[Premium] Tracking My List of Ten Surprises for 2012

I thought now would be a good time to see how my ten surprises for 2012 are tracking as we are nearly a third of the way through the year. I posted these as my first weekly newsletter and these are events that have 1-in-3 odds of happening but which I believe have a more than 50 percent likelihood of occurring in

Chart of the Day: Flight to safety – German Bunds edition

The German 2-year note has dropped below Japan’s for the first time ever, with the German 2-year note yielding 0.109%, a record low. Japan’s 2-year note yield is 0.111%. Meanwhile, the 10-year bund is at 1.638%, nearing the record low of 1.636% from September

Bernanke: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has been guest lecturing at George Washington University, giving students a four-part series of talks entitled “The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis”. Below are the slides that accompanied his lectures

The Economist sees (and raises)

The Free Exchange blog at The Economist has accepted my bet, and very cleverly (the bastards!) they have added a second one. For two years I have been arguing that a Chinese rebalancing will require much slower GDP growth rates than we currently think possible and, working backwards from annual consumption growth rates of 7-8%, I have argued that this implies that China’s real GDP growth rate will average not much more than 3% annually over the rest of the decade. So here are the two bets, both on China

On debt’s centrality to modelling complex economic systems

My view as developed in that post is that debt is central to understanding economic systems, and not just because it has a redistributive element in apportioning losses between creditors and debtors when recession forces credit writedowns. More importantly, debt accumulation adds to an economy’s ability to sutain economic growth (and malinvestment) by adding to aggregate demand. The video in this post gets to why this. matters

[Premium] Daily Commentary: Net Capital Rules and the Credit Crisis

This daily commentary is a bronze-level post for Pro subscribers. Two articles worth reading on the 2004 change in net capital rules for investment banks are highlighted in today’s links

What were big-time pundits saying just as stocks were bottoming in March 2009?

Faber, Buffett and Grantham were bullish as stocks reached their financial crisis nadir

The current housing bust is much worse than the Great Depression

Great chart from the recently released Economic Report of the President. We suspect the Great Depression housing bust didn’t have the government props to soften the blow as we do today, which, therefore, on a relative basis, makes the current bust much worse. The prior conditions to the current bust must have been much worse than those before the Great Depression

The Problem with Success

Cash accounts for almost 6% of all corporate assets and the highest in sixty years. This increase is a result of a number of factors. Record profits give businesses the wherewithal. But corporations are not rewarded for the cash holdings. Moreover, the cash is held in such instruments as money market funds, commercial paper and bank deposits

The Fetish for Liquidity (and Reform of the Financial System)

So here’s the deal. What happened is that the financial sector taken as a whole moved into extremely short-term finance of positions in assets. This is a huge topic and is related to the transformation of investment banking partnerships that had a long-term interest in the well-being of their clients to publicly-held, pump-and-dump enterprises whose only interest was the well-being of top management.

It also is related to the rise of shadow banks that appeared to offer deposit-like liabilities but without the protection of FDIC. And it is related to the Greenspan “put” and the Bernanke “great moderation” that appeared to guarantee that all financial practices—no matter how crazily risky—would be backstopped by Uncle Sam. And it is related to very low overnight interest rate targets by the Fed (through to 2004) that made short-term finance extremely cheap relative to longer-term finance. All of this encouraged financial institutions to rely on insanely short short-term finance

[Premium] The Ultimate QE is the Fed’s Coming Purchase of Real Assets

I would bet on near-systemic collapse before the Fed starts either asset purchases or Congress resorts to fiscal activism. But eventually, the Fed is going to purchase more than just treasuries. They will purchase a lot of financial assets and probably some real assets as well

Marginalization of Western Europe

US money markets have dramatically cut their exposure to European bank paper. This has been widely reported and has intensified the dollar funding needs of some European, especially French and Italian banks.

When we talk about European banks needing to secure dollar funding, where are they getting those dollars