. banking system is a sham (10% unemployment is not a worst-case scenario), the fact of the matter is these tests MUST show some differentiation in order to be credible.  Vincent Reinhart, a former Fed official now at the AEI, makes this case in the video below with Bloomberg News.

Most of us have fixed on whether the stress tests will be credible or not.  In order to be credible, there will have to be stress test winners and losers. Now, mind you, the government has to be very careful about the stress exercise hurting some institutions, so it will tread carefully. This is very much a political exercise. So, having heard Reinhart voice his view, my question is whether the winners and losers will be picked based on real financial differentiation or based on other more political factors.

Related posts:

• Black: Stress tests and the Big Lie
• Stress tests reveal Citi and BofA need more capital, but you knew that already
• What the stress tests reveal about Obama’s thinking on banks
• BofA, Citi, Wells and GMAC biggest losers in stress test leaks
• Meredith Whitney: Regardless of stress tests, banks will still need more capital

Paul McCulley of PIMCO made a few comments back in March which caught my attention.  Given how well banks are doing this earnings season, I thought it relevant to quote him here.  The essence of his remarks was this:

• Deleveraging is a self-reinforcing vicious cycle brought upon by the Paradox of Thrift.  In order to stop this downward deflationary spiral, we need the political will to socialize losses from which privatized gains have already been made.  While this socialization of losses is unseemly and maddening, it is wholly necessary.

Personally, I don’t buy it.  McCulley is talking his own book. It is a self-serving statement.  Nationalization or stuffing bondholders are equally good ways of stopping this spiral. Nevertheless, here is what he had to say:

The present crisis, in textbook terms, is a case of the dual, mutually reinforcing maladies of the Paradox of Thrift and the Paradox of Leverage. In many respects, they are the same disease: what is rational at the individual citizen or firm level, notably to increase savings out of income or to delever balance sheets, becomes irrational at the community level.

If everybody seeks to increase their savings by consuming less of their incomes, they will collectively fail, because consumption drives production which drives income, the fountain from which savings flow. Likewise, if everybody seeks to delever by selling assets and paying down debt, or by selling equity in themselves, they can’t, as the market for both assets and equity will go offer-only, no bid.

Both of these maladies require that the sovereign go the other way, (1) dis-saving with even more passion than the private sector is attempting to increase savings, thereby maintaining nominal aggregate demand and thus, nominal national income; and (2) becoming the bid side for the levered private sector’s offer-only markets for assets and equity. It really is that simple, at least on paper, as Keynes and Minsky wisely taught.

The problem with the desirable textbook solution is that it suffers from constrained political feasibility. Actually, dealing with the Paradox of Thrift is practically much easier, even if less critically important, than dealing with the Paradox of Deleveraging. While Congress may belly-ache and wrangle incessantly about the precise size and composition of fiscal stimulus packages, it is safe to say that but for a few wing nuts, we are all Keynesians now in the matter of cracking the Paradox of Thrift.

In contrast there is limited political consensus for using the sovereign’s balance sheet and good credit to break the Paradox of Deleveraging. Put differently, while we may all now be Keynesians, we are not all Minskyians. What is ineluctably needed involves socializing the losses of a banking system – both conventional banking and shadow banking – after the spectacular winnings of the Forward Minsky Journey were privatized. It simply doesn’t sit well politically. In fact, it stinks to high heaven.

Thus, to quote my partner Mohamed El-Erian, we must contemplate a scenario in which the economically desirable solution is not politically feasible, while that which is politically feasible may not necessarily be economically desirable. Last Sunday, on 60 Minutes, Ben Bernanke addressed this nasty reality directly when he said that perhaps the most severe risk we face is the lack of political will.

In my view, the Geithner-Summers-Bernanke bailouts are very much a case of socializing the losses, as bank earnings this quarter attest. So McCulley is getting his wish. Let’s see whether this method of dealing with the crisis has longer-term benefits.

Source
The Thinking Behind the Stimulus and Bailout Programs – Paul McCulley

Related posts:

• The $1 trillion deficit: has Bill Gross gone crazy?
• Doubling down at AIG
• Are European banks sitting on 16.3 trillion in toxic assets?
• Chart of the Day: Citigroup
• British banks are underestimating losses