Here’s another interesting piece from Randall Wray, the economics professor from University of Missouri-Kansas City (that same school which employs Bill Black of “The Best Way to Rob a bank is to own one” fame).

Wray has a lot to say most, but not all, of which I found convincing – but that’s a story for another day.

This is what I found most interesting:

Here is what I propose: let’s support Senator Bayh’s proposal to “just say no” to raising the debt ceiling. Once the federal debt reaches $12.1 trillion, the Treasury would be prohibited from selling any more bonds. Treasury would continue to spend by crediting bank accounts of recipients, and reserve accounts of their banks. Banks would offer excess reserves in overnight markets, but would find no takers—hence would have to be content holding reserves and earning whatever rate the Fed wants to pay. But as Chairman Bernanke told Congress, this is no problem because the Fed spends simply by crediting bank accounts.

This would allow Senator Bayh and other deficit warriors to stop worrying about Treasury debt and move on to something important like the loss of millions of jobs.

What the good Professor is suggesting is that the Treasury doesn’t have to issue bonds at all.  In fact, since the Treasury does control the electronic printing press, it could legitimately buy stuff with money it prints out of thin air.

Sounds a bit like counterfeiting, doesn’t it?  But, let’s step back for a second:  what is the functional difference for the federal government between Treasury securities and bank notes? Both are liabilities of the federal government. But liabilities of what? The only obligation they enforce on the government is the promise to repay with more paper (or electronic bank credits, if you will). For all intents and purposes, bank notes, reserve deposits, and Treasury securities are fungible: they are obligations to be repaid in the same fiat currency.

I’m looking at a five dollar bill right now.  It says “Federal Reserve Note" across the top. It has an oversized picture of Abraham Lincoln in the middle.  It also says “this note is legal tender for all debt, public and private” in the lower left, signed “Anna Escobedo Cabral, Treasurer of the United States.”  On the back, I see “The United States of America” up top and “In God We Trust” underneath with a picture of the Lincoln Memorial in the middle, labelled “Lincoln Memorial” for those who don’t know what it is. But, I’m trying to figure out why Geithner and the gang couldn’t just reel off a bunch of these and some Jacksons and Benjamins and pay people?

Now I’m looking at a Canadian Twenty. It sure is colourful. It has a bunch of French on it and a picture of the Queen. But, other than that, it’s really no different than the American fiver. “Ce billet a cours legal/ This note is legal tender.”

I have some Euros and Mexican pesos too. But these central banks don’t say anything about their obligations.  Very dubious! At least they’re colourful like the Canadian money.

How ‘bout a British tenner? Dickens on the front, and the Queen on the back (she’s everywhere). A-ha. Here’s what I’m looking for. It says “Bank of England. I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of ten pounds.” 

I think that gets me to my point, actually.  From the government’s perspective, there is no functional difference between any of its obligations like bank notes, electronic credits, or treasury bills and bonds. As the Ten pound note says, “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of [fill in the blank sum][fill in the blank fiat currency].”

So, the U.S. government could legitimately stop issuing bonds altogether if it wanted to.  When people complain about the admittedly enormous government debt, they don’t think of the mechanics of the issue. As I see it, in a fiat money environment, the first function of the Treasury bonds is to serve as a vehicle to add or subtract reserves in the system to help the Federal Reserve hit a target Fed Funds rate. The second is to give holders of government obligations a return on their investment. After all, bank notes or bank reserves don’t pay much if anything.

Am I missing something?

Source

Memo to Congress: Don’t Increase the Government’s Debt Limit! – L. Randall Wray

Related posts:

• Russia, sovereign debt defaults, and fiat currency
• Interest rates up in the US as investors choke on supply
• Quote of the day: Stephen Roach
• Another take on the treasuries bubble
• Mea Culpa: The Fed is not going to buy treasuries

Hat tip Rolfe Winkler.

Related posts:

• Steve Keen and the spectre of terminal debt
• Steve Keen: On the Edge with Max Keiser
• Bloomberg News is still after the Fed for more disclosure
• Dilbert on the asset-based economy
• What does Mises say about trying to stimulate the economy out of recession

Columbia University Professor and former Federal Reserve official Frederic Mishkin wrote a much-discussed Op-Ed in the Financial Times yesterday. In it, he asks

Are potential asset-price bubbles always dangerous?

He answers this question with a no, noting that some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others because of their connection to debt and credit. I agree with his delineation and assertion that some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others. But, his conclusion that the non-credit variety of asset bubble — what he calls the “pure irrational exuberance bubble” — is not dangerous is false. This is the same blinkered thinking which led to Nasdaq 5000 and its crash. Experience demonstrates that all asset bubbles are dangerous, some asset bubbles are more dangerous than others. Think Animal Farm: All bubbles are equal, but some bubbles are more equal than others.

The real question Mishkin attempts to answer is whether the Federal Reserve (where he once worked) or any other central bank should target asset prices so as to prevent bubbles from taking form.

Because the second category of bubble does not present the same dangers to the economy as a credit boom bubble, the case for tightening monetary policy to restrain a pure irrational exuberance bubble is much weaker. Asset-price bubbles of this type are hard to identify: after the fact is easy, but beforehand is not. (If policymakers were that smart, why aren’t they rich?) Tightening monetary policy to restrain a bubble that does not materialise will lead to much weaker economic growth than is warranted. Monetary policymakers, just like doctors, need to take a Hippocratic Oath to “do no harm”.

Are we to take this seriously?  Even Alan Greenspan is showing more realism in the wake of our latest bubble.  This man is outright dangerous.  Don’t be fooled; his piece is a plant. We have some serious asset bubbles forming right now and he is looking to give intellectual cover to the watch-the-bubble-and-clean-up-after-the-mess policy we saw on display in the late 1990s. Yves Smith thinks there is a connection between his statement and likely Federal Reserve policy.

What I find interesting is how the Federal Reserve under Greenspan had an explicit policy of targeting asset prices as a means of reflating the economy. Yet, Mishkin is saying they should not target asset prices as a means of deflating the economy. This is what is called monetary policy asymmetry, otherwise known as the Greenspan Put. It’s not about targeting asset prices but looking for excess credit growth, which was certainly on display in the Nasdaq boom as well.

In effect, Mishkin is arguing for us to continue with business as usual. This is one of the more loathsome pieces of prattle I have witnessed since the financial crisis began. I hope no one takes this man seriously. I am ashamed that he is a professor at the business school I attended.

I would be remiss if I didn’t point out his equally absurd piece of research on Iceland’s economy before it collapsed. he wrote a piece called “Financial Stability in Iceland” with Tryggvi Herbertsson which stated:

Our analysis indicates that the sources of financial instability that triggered financial crises in emerging market countries in recent years are just not present in Iceland, so that comparisons of Iceland with emerging market countries are misguided.

No, Mr. Mishkin your analysis is misguided. It was with Iceland and it is here again. See below for a real analysis on Iceland from Willem Buiter and Anne Sibert which we can take seriously.

As I have been saying, you can get wildly different conclusions from two people based on the same facts and largely the same analysis. It goes to philosophical predisposition.  What this FT article by Mishkin demonstrates is that no amount of real world evidence of the havoc that bubbles wreak will dissuade these ivory tower ideologues from supporting failed economic policy.

Sources

Not all bubbles present a risk to the economy – Frederic Mishkin, FT

Financial Stability in Iceland (pdf) – Icelandic Chamber of Commerce

The collapse of Iceland’s banks: the predictable end of a non-viable business model – VoxEU

Central Banks Can Do Better Than Just Mopping Up – Caroline Baum, Bloomberg

Related posts:

• Popping bubbles
• Federal Reserve’s Fisher says tightening will be aggressive
• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Quote of the day: William White and inflation
• Bank leverage: forever blowing bubbles part two

That’s all you need to know.

Source

FOMC statement – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Related posts:

• The Federal Reserve bails out AIG
• No Fed cut
• The Fed leads a global rate cut by central banks
• Bloomberg wins Freedom of Information lawsuit against Fed
• Don’t underestimate the power of printing money

I have said on a number of occasions that a sovereign nation that issues debt in its own fiat currency cannot default involuntarily.  The case most people point to as a counterfactual is Russia in 1998.  I mentioned Russia in a recent post:

Countries that have gone bust, Russia, Mexico, and Argentina were borrowing in foreign currency because of interest rate differentials. No sovereign nation which prints and issues debt in its own fiat currency can ever involuntarily be made insolvent.

I was on a trading desk that was dealing in synthetic GKOs before Russia defaulted in 1998, so I remember the incident quite clearly. Russia’s was not an involuntary default by a country which issues debt in its own fiat currency. Russia was a perfect example of a voluntary default due to huge foreign currency debt and foreign exchange reserve losses (see Wikipedia for a pretty accurate and thorough account on the events of the 1998 Russian financial crisis).

Marshall Auerback summed it up well in an email to me as we discussed this case in view of his post refuting chatter about Japan defaulting. Not the underlined words.

Russia didn’t have to default.  As a point of logic, the concept of ability to pay being inherently revenue constrained is not applicable to the issuer of a currency. Any such constraints are necessarily self-imposed (including various ‘no overdraft’ legislation in some countries for the Treasury at the Central Bank). The issuer can always make payment of its currency by crediting the appropriate account or by issuing actual paper currency if demanded by the counter party.

An extreme example is Russia in August 1998. The rouble was convertible into $US at the Russian Central Bank at the rate of 6.45 roubles per $US. The Russian government, desirous of maintaining this fixed exchange rate policy, was limited in its willingness to pay by its holdings of $US reserves, since even at very high interest rates holders of roubles desired to exchange them for $US at the Russian Central Bank. Facing declining $US reserves, and unable to obtain additional reserves in international markets, convertibility was suspended around mid August, and the Russian Central Bank has no choice but to allow the rouble to float.

All throughout this process, the Russian Government had the ability to pay in roubles. However, due to its choice of fixing the exchange rate at level above ‘market levels’ it was not, in mid August, willing to make payments in roubles. In fact, even after floating the rouble, when payment could have been made without losing reserves, the Russian Government, which included the Treasury and Central Bank, continued to be unwilling to make payments in roubles when due, both domestically and internationally. It defaulted on rouble payment by choice, as it always possessed the ability to pay simply by crediting the appropriate accounts with roubles at the Central Bank.

Why Russia made this choice is the subject of much debate. However, there is no debate over the fact that Russia had the ability to meet its notional rouble obligations but was unwilling to pay and instead chose to default.

Russia defaulted voluntarily, an event which the geniuses at Long-Term Capital Management failed to model correctly. Moreover, the immediate stress on Russia was not the rouble-denominated debt but the mountain of foreign currency obligations via an unrealistic currency peg which were draining reserves. Similar events unfolded in Argentina a few years later as their currency board crumbled and the Peso was devalued by three-quarters.

Again, the point is that a government can always make good on its own fiat currency obligations if it chooses to do so. The real question is why a country might voluntarily default on its own currency debt or involuntarily on foreign currency debt.  The answer usually has to do with taxes.  In Argentina and Russia, the government was unable to prove that its taxation policies were benefitting its citizens, creating rampant tax evasion, especially in the monied classes. Capital flight took form as many dodged taxes. Capital flight eventually turns into currency revulsion which creates the pre-conditions for depression, as Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania learned most recently.

The relationship these examples from the Baltics, Argentina and Russia have with Japan and the United States is taxes. When taxes seem unfair or excessive, the citizens evade taxes and eventually revolt; you end up with a situation like Russia circa 1998, Argentina circa 2002 or Zimbabwe circa 2007.

Related posts:

• Russia devalues currency again as foreign reserves plummet
• Latvia – the insanity continues
• The Age of the Fiat Currency: A 38-year experiment in inflation
• Argentina faces potential collapse
• Russia cuts Europe off completely from its gas

The following is a re-print of the latest monthly newsletter from Niels Jensen of Absolute Return Partners, published with the express permission of the author. Visit www.arpllp.com to learn more about Absolute Return Partners. You can reach the firm by email at info@arpllp.com.

This post on taxes and budget deficits should remind one of three recent posts here which take varying views of the fiscal position in Japan. See "Marshall Auerback’s "Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus" and “The new Japan, domestic consumption, and the neo-liberal thought machine “ and my “Japan: stimulus without reform leads to a policy cul de sac.”

While I am personally no fan of supply-side economics or Arthur Laffer (actually, in full disclosure, I have to admit to being generally anti-Reagan/Thatcher as well – in large part due to a lax regulatory environment on both counts and some heinous racial politics in Reagan’s case), I do favour lower taxes as a way to stimulate the economy (through a payroll tax cut, for example).

“The only thing worse than rescuing the system would have been not to do so.”   – Martin Wolf

Welcome to the third letter in our four letter series about major trends defining the future of the world we live in. I kicked off back in September with a piece on energy supplies and last month I took a closer look at the demographic outlook. This month my focus will be on government and why our leaders need to think outside the box to solve the crisis we find ourselves in. I have found this topic particularly difficult to handle – probably because I am somewhat outside of my comfort zone. I sincerely hope you enjoy it anyway.

Let me introduce the main characters: First, the banks which are veering out of control (again!). Next, our central bankers and regulators who are doing a better job than broadly perceived; however, they lack the political support to tackle a financial system which thrives on excesses. And, just to complete the picture, we are up against a political system which is institutionally corrupt and politicians who are hopelessly narrow-minded and unable to look beyond the next election.

Less means more

Since the early 1980s, we (or at least those of us living in an Anglo-Saxon country) have lived in a world where less has carried the meaning of more. Reagan and Thatcher both genuinely believed in small government. Fundamentally, they shared the view that people respond to economic incentives, but it was not only about tax. The public sectors in both countries were slimmed down and much red tape removed. Even the City of London underwent drastic transformation – the so-called Big Bang. The economy reacted favourably in both countries and stock markets began a journey which lasted more than two decades and delivered the most powerful bull market of all times.

But, as we all know now, it ended in tears. Like children in a candy shop, we couldn’t control ourselves. Greed took over and whatever control mechanisms there were in place failed miserably when we needed them the most. It is therefore perfectly understandable that both regulators and politicians want more control. I just wish that our elected leaders would put their self-interest to the side for once and do what is right for the country. Unfortunately, that is about as likely as the sun not rising tomorrow morning.

Too big to fail or…?

Central to the discussion is the role of our banks. Are some banks really too big to fail or are they just too politically connected to fail? Following last year’s near Armageddon, most banks desperately need fresh capital and our monetary authorities – with plenty of encouragement from our Government – have created an environment which has handed banks a license to print money. In a budget constrained world, such a policy was always considered a more palatable way to re-finance the banking sector than the alternative – pumping more hard earned tax payer money into the banking system. So far so good.

Unfortunately, little seems to have been learned from the excesses of recent years. As we have seen time and again, easy money leads to carelessness, paving the way for future bubbles, and why should it be any different this time? A system where profits are privatised and losses socialised is destined to fail. It is the old moral hazard argument all over again and it encourages extreme risk taking. It is nevertheless the system which is being practised all over the world at the moment. And if politicians believe they can solve the problem by capping bonuses, they are less intelligent than even I thought.

In a recent article in the Financial Times, Willem Buiter made some interesting observations on this subject:

Will things be different during the next boom/bubble?  The next credit and asset market boom will generate massive profits and generous tax revenues.  The same phalanx of lobbyists will again descend on regulators, legislators and members of the executive branch of government.  New and exciting financial instruments – superprime lifegages perhaps – will be demonstrated by highly paid hirelings from academia to have unprecedented potential for diversifying, sharing and extinguishing risk.  It will be different from every other boom in the past.  It will be a truly sustainable euphoria – a high for humanity.  And the regulators/supervisors will be convinced, seduced, intimidated or co-opted.

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King recognises the problem:

It is important that banks in receipt of public support are not encouraged to try to earn their way out of that support by resuming the very activities that got them into trouble.

As a possible solution, King has proposed a re-introduction of the rules which used to be in place, prohibiting retail and investment banking activities under the same roof. For speaking his mind, he was publicly reprimanded by the Prime Minister, who deemed such a policy response “simplistic and out-of-date”. Perhaps I should mention that banks are amongst the largest contributors to the political parties in this country. So much for integrity.

It is time to move on

A friend of mine attended an investment conference recently, where one of the speakers was the CEO of a world famous investment bank. When the talk turned to bonuses, the CEO stated flatly that “it is time to move on” (no prizes for guessing which bank). Perhaps it is time to move on, but not in the direction he wants to go. When US tax payers were forced to cough up $185 billion last year to save AIG which in turn saved an entire industry bar Lehman Brothers, the man on the street would be forgiven for expecting a touch more humility and sensitivity from those running our banks.

I am not for one second arguing that bonuses should be regulated. It is simply the wrong way to address the problem. But society is faced with a much broader problem when bankers carry on living in their ivory towers whilst the canyon between them and the rest of society grows bigger and bigger. “Take risks and you will be amply rewarded; fail and the tax payer will bail you out” is about the only lesson they seem to have learned from the past two years. The solution? Force banks to take less risk. It is absurd that many of our banks are still levered 30, 40 and some even 50 times. With less risk, their profits in good times will be much lower (and their losses in bad times correspondingly smaller), and the reduced profits will automatically drive down bonuses.

Here in the UK, two banks (Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group) are being forced to break up their businesses. If you are too big to fail, you are too big to exist, seems to be the philosophy. However, the government deserves little or no credit for that decision. It is in fact the EU Commission which is forcing the government to take this draconian step. Who said nothing good comes out of Brussels? It is a much more constructive move than the pathetic focus on bonuses, but it doesn’t address the basic problem – banks must reduce their gearing.

The Laffer curve

Regulating banks more effectively is only half the story, though. As already alluded to, governments all over the world are faced with rising debt, threatening to bankrupt many countries. Several political leaders have already stated publicly that taxes will have to rise, but is that really the appropriate policy response to a dire fiscal outlook? Let’s turn our attention to the so-called Laffer curve. The Laffer curve simply states that there is always a revenue optimal tax rate. The Laffer curve does not provide any evidence as to what that tax rate actually is. As illustrated in chart 1 below, not surprisingly, when the tax rate is zero, the tax revenue is also zero; likewise when the tax rate is 100%. Somewhere in between, the optimal tax rate is to be found. The obvious implication of this relationship is that, over and above a certain point, the tax revenue falls once the tax rate is increased.

Behind the relationship between the tax rate and tax revenues lies the simple notion that a change in the tax rate has an arithmetic as well as an economic effect on tax revenues. The arithmetic effect of a tax hike is always positive whilst the economic effect is always negative due to the effect it has on output, employment, consumption, etc. In other words, the two effects always move in opposite directions.

  Chart 1:  The Laffer Curve

Source:

http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm

It was this basic idea which drove President Reagan to lower tax rates in 1981, yet he was by no means the first US president to do so. In the early 1920s Presidents Harding (1921-23) and Coolidge (1923-29) had reduced the top rate from a whopping 77% to 25% and, in the early 1960s, President Kennedy had also introduced massive tax cuts. The top rate had peaked at 94% (!) by the end of World War II and he brought it down to 70% (see chart 2).

Chart 2:  US Marginal Tax Rates

Source: http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm

Compelling evidence

So how did these tax cuts actually affect tax revenues and overall economic growth? The evidence is quite compelling (see table 1 below). During the four years prior to 1925 (the year in which the 1920s tax cuts were fully implemented, US tax revenues declined by 9.2% per year. In the following four years, tax revenues rose 0.1% per annum. The Kennedy experience was equally convincing. In the four years prior to the 1965 tax cuts, tax revenues rose by 2.6% per annum. In the following four years, revenues rose by 9.0% per year. Finally, in the Reagan years, tax revenues declined by an annual rate of 2.6% during the four years leading up to 1983, whilst revenues grew by 3.5% annually during the subsequent four year period.

Table 1:  US Tax Revenues around Major Income Tax Cuts

Source:  http://www.heritage.org/research/taxes/bg1765.cfm.

All numbers are inflation-adjusted.

Furthermore, in all three instances, economic growth accelerated following the tax cuts. For example, between 1978 and 1982, US GDP growth averaged 0.9% per year in real terms. Between 1983 and 1986, the economy grew by 4.8% in real terms, so the case in favour of tax cuts appears to be pretty compelling.

Other factors to be considered

It is not always one-way traffic, though. In his first term as President Clinton actually increased taxes in 1993 and what followed? One of the biggest economic booms of all times. Other factors impact tax revenues as well. In the case of Clinton, he presided over an economy which benefited immensely from globalisation and an IT boom, the likes of which had never been seen before.

Here in Europe, total tax revenue as a % of GDP is, on average, much higher than it is in the United States (chart 3). Whilst European growth rates have, admittedly, been modestly below US growth rates in recent years, there is no evidence to suggest that the higher tax rates have done significant damage to European growth. If that were the case, Denmark and Sweden should suffer the lowest growth rates amongst developed nations. In fact, the two Scandinavian countries have enjoyed comparatively high economic growth in recent years.

Also, corporate earnings have been as strong here in Europe as is the case in the US, and European stock markets have actually vastly outperformed the US market in recent years. So it is hard to drive the argument that lower taxes always lead to higher economic growth and stronger stock market performance. However, it is noteworthy that, in the United States, 3 major income tax cut programmes have been implemented in the last 100 years. In each and every case, tax revenues have grown, GDP growth has accelerated and there has been significant job creation. Can you ask for any more than that?

The canary in the coal mine?

One thing is sure, though. Given the rapidly rising public debt all over the OECD area, economic growth must be secured at any price. Anything else will be devastating longer term. Japan stands out as the black sheep with public debt-to-GDP reaching 218% this year. Japan has tried many things to drag itself out of the quicksand but to no avail.

Chart 3:  Total Tax Revenues as % of GDP (2006)

Source: OECD

Its stimulus programme has been very Keynesian with a multiple of public spending projects over the past couple of decades, most of which have been a terrible waste. Now, 20 years later, Japan is falling into the precise trap our economic adviser Woody Brock is warning so vehemently about. GDP growth is slow or non-existent. Debt continues to grow rapidly and sticky deflation makes an already difficult situation almost impossible to deal with.

So far, Japan has just about gotten away with it because they have had easy and cheap access to credit. But what will happen if (when) that changes? It is no longer inconceivable that Japan will default on its sovereign debt at some point over the next decade. Ambrose Evans-Pritchard has written an excellent piece in the Daily Telegraph recently about Japan’s predicament, which you can read here.

Woody Brock did a study earlier this year where he pointed out the danger of allowing public debt to grow much faster than GDP for an extended period of time. As is evident from chart 4, should the United States (or any other nation for that matter) fall into that trap, the implications could be very dire indeed. Think Zimbabwe. Therefore, given the large escalation of public debt, policy makers should aggressively pursue a pro-growth policy. Anything else could have fatal consequences.

Chart 4:  US Federal Debt Outlook

Source: www.sedinc.com

Cut income taxes! 

Empirical evidence suggests that recessions destroy tax revenues; tax cuts don’t. And increased tax revenues are precisely what we need to solve our fiscal crisis. It is therefore tempting to argue that now is the time for a reduction in income tax rates. Unfortunately, and true to form, our politicians will most likely do exactly the opposite. And the Swiss will be laughing all the way to the bank as more and more disenchanted people in this country flee Britain and Gordon Brown’s strait jacket to start a new life in Switzerland.

Niels C. Jensen

© 2002-2009 Absolute Return Partners LLP. All rights reserved.

This material has been prepared by Absolute Return Partners LLP ("ARP"). ARP is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. It is provided for information purposes, is intended for your use only and does not constitute an invitation or offer to subscribe for or purchase any of the products or services mentioned. The information provided is not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision. Information and opinions presented in this material have been obtained or derived from sources believed by ARP to be reliable, but ARP makes no representation as to their accuracy or completeness. ARP accepts no liability for any loss arising from the use of this material. The results referred to in this document are not a guide to the future performance of ARP. The value of investments can go down as well as up and the implementation of the approach described does not guarantee positive performance.  Any reference to potential asset allocation and potential returns do not represent and should not be interpreted as projections.

See other posts I have published referencing or presenting Niels’ analysis.

• The emerging markets crisis – Nov 2008
• Do BRICs (and Germans) Eat PIGS? – Feb 2009
• Europe on the ropes – Mar 2009
• The Fake Recovery - Apr 2009
• Green Shoots or Smoking Weed? – May 2009
• Make Sure You Get This One Right – Jul 2009
• The Hamster on the Wheel – Sep 2009
• A Country for Old Men and a Bit of Samba – Oct 2009

Related posts:

• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Obama takes middle road on stimulus and taxes that leads nowhere
• Are US corporations feeding at the trough of low taxes?
• Japan: stimulus without reform leads to a policy cul de sac
• A note on Japan’s experiment with quantitative easing

Several notable economists prognosticated on what Japan should do to get out of their malaise in the 1990s but none of them understood the problem or the options available to the sovereign government. They all gave poor advice. The way Japan recovered after that decade of poor economic outcomes was through fiscal policy. Monetary policy had little to do with it, as Richard Koo has demonstrated in his recent book on the country.

Let’s eliminate a few misconceptions.  Japanese households do not fund the deficit.  A government default is not possible (unless Japan chooses to do it, which I suppose they could do as they are pretty clueless).We learned that interest rates do not sky-rocket and inflation does not accelerate when deficits and debt issuance are on-going and huge – quite the opposite. If the BOJ should want to increase the money supply, devotees of the money multiplier model (including numerous Nobel Prize winners) would have the BOJ purchase securities. When the BOJ buys securities reserves are added to the system. However, the money multiplier model fails to recognize that the added reserves in excess of required reserves drive the funds rate to zero, since reserve requirements do not change until the following accounting period. That forces the central bank to sell securities, i.e., drain the excess reserves just added, to maintain the funds rate above zero. If, on the other hand, the BOJ wants to decrease money supply, taking reserves out of the system when there are no excess reserves places some banks at risk of not meeting their reserve requirements. The BOJ has no choice but to add reserves back into the banking system, to keep the funds rate from going, theoretically, to infinity.

In either case, the money supply remains unchanged by the BOJ’s action. The multiplier is properly thought of as simply the ratio of the money supply to the monetary base (m = M/MB). Changes in the money supply cause changes in the monetary base, not vice versa. The money multiplier is more accurately thought of as a divisor (MB = M/m).

Their export model is dead, the Chinese are eating their lunch, so the Japanese have to switch to a domestic consumption based model.  How do you do that without spurring lots of unemployment in the absence of government spending?

It is clear to me that the neo-liberal period in Japan has devastated the security of the middle class which accounted for more than 80 per cent of the population. A person could rely on retaining full-time employment on good wages for life as long as they completed secondary school. The 1991 recession which followed the real estate collapse and poor investments by the financial sector led to the “lost decade”. The Japanese government under the neo-liberal helm of Prime Minister Koizumi started deregulating things that had previously been integral to providing this security, including cutting back government spending. See Koo’s book. His evidence is very compelling here.

Around 30 per cent of Japanese workers are employed in low-paid, casual jobs that offer no security. While Japan enjoyed stable growth this was not a problem. But the numbers of temporary workers has risen as the revered life-time employment system that generate prosperity in the Post-World War II period for the vast majority of workers has been steadily dismantled under neo-liberal urging.

I can do no better than to relay discussions I had on this point with Professor Bill Mitchell of the University of Newcastle in Australia.  Bill eloquently summarises the neo-liberal insanity which is destroying this country:

The neo-liberals are running rampant now and predicting a maelstrom. This dominance of neo-liberal thinking will be a major constraint on the new government and it is already showing a compliance to the views.

The family-first policy proposals are a sop to the intergenerational debate.

The decision to shift spending priority to welfare away from national infrastructure provision is an example. The new Prime Minister has already said he will raise taxes to “pay for” the new spending initiatives. He has also promised to cut spending on major infrastructure.

The private investment jackals who have been indulging in wasteful, inefficient yet highly profitable private equity projects in the West are poised to capitalise on this shift in Japanese sentiment. They see Yen-signs before their eyes and are on the move already.

One commentator in today’s Australian says Australia investors are “primed and ready, as Japan rebounds from the global downturn with more resilience and speed than expected …”

The upshot according to the Australian commentary (consistent for a News Limited journalist) is that there will be:

… a focus on public-private partnership projects – a new concept for Japan. They are now essential as government debt soars past double the country’s annual economic output, with public infrastructure spending totalling $7.5 trillion since 1991. And the latest central government stimulus package crowded out bond-raising opportunities for regional governments.

Infrastructure is emerging as a new “asset-class” in Japanese financial markets. We never learn!

If they really understood the fiat monetary system they could continue to provide public infrastructure and extend better safety net protection for the poor. The large deficits that the Japanese government runs is symptomatic of the huge saving desire of the domestic population. Not even the traditionally strong net export performance can offset the high saving ratio.

The saving ratio will also decline as more safety net provisions are extended to the population, who at present feel as though they have to provide for their own retirements. The introduction of a national superannuation scheme would also help.

In that sense, the deficit would fall anyway as consumption increased.

Related posts:

• Japan’s easy money policy was the trigger for the tech wreck
• Is Japan next on the road to quantitative easing?
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Japan: stimulus without reform leads to a policy cul de sac
• The Japanese Problem is now ours

When I read Ed’s recent piece “Japan: stimulus without reform leads to a policy cul de sac,” I couldn’t help but think he is wrong about Japan.

Supporting aggregate demand

The problem is taxes. In Japan, taxes are too high relative to the desire for spending and savings. Policy makers need to stop taking so many yen away from working people, so that they are able to buy all of the output which they can produce at full employment levels.  

The Japanese should have gone for domestic demand-led growth instead of export-led growth. When export growth reversed, the economy went into depression. Even Richard Koo, who has often spoken of a balance sheet recession and has the right approach on Japan, never imagined that such a thing would happen.  But it’s easy enough to resolve; simply support domestic incomes with the right tax cuts to sustain domestic demand at desired levels to sustain output and employment.

One can always sustain domestic demand by altering the fiscal balance.  In truth, it is as simple as debiting and crediting accounts on the Bank of Japan’s master yen account spread sheet.

Again, a fiscal adjustment can restore domestic demand immediately.

Savings in Japan

The savings rate in Japan is down as a consequence of falling net exports and what was until recently a falling budget deficit. The deficit trend is now reversing in a very ugly way- falling revenues and increased transfer payments.  True, private sector savings have fallen which means that Japanese policy makers have run out room for error.  I would contend that the vast scale of private savings allowed them to continue to screw up for so long by, for example:

• hiking the VAT in 1996
• introducing ‘fiscal consolidation’ in 2001 (and finally relenting in 2003 when the economy finally started to grow again, until this latest fiasco). 

Issuing one’s own fiat currency debt

But, the notion that the country is in a ‘debt trap dynamic’ as Ambrose Evans-Pritchard suggests is ludicrous.  Debt is serviced by data entries by the BOJ- debits and credits to securities accounts and transactions accounts at the BOJ. The BOJ can spend/credit accounts at will.  It’s just data entry.  Spending is not constrained by revenues (this is fiat currency, not a gold standard). In a worst case, ‘over-spending’ causes inflation. But, that happens to be what they are trying to accomplish. Getting some inflation would be considered a success.  Moreover, it can easily be reversed by tightening fiscal policy if it comes to that.

It’s really that simple.

Related posts:

• Japan: stimulus without reform leads to a policy cul de sac
• Do the personal income data demonstrate unbalanced reflation?
• Unrealized gains in wealth
• South Korea going gangbusters in contrast to UK
• Depression in Japan

This is a post I wrote in response to an ongoing debate about financial crises, credit revulsion and deficit spending over at Naked Capitallism. See the four links in the first paragraph for the precursor articles.

DoctoRx, Rob Parenteau and Marshall Auerback have each written articles here to bring clarity to some issues I first raised at the beginning of the month in my post, “The recession is over but the depression has just begun.”

As I see it, the issue we are debating has to do with how the government responds when large debts in the private sector constrain demand for credit in the face of a severe economic shock and fall in aggregate demand. In short, if private sector debt levels are so high that a recession precipitates private sector credit revulsion, how should government respond?

Frankly, this question is as much philosophical and political as it is economic.  So I want to wait to answer it and first frame the monetary system in a way which reveals the political nature of the question. Afterwards, I hope it is apparent that there is no one answer to this question and that any society’s answer depends on and reveals its priorities as a people. I will try to make some concluding marks about government debts and taxes in a fiat currency system given the analysis Marshall’s post.

Money and the sectors of the economy

Money is a tool, a medium of exchange, which derives its value from its utility in allowing individuals in an economy to trade goods and services. It eliminates the need to barter and make direct exchanges of goods and services in order to trade. Think of any economy as a collection of individuals or groups which trade goods and services with each other and with the outside world in exchange for a money-value of those goods and services. Each transaction is an exchange of a good or service for a equivalent value amount of money.

So, in any country, the flow of goods and services should be a one for one mirror image of the money flows. Now, if you break an economy down into sectors like the government sector, the private sector, and the foreign sector, the same is also true. Two accounting identities flow from this.

• In any particular time period, the changes in both money value of goods and the changes in the financial balances must sum to zero.  As Rob, illustrated: Household FB + Business FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0
• One sector’s deficit is another sector’s surplus. Think of it this way, if you and I are the only ones in the economy. If I spend more than I earn in, say, one particular month to buy your goods and services, you must have spent less than you earned in that same month to buy my goods and services.

If you take Rob’s formula and combine the two sectors of households and businesses into one sector, the private sector, you are left with Private FB + Government FB + Foreign FB = 0. What this means is that in any given time period, the private sector financial balance is offset by the government and foreign sectors’ balance such that they all sum to zero.

Private sector debts and credit revulsion

Given the framework above, it should be clear that when the private sector has a net surplus, the government and foreign sectors must have a combined net deficit.

So what happens when the economy lapses into recession because of a financial crisis caused in large part by excessive leverage and debt?

The answer is credit revulsion, also known as deleveraging. And this is what we have just seen in the U.S. economy.  Credit revulsion means that the private sector (businesses and households) reduce or are forced to reduce their debt burdens. This change in behavior induces a net surplus in the private sector; the private sector increases savings.

I’m sure you know where this is going. If the private sector moves to a net surplus, the combined government/foreign sectors must axiomatically move to a deficit. 

A foreign sector deficit means that we are net exporting i.e. foreigners are buying more stuff from us than we are from them. We are talking money flows here not goods and service: more money coming in than going out (FB deficit) means fewer goods coming in than going out (current account surplus). Since the U.S. is not going to run a current account surplus, I am going to leave this out of the discussion to focus on the real issue: Government.

We can try and reduce private sector savings

So, the result for the U.S. of a private sector which is net saving is government deficits – this what naturally flows from a credit-revulsion induced private sector deleveraging. By saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against deficit spending.

However, this is where the political/philosophical discussion starts. Two questions come to mind.

• Do we want the private sector to net save at this point in time?
• If so, do we want this savings to occur in an environment of more aggregate demand or less?

Policymakers today have answered no to the first question. They have said, “we do not like credit revulsion and our preferred policy choice is to work against it by reducing private-sector savings.” How do they do this? They lower interest rates in such a way that there is less incentive to save. Policymakers are in effect voting to continue the asset-based economic model.

But, there are several problems with this policy decision: it rewards debtors over savers, it prevents deleveraging from occurring, it creates asset bubbles, it keeps zombie companies and overcapacity alive, and it misallocates resources by artificially lengthening time preferences for money. In short, it is poor policy and it will end poorly as well.

Or we can maintain it and decide to either increase or decrease aggregate demand?

If you reject this policy path, you then have two options. In one, aggregate demand is reduced. In the other aggregate demand is increased.  Which option we choose, again, depends on politics.

In a July post, I outlined the choices. (Note the labels ‘surplus’ and ‘deficit’ should really be labeled ‘financial balance.’ For simplification the foreign sector isn’t depicted but one could assume it is aggregated with the government sector.):

In the Minsky world, the increase in net savings in the private sector and reduction of the current account deficit is axiomatic when the government is increasing deficits.  The point is that the private sector net saving and current account deficit must equal the government deficit.  So, when the combined private savings and current account deficit increases, the government’s financial balance must become more negative.

What this implies is this (diagram from Paul Krugman’s post with the unfortunate title “Deficits saved the world”):

To make the graph easier to follow we start with sector balances at zero i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both the private sector including the current account deficit and for the government sector. And just to be clear, points above the line show private sector savings or public sector deficit.

1. We start where the red circle is.
2. When an economic shock hits which precipitates a massive deleveraging, the entire demand curve shifts to the left to a new lower GDP level, everything else being equal. Thus, deleveraging equals recession. And we now see the private sector curve hitting the public sector curve where the blue circle is. The private sector is now saving and the public sector is in deficit. That is where we are today.
3. However, to bring things back to neutral i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both sectors, one could cut government spending dramatically.  That shifts the entire government curve to the red line on the left, leaving us where the green circle is: in a deep, deep depression. Krugman calls this the Great Depression outcome.

The cult of zero imbalances

In the depression post which kicked off this debate, I said “I must admit to having a preternatural disaffection for large deficits and big government which is what Koo and Minsky advise respectively.” Consider me a card-carrying member of the cult of zero imbalances. My preference is to see a neutral state where the sectors are balanced as the average long-term outcome. We may deviate from a zero imbalance state over the short-term, but we should be working toward it over the longer-term.

However, in the interim, what we want is to get back to that red circle in the chart and higher GDP and stay away from the green circle and lower GDP – also known as depression.  The difference between these two is government deficit spending.

Depressions are downward economic spirals. And when I invoke the term spiral, you should not be thinking of some stable equilibrium like the Great Moderation, Goldilocks economy, Nash equilibrium or some other close facsimile of economic Nirvana. You should be thinking war, famine and pestilence because those are the events which are historically associated with periods of high deflation and depression.

For me, the choice is clear.

The key is liquidation of overcapacity

While the picture I presented above represents a single point in time, what we want to know is how we get back to the green circle over time. In the depressionary example, we contract immediately and violently as aggregate demand is reduced in both the public and private sectors. The result is a liquidation of overcapacity and a depression. In the pro-growth example, aggregate demand is boosted by government spending whilst the private sector deleverages. In this scenario, liquidation of overcapacity also occurs if the government allows it to do so.

And this is the key: to the degree that government deficit spending is used as a vehicle for channeling funds to so-called systemically important businesses to prevent them from failing, we are merely kicking the can down the road. With the deleveraging, malinvestment must be purged for the economy to right itself on a sustainable growth path.

Government’s hidden debt?

That brings me to the last point: government debt. The first issue I want to address is unfunded liabilities.  This is something of great concern to many (including myself).  However, when we are talking about debt and credit, it is not particularly relevant. I mention this because of my statement in the original post:

The government plays a crucial role here because of the huge private sector indebtedness.  In the U.S. and the U.K., the public sector is not nearly as indebted.

A lot of people want to bolt the unfunded liabilities onto government debt to make the government’s debts appear larger than they actually are.  But when talking about the credit system, we have to be careful and distinguish between obligations and actual debt – related but different terms.

In a period of credit revulsion, the key issue is the overall credit in the system. At issue is a debtor’s inability to meet large existing obligations such that the debtor defaults, the obligation is written down, and the overall credit in the system contracts by the amount of capital that has been allocated to that writedown. The issue is credit writedowns and how they suck capital out of the system, reducing credit and leading to a potential deflationary spiral. It has absolutely nothing to do with unfunded obligations.

The governments unfunded liabilities for social security and healthcare are akin to General Motors’ unfunded pension liabilities. GM’s unfunded liabilities are germane to a credit crisis only to the degree they flow through the income statement and, thus, require credit financing in real time.

Government and its money

The difference between GM and the federal government is vast, however. General Motors is a private organization which must fund its obligations by selling products.  To quote Ben Bernanke’s now infamous words:

the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost.

The U.S. government has monopoly control of the currency and no other entity can print money as a medium of exchange in the United States (see my post “The origin of the U.S. dollar as legal tender and its link to Depression” for how this came to be.)  When anyone else attempts to print money, it is called counterfeiting. In saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against legal tender laws.

This is a problem for states – which cannot print their own money – and for Eurozone countries – which also cannot print their own money (as I laid out in my post, “Depressionary bust in Ireland is echoed in California”) – but it is not a problem for the U.S. government. If the U.S. government so chooses, it can ‘fund’ any purchase with additional money it prints. It is not constrained in the same way private sector actors or even states and local municipalities are.

It is disingenuous for economic pundits like Marc Faber to suggest the U.S. is going to go bust. The United States will not literally be declared insolvent as long as it issues debt in its own currency. Countries that have gone bust, Russia, Mexico, and Argentina were borrowing in foreign currency because of interest rate differentials. No sovereign nation which prints and issues debt in its own fiat currency can ever involuntarily be made insolvent.  

Inflation is another issue altogether.  When the economy is operating at potential, money printing leads to consumer price inflation. But this is not the case right now, there is an enormous output gap that is not going to be closed anytime soon.  So the government can print all the money it wants and buy all the Treasuries it wants; none of this will lead to consumer price inflation in the short run except via dollar depreciation and import prices. Again, I have to remind you that in saying this, I am stating fact, I am not making a political argument for or against quantitative easing.

I should point out that the output gap is why money printing is leading to an asset price bubble both in the U.S. and globally and one reason we should reject QE even in the absence of consumer price inflation.

I hope this post adds to the debate Marshall, Rob, and DoctoRx have taken on.

Related posts:

• Barack Obama: “if we keep on adding to the debt… that could actually lead to a double-dip”
• Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head
• Will Asia’s downturn be worse than America’s?
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• What are the consequences of the huge U.S. deficit?

Steve Horwitz had an interesting read last week on Friedrich von Hayek, the Nobel Prize winning Austrian School economist. Von Hayek is best known for his 1944 Libertarian call to arms “Road to Serfdom” and is generally considered one of the fathers of the free market ideology.

In Horwitz’s piece, he points out that Hayek was not a ‘liquidationist’ and he uses the title quote to demonstrate that Hayek saw deflation as destructive. Was this an evolution in beliefs? it’s hard to say.

Horowitz goes on to say:

Those Austrians who think deflation is always and everywhere a good phenomenon strongly overlap with those Austrians who wonder whether Hayek is really an Austrian (or a even a classical liberal) anyway, so I’m doubtful this will convince them of the claim that a concern with monetary deflation has been, and should be, a core part of Austrian monetary and macro theory.  However, it does, in fact, bolster the case for a monetary equilibrium reading of Hayek.

The question, of course, is if price stability is the ultimate goal of monetary policy, how does one achieve that in a deflationary environment?

Source

Hayek on Deflation and the Great Depression – Steve Horwitz

Related posts:

• The inflation-deflation debate
• Forget Inflation, debt deflation is the real threat
• Credit deflation and the Japanese problem
• Goldman says fund managers expect deflation
• The inflation – deflation debate redux

This morning, I ran across a post by Prieur du Plessis, which linked out to a Stephen Roach interview on Charlie Rose.

Roach is the head of Morgan Stanley Asia and has been a voice to listen to when trying to discern where China is headed and how its relationship with the United States will develop. That was the topic of conversation between Roach and Rose. Through the links on that post I happened upon a 1996 Roach interview on Charlie Rose of a very different sort where he talked about the hollowing out of America and his concern for the future. I want to link those two below.

In the transcript of the recent China interview on Rose’s website, Roach marvels about the progress made in China:

CHARLIE ROSE: You left Wall Street to go live in China.

STEPHEN ROACH: I did. About three years ago, your friend and mine, John Mack, called me up and said, 25 years as an economist, a long time, good job. How would you like to do something different and be the chairman of Morgan Stanley’s business activities in Asia? And I told John I thought he was nuts. I had the best job. I wasn’t going to leave it. He said, "Think about it."

And, you know, John, when he says, "Think about it," there’s a fair amount of emphasis there. I did think about it. And I’d built fabulous relationships in Asia over the years, Charlie. I was passionate about the region. I thought I knew it well, but I knew in my gut that it would be a lot different from the inside than from the outside, and I said, yeah, I’m going to go for it.

And I’ve been out there now about two and a half years. And I have no regrets. I love it. I have learned an awful lot about Asia, and I thought it was time to put it down in a book and get it out there when the world is very focused on Asia, its own challenges and its role in the global economy.

CHARLIE ROSE: What do you love and what have you learned?

STEPHEN ROACH: What I am most passionate about in terms of Asia is what they’ve done, especially in China, over the last 30 years. You know, big celebration, 60th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. But the first 30 years were pretty awful and the next 30 years have been spectacular. And the difference is they have really put huge focus on transitioning this economy from one that was owned by the state to one that is more of a market-based economy. They’ve taken huge risks in terms of reforms, layoffs, building market structures, building companies that we’ve never seen before. And to be on the inside and watching, watching that risk taking up close is a pretty fascinating experience for anyone. And I love every bit of it.

They go on to talk about the outlook there as well as how the government is dragging its heels on increasing domestic demand and shoring up a porous social safety net among other things. I definitely suggest you read the full transcript here. It makes for a better understanding of China. A snippet of the video is embedded below.

However, what was equally interesting to me was that Roach and Robert Reich were talking to Rose about concerns over the hollowing out of America’s workforce through downsizing (off-shoring had not yet gathered full steam).

Roach says:

“What has changed for me is my appreciation for what it has taken to get from point A to point B over the last ten years. It would be one thing if these productivity gains were built on the back of a more talented, skilled, educated, dynamic work force, but it’s another thing altogether if these productivity or efficiency changes were built on the basis of strategies that are hollowing out our companies, hollowing out our workforces, stagnating real wages – tactics in the end that can really lead to industrial extinction.

I’m sure you see the connection. If not, watch the video below in the context of the more recent video and your knowledge of what is happening in the global economy. I will say this: Roach was right about the dichotomy between the benefits to the owners of capital and the benefits to labor that these corporate strategies created.

Where I think his view could be tweaked looking back 13 years is in terms of what it has meant for Corporate America.  The hollowing out of America’s workforce and lack of investment domestically has not meant a hollowing out of Corporate America. Those companies that did downsize American workers in a ‘short-term’ play for next quarter’s earnings are many of the ones which have outperformed for the last 13 years because they have gone global. And the impressive leaps forward in China are testament to the gains made in places like China due in part to that move. It’s called ‘global labor arbitrage’ and it is what I see as the defining element of globalization as practiced.

In the end, however, a day of reckoning will come – not for the managers of the companies who have profited over the time span between these two interviews because they are going to keep their bonuses.  The day of reckoning for America will come in terms of the growth and dynamism of its middle class. Whether the U.S. then moves toward a Latin American style economic structure of a few rich at the top, a weaker middle class, and everyone else at the bottom or back to a more equal income and wealth distribution depends on the reaction by the ‘body politic,’ not on Wall Street.

Related posts:

• Stephen Roach: Downturn in Asia less severe, but recovery later
• Stephen Roach and Jim Grant: Video of credit crisis thoughts
• Stephen Roach is still bearish, no recovery until 2010
• Stephen Roach sees a W-shaped recovery for China
• Stephen Roach is talking double dip again

Marshall Auerback here with a few thoughts on money, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, and the alphabet soup of emergency liquidity facilities.

The expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet has been widely misunderstood within the economics profession, because it has been viewed through the lens of a pre-existing debate about the monetary transmission mechanism. Those who emphasized the importance of the money supply (on nominal spending) saw the expansion as quantitative easing, and warned about eventual inflationary consequences. Those who emphasized the credit channel (as Bernanke) saw the expansion as providing credit that was temporarily unavailable in the private market. The fact that the balance sheet expanded on both sides, and in both cases with the private sector as counterparty, tells us that something else was going on.

I would argue that the Fed’s actions after Lehman should be understood as moving the wholesale money market onto its own balance sheet. Banks with surplus funds lent them to the Fed by holding excess reserve balances, and banks that needed funds borrowed them from the Fed through the discount window. Foreign banks that needed dollar funding got it through their own central bank, which got it from the Fed through the liquidity swap facility. Banks that were short of collateral eligible for discount borrowed directly through the new commercial paper facility. Shadow banks that could not deposit in the Fed instead bought Treasury bills, and the Treasury deposited the proceeds at the Fed.

Once we think about the Fed’s balance sheet expansion in this way, the doubling seems in fact rather small. After all, the wholesale money market is much larger than the mere trillion or so that Fed took on. Deleveraging provides one answer why the expansion was not even larger. But the deeper answer, I think, comes from an appreciation that the Fed was acting as lender of last resort, and in doing so supporting continued lending in the private money market that would otherwise have frozen. In effect the Fed was offering a standing facility at prices away from market prices, so only those who most needed it took advantage. Simply knowing it was there made others willing to deal privately at more reasonable prices.

Thus, the commercial paper lending facility expanded and then contracted as private lending recovered. The central bank liquidity facility has followed a similar course. The important thing to realize is that, as these temporary liquidity facilities have wound down, the Fed has ramped up additional facilities, now aimed at restarting the securitized lending system more generally.

Related posts:

• Chart of the day: Fed Balance Sheet
• Fed is buying money market fund assets
• Will banks exiting TARP take back their toxic waste now?
• Flooding the system with money?
• Why is Zero Hedge claiming the Fed is intervening in equities markets?

Morgan Stanley has an interesting piece out this morning called Debtflation. In the past, they have raised alarm bells over what they see as embedded inflation in the loose monetary policy presently being followed by most central banks.  This particular piece focuses not on a general potential for inflation, but the possibility that central banks will explicitly target higher inflation in order to reduce high debt burdens – a policy advocated by Kenneth Rogoff.

The recent downturn has called many of the old certainties into question. In the world of central banking, a prominent victim of the downturn is the – previously orthodox – view that central banks should neglect asset prices when conducting monetary policy. Yet more recently, another major tenet of central bank doctrine is being challenged – the view that monetary policy should not be used to help out governments under debt pressure. We think that the risk of independent central banks creating some amount of (controlled) inflation going forward cannot quite be dismissed out of hand.

We have flagged inflation as a major long-term risk going forward: if the recovery is as tepid as we expect, central banks will be inclined to err on the side of caution when it comes to withdrawing the unprecedented conventional and unconventional monetary stimulus. But we believe that there will be a familiar additional source of inflation risk – the mounting public debt burden.  There is no doubt that, last winter, with the global economy slumping, central bankers welcomed the help they got from hugely expansionary fiscal policy. However, the result has been a massive increase in developed countries’ public indebtedness – the extent of the debt build-up in some countries resembles the consequences of wars. Historically, developed economies have escaped high debt by growing out of it rather than inflating it away or defaulting (with the notable exception of Germany and Japan). Growth after World War II for example was fast, not least because war-ravaged economies were rebuilding their capital stocks.

This time around, however, eroding the debt through faster growth may not be an option. Instead, growth in many developed countries is likely to slow significantly going forward as labour forces shrink due to the demographic transition. Worse, population ageing will impose added pressure on public expenditure through higher pensions and healthcare costs. If outgrowing the debt is unlikely, and if governments lack the resolve to cut spending and/or raise taxes sufficiently, the remaining options are default and inflation. No policymaker in the developed world – and, by now, few in the developing world – would want to countenance default as an option. This leaves inflation. The question is familiar: could central bankers be forced to engineer inflation – ‘monetise the debt’? Almost all developing world central banks are independent from an institutional point of view. Indeed, one of the main reasons for setting up independent monetary authorities is precisely to avoid pressure from governments to inflate away the debt. So, central banks cannot be forced by their governments to generate inflation (unless governments were prepared to change the statutes of their monetary authorities; this would in most cases require going to the legislature).

With governmental coercion being unfeasible, is there a possibility that independent central bankers might generate inflation out of their own volition? If nothing else, they would take a big gamble with their hard-won credibility. And history teaches us that the reason behind most, if not all, episodes of very high inflation has been monetary expansion to finance government expenditure or reduce debt (see "Could Hyperinflation Happen Again?" The Global Monetary Analyst, January 28, 2009).

Morgan Stanley is saying in effect that it fears central banks inflating away private and public debt burdens by printing more money. It is not clear that quantitative easing really is inflationary (at least in the short-term). For this policy to actually produce inflation in an environment that is geared more toward deleveraging, we will need serious asset price inflation to spill over into the real economy – and this would require increases in asset prices that would be extremely destabilizing when the inevitable bust occurs. Most likely an asset bubble bursting would tip the global economy back into deflation. This is the Scylla and Charybdis problem I outlined in June. So, I am not sure central banks could pull this off even if they wanted to.

More from Morgan Stanley at the link below.

Source

Debtflation – Morgan Stanley

Related posts:

• Quote of the day: William White and inflation
• Are central banks independent actors?
• Stephen Roach: Downturn in Asia less severe, but recovery later
• The inflation – deflation debate redux
• Emerging Markets will be tested by inflation

This is a cross-post from an article I wrote at the finance site New Deal 2.0, a one-stop-shop for current news, sharp analysis and potential solutions of the country’s fiscal crisis. Edward linked to this in this morning’s links, saying “I don’t agree 100% but this is a good overview” – tied to the Austrian business cycle theory as he is!

He asked me to post this here as well. I hope this will help identify some of the flaws in conventional economic orthodoxy.

Fears about the falling dollar are stoked by neo-liberal money myths that harken back to the gold standard system.

It seems there isn’t a day that goes by without more commentary on the demise of the dollar and the concomitant risk of a collapse of the world’s reserve currency. Again, the reasoning here appears largely to be based on the tyranny of orthodox neo-liberal economics. Orthodox economists view dollar depreciation as an imminent danger which raises the relative costs of imports, and imparts an inflationary bias to the economy. Moreover, they argue that depreciation leads to expectations of further depreciation and fuels the run out of the currency.

So, in the logic of this view, there may be no interest rate that is high enough to counter expectations of losses due to depreciation and possible default, which means that there will be no alternative but to urgently restore reserves of foreign currency either through renegotiation of foreign debt obligations, international donor assistance or default, especially given our supposedly “reckless” and “irresponsible” government spending, which is supposedly robbing future generations of growth and prosperity.

Large deficits are not the problem

Let’s all take a deep breath here: Whilst the dollar index has fallen some 15% from the high sustained earlier this year, it is still above the lows sustained at the height of the credit crisis reached about a year ago. Secondly, there seems to be a fear that the current fall in the dollar could well engender inflation, and create a panicked response from policy makers where the Fed actually does raise rates and the Treasury begins to reduce government spending. Given high prevailing debt levels and the weak state of the consumer’s personal balance sheet, this would be an unmitigated disaster.

It is true that excessive government deficit spending can be inflationary, and could therefore cause some impact on exchange value of dollar. But this can’t be viewed in some sort of vacuum. The size of the deficit is irrelevant in itself. There is no meaning in the terms ‘large deficit’ or ’small deficit.’ You have to relate them to the extent of labor and capital underutilization, which is a human measure of the aggregate demand deficiency. The fact that labor underutilization is now in excess of 16 per cent in the US (combined unemployment, underemployment and hidden unemployment) and capacity utilization is in the 60-65 per cent range rather than 90 per cent range sends one very clear message – the deficit is not large enough.

So the correct policy response is to spend until we get to full employment. That is the only consequence of excessive deficits — insolvency is not possible. Your social security check will never bounce in a country issuing debt in its own freely floating non-convertible currency.

The size of our government deficit is endogenously determined, which is to say that it has no external cause; it is a function of internal, domestic phenomena. Today, the deficit is largely a function of weaker spending power and concomitantly lower economic growth. (”Good government spending” more or less seeks to fill private output gaps; “bad government spending” is a consequence of government not taking responsibility for filling the spending gap and instead letting this occur via the automatic stabilisers). So the scenario of ever-increasing deficits is unlikely because as economy heats up, deficit shrinks and turns to surplus (as during the Clinton years and also the 1920s).

The orthodox interpretation of a nation with a declining currency and a large current account deficit appears to indicate that the nation concerned is “living beyond its means” — with excessive domestic demand that boosts imports; the excessive demand also fuels inflation that restricts exports. The presumption is that the resultantly large deficit must be “financed” by flows of foreign reserves, which, for the most part, must be attracted by high returns and a stable political, economic, and social environment.

From the US perspective, this means that if America cannot continue to attract these needed reserves, it must raise rates to attract new foreign capital, which in turn will slow its growth to reduce imports; lower prices and wages could also encourage exports. The obvious portent of the default on foreign debt obligations is then used to argue in favour of restricting government spending. Thus, both monetary and fiscal policy ought to be tightened to encourage such capital flows even as this reduces the need for them. In other words, an emerging markets’ crisis writ large.

Deflation or inflation?

But the reality is not so much that the US is inflating, so much as that the rest of the world is deflating relative to the dollar. Import prices are still generally falling, inflation remains quiescent and private credit growth is now contracting. These are hallmarks of deflation, not inflation. Additionally, the US is not borrowing in a foreign currency (in contrast to Iceland or Latvia or the Asian countries during the 1997/98 emerging markets’ crisis), so it does not face an external funding constraint.

What about China? True, there may be some indications that there is some shifts in terms of private portfolio preferences. Perhaps the Chinese don’t want to buy as many dollars as they did before. Perhaps hedge funds are now laying on a big “short dollar” trade in the markets. These are one-off portfolio preference shifts and it seems inadvisable for US policy makers to respond to every single vicissitude of changing market sentiment. That way leads to Latvia and economic implosion.

It’s hard to believe that a nation with 10% official unemployment and likely double that when one factors in underemployment is actually “living beyond its means.” It is even crazier to suggest that we should scale back government spending and private consumption, when there is substantial unused capacity and under-utilised resources (particularly labour). In those circumstances, the nation could not possibly be living beyond its means.

What about those terrible “global imbalances” that we are told must be rectified, what I call “the cult of zero imbalances”?

Well, let’s consider that as a possible policy response.

Policy fables

According to the G20 communiqué, those countries running current account deficits, most notably the U.S., would have to define ways to boost savings. Nations running surpluses – China, Germany and Japan, among others – would detail how they propose to reduce any reliance on exports. The U.S. would likely need to commit to a sharp deficit reduction by government. Europe would need to commit to improving competitiveness. That could mean introducing “labour market reforms” (an interesting choice of language here), which generally is code for being able to sack workers and destroy the power of trade unions.

The collective impact of these measures? We want more domestic led consumption in Asia and the EU (especially Germany), but then the two largest economic areas (the US and Europe) would have to deflate their economies. The former, by reducing the public net spending which would thwart the goal of “boosting” saving, and the latter, by widespread shedding of workers and the resulting collapse in consumption (and rising deficits via the automatic stabilizers as welfare payments and crime rose).

These, of course, are the traditional “remedies” proposed by the IMF — and we can see what a great job this organisation has done. Just ask any Argentinean. Neo-liberal-based policy recommendations almost invariably make things worse. We have ample examples of this in Asia, Russia and Brazil during the 1997/98 emerging markets and more recently in Iceland and the emerging market economies of Eastern Europe.

Goldbug mentality still dominates

It is important to understand that much of the economic orthodoxy is still dominated by the “gold standard paradigm”.

Under the Gold Standard, the leading economies of the world, through their monetary authorities, agreed to maintain the “mint price” of gold fixed by standing ready to buy or sell gold to meet any supply or demand imbalance. Further, the central bank (or equivalent in those days) had to maintain stores of gold sufficient to back the circulating currency (at the agreed convertibility rate). The currency was strictly convertible into gold at the fixed parity. So this was a convertible, fixed exchange rate system.

Gold was also considered to be the principle method of making international payments. Accordingly, as trade unfolded, imbalances in trade (imports and exports) arose and this necessitated that gold be transferred between nations (in boats) to fund these imbalances. Trade deficit countries had to ship gold to trade surplus countries. Money literally did “flow” between countries (which is why we still speak in terms of “capital inflows” and “capital outflows” even though the reality of current modern monetary operations is that we electronically credit and debit bank accounts).

This inflow of gold into surplus countries allowed them to expand their money supply (issue more notes) because they had more gold to back the currency. This expansion was in strict proportion to the gold-currency parity. The rising money supply would push against the inflation barrier (given no increase in the real capacity of the economy) which would ultimately render exports less attractive to foreigners and the external deficit would decline. The trade deficit country would lose gold reserves and this would force their government to withdraw paper currency which drove up unemployment and drove down the price level. The latter improved the competitiveness of that economy. The two adjustments – for the surplus and deficit countries — helped to resolve the trade imbalance. But it remains that the deficit nations were forced to bear rising unemployment and vice versa as the trade imbalances resolved.

So under the Gold Standard, the government could not expand base money if the economy was in trade deficit. It was considered that this constraint acted as a means to control the money supply and generate price levels in different trading countries which were consistent with trade balances. The domestic economy, however, was forced to make the adjustments to the trade imbalances.Monetary policy became captive to the amount of gold that a country possessed (principally derived from trade).

In practical terms, the adjustments to trade that were necessary to resolve imbalances were slow. In the meantime, deficit nations had to endure domestic recessions and entrenched unemployment. So a gold standard introduces a recessionary bias to economies with the burden always falling on countries with weaker currencies (typically as a consequence of trade deficits). This inflexibility prevented governments from introducing policies that generated the best outcomes for their domestic economies (high employment). Ultimately the monetary authority would not be able to resist the demands of the population for higher employment.

We no longer have this currency system, but traditional economic thinking and modelling is still based on it, which is why notions of “affordability” and “sustainability” still dominate our economic discourse. But given that we operate under a fiat currency system (where government declares money to be legal tender), we face no operational constraint per se, or issues of national solvency.

So, in regard to the dollar, what is our advice to Lawrence Summers, Tim Geithner, and Ben Bernanke? Do nothing. In the words of the English poet, John Milton, “They also serve, who only stand and wait”.

Related posts:

• The dollar is rising against floating currencies
• The Cult of Zero Imbalances
• Hyperinflation, national bankruptcy, dollar crash and other exaggerations
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• Japanese defend dollar’s status while China tears it down

Remember when Paul Krugman asked aloud “How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?” He had a very well-received answer.  But he left out something.

The elephant in the room was debt.  No one seems to have been noticing.

Below is a British video parody version asking economists and political leaders the same question (in a slightly more graphic version). Warning : this video is hilarious but graphic.  Don’t play it at work. I warn you.

Hat tip Yves Smith.

Related posts:

• Doubling down at AIG
• Tim Geithner defends himself before Congress
• Paul Tudor Jones: Trader – Flashback to 1987
• Bloomberg News vs. Fed: Judgment against Fed attached
• Wassup 2008

Marshall Auerback here. This is a cross-post from an article I wrote at the finance site New Deal 2.0, a one-stop-shop for current news, sharp analysis and potential solutions of the country’s fiscal crisis.

We’ve said it before and we’ll say it again. As a matter of national accounting, the domestic private sector cannot increase savings unless and until foreign or government sectors increase deficits. Call this the tyranny of double entry bookkeeping: the government’s deficit equals by identity the non-government’s surplus.

So, if the US private sector is to rebuild its balance sheet by spending less than its income, the government will have to spend more than its tax revenue. The only other possibility is that the rest of the world stops saving on a massive scale — letting the US run a current account surplus. But that is highly implausible and socially undesirable, since it means we export our economic output, rather than consume it domestically. And if the government deficit does not grow fast enough to meet the saving needs of the private domestic sector, national income will decline, which, given the size of the private sector’s debt problem, will generate a huge debt deflation.

This is the foundation of modern monetary theory. Would that the IMF and the G20 understood these basic facts. The anodyne communiqué from last weekend’s Pittsburgh summit makes clear that this is not the case. Western policy makers appear determined to consign us to years of additional economic misery because of the continued embrace of a flawed market fundamentalist economic paradigm.

So far, instead of trying to revive the productive economy, most of the G20’s resources have consisted of mouth-to-mouth resuscitation for a dying financial sector. This has not “worked” to the extent that last weekend’s communiqué advertised. The best analogy to describe the current state of our financial system is that we have placed scaffolding over a decaying building, but done little to repair the underlying structure. What happens when the economic scaffolding is removed via “exit strategies”, as the G20 participants have advocated?

For many generations, we didn’t face the unprecedented financial fragility we are experiencing today. But there are good reasons why we avoided this until recently. We have spent the past quarter century eviscerating what was fundamentally a robust structured originally devised during New Deal, a system which basically saved the US capitalist system and served the interests of its citizens very well until it was hijacked by a bunch of corporate predators under the guise of deregulation and neo-liberalism.

To read the communiqué from the Pittsburgh summit is to gain insight into an ideology which views government, not as a stabilizing influence protecting us from private sector rent seeking monopolists. Rather it’s an unwanted stepchild, brought out on display as a necessary evil, and destined to be shoved away as soon as we get back to a “normal” economic state of affairs, where the government minds its own business and lets the magic of the “free market” operate. Hence, the emphasis by the Pittsburgh summiteers on “sustained, strong and balanced growth“, the usual code words designed to encourage budget surpluses, more private sector savings and shift from public to private sources of demand.

There is little understanding that if households and firms try to net save (save more out of income flows than they tangibly invest) incomes collapse, and desired private net saving is thwarted. The private “excess saving” cannot exist without a budget deficit or a trade surplus. Many people make this mistake. At best, we can talk about planned private saving being in excess of planned private investment, but other than that, we are violating double entry book keeping principles.

And consider this: in 1998, 1999 and 2000 (increasing each year), the US government “virtuously” ran budget surpluses. And guess what happened? The private sector became more heavily indebted than before as the fiscal drag squeezed liquidity and destroyed aggregate demand and incomes. Along with our misconceived embrace of financial deregulation, the combined result was sharply rising unemployment and a major recession in 2001-02 with unemployment rising sharply and the automatic stabilizers pushing the budget back into deficit.

Unfortunately, that was the yellow flag for what was to follow, a warning signal blithely ignored by our economically illiterate policy makers. Instead, we perpetuated a massively leveraged financial system via Frankenstein financial products such as collateralized debt obligations, and credit default swaps. We squeezed private sector incomes via constrictive fiscal policy, thereby inducing the debt-fueled consumption that is now regularly decried by our officialdom and the commentariat.

The bottom line is that if we want habitual private sector savings, we need habitual government deficits.

And government deficits are not an aberration; they are the norm. Our first (and possibly greatest) Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, called the national debt a “national blessing”. Similarly, Paul Krugman and L Randall Wray have argued that it was World War II and the subsequent cold war that ended the depression, which created the foundations for a significant expansion of government debt, which in turn set the stage for the “Golden Age.” The government deficit reached 25 percent of GDP during the war, providing a massive amount of private sector saving in the form of safe financial assets that strengthened balance sheets. From 1960 onward, the baby boom drove rapid growth of state and local government spending, so that even though federal government spending remained relatively constant as a percent of GDP, total government spending grew rapidly until the 1970s. This pulled up aggregate demand and private sector incomes, and thus consumption.

This is unsurprising: The private sector cannot create “net nominal wealth” because every private financial asset is offset by a private financial liability. Over the long term, the maximum that a government can hope to collect in the form of taxes is equal to its purchases of goods of services. There is no hope of running long-term budget surpluses because the government cannot possibly collect more than the income it has created as it paid out dollars. When the government attempts this, as it did during the Clinton Administration, the public finds that its net financial assets would be less than its tax liability, requiring households to dip into its “reserves” of accumulated savings, which gradually become depleted. In the absence of other factors, demand slows and the government almost invariably falls back into deficit.

If an external creditor is added (such as China or Japan) it merely delays or extends the process, since for a time, countries running current account surpluses with the US can use their surplus dollars to accumulate additional US dollar financial claims. But in the absence of any increase in US government spending (which is the only source of NEW NET FINANCIAL ASSETS), the end result is still a massive accumulation of private sector debt, which is what got us into this mess in the first place. By contrast, assuming a non-convertible, freely floating fiat currency, a government can never be insolvent even if its tax revenue declines significantly. Its balance sheet can never become precarious in the same way that a household balance sheet can.

In the abstract, this always sounds controversial to those uncomfortable viewing the world within a financial balances construct. It also helps to explain the intellectual incoherence at the heart of the G20 communiqué and the Obama Administration’s economic policies, which has been dominated by Wall Street interests.

So it’s worthwhile considering some historic examples, which illustrate the point better. During WWII, the US government generated huge deficits and bond issues. The record expansion of government deficits not only facilitated the war effort, but created full employment. (As an aside, it is always interesting to pose the following question to “deficit terrorists “: if government budget deficits are so awful, and so egregious for the long term performance of an economy, then why run them at all during wartime, when presumably we need the economy to be functioning in an optimal manner?) After the war, the Fed was concerned with potential inflationary pressures and raised interest rates. President Truman, a hard money man par excellence, drastically cut defense spending from $90.9bn to $10.3bn and the US accumulated huge fiscal surpluses. Post war surpluses, combined with Fed tightening, contributed to a recession in 1949. Unfortunately, it took the “military Keynesianism” brought on by the Korean War to shift Truman away from his aversion to deficit spending, which was continued by Eisenhower, and sustained via his national highways building program. During that period, unemployment decreased. Similarly benign effects on unemployment were manifested in the wake of the Kennedy tax cuts and those of Reagan in the early 1980s.

Today, budget deficits are the highest as a percentage of GDP, but they are overstated to some degree, because they include the TARP measures to stabilize the financial system which brought the global economy to its knees in 2007/08. Classic Treasury expenditures deal with the purchase of real goods and services; Federal Reserve functions deal with the purchase and sale of financial assets. And yet, the focus of policy makers is quickly reverting to “exit strategies” and a reduction of budget deficits, where the Pittsburgh communiqué pledged to “prepare our exit strategies and, when the time is right, withdraw our extraordinary policy support in a co-operative and co-ordinated way, maintaining our commitment to fiscal responsibility.”

If only that were true. The only way one could politically justify a government running a sustained surplus would be to make the case that unemployment created a more functional way of ensuring high profits (via wage discipline) than full employment. Put in those terms, it’s not a particularly compelling message, but it has the virtue of being consistent with modern monetary theory.

Oddly enough, the G20 communiqué devotes considerable attention to the government’s “exit strategies”, which came in response to the destructive private sector financial practices which created this catastrophe. There has been less attention directed to the underlying causes themselves. Thus the IMF, in its latest “Global Financial Stability Report”, suggests that restarting securitization markets is “critical” to a wider economic recovery, and that current US and European proposals to force banks that originate loans to hold on to the first 5% of losses in all securitizations, were not sufficiently flexible and might backfire. In the words of Credit Lyonnais Asia strategist, Christopher Wood:

“[The IMF] is yet again doing the world a disservice by acting as a lobbying group for the securitised debt peddlers. It is clearly fundamentally correct that the agents of securitisation should be made to retain some ’skin in the game’ after the terrible damage they have inflicted. It is true that the collapse of securitisation represents a massive deflationary risk for the global economy. But that does not mean that the answer is to allow a new free-for-all in securitisation assuming, charitably, there is demand for the securitised product.” (”Greed and Fear”, 24 Sept. 2009, CLSA, Asia Pacific Markets)

The IMF, the G20, indeed virtually all policy makers — including the Obama Administration — will make themselves far more relevant when they emphasize that full employment and prosperity can only be achieved to the extent that governments are prepared to spend up to a level justified by non-government saving. That does not mean unconstrained government spending. But the spending ought to be set with regard to results desired and competencies to execute plans — not out of some pre-conceived notion of what is “affordable”. Our federal government can afford anything that is for sale in terms of its own currency. And if it spends too much after getting us to a state of full output, it can get inflationary. But let’s get to that state of affairs first before we start worrying about perpetuating the flawed model of the past. That got us transitory prosperity and wage gains. And it promises years of economic misery if we do not move beyond neo-liberal economic fairy tales.

Related posts:

• Minsky: Turning neoclassical economics on its head
• The Cult of Zero Imbalances
• Low savings, high debt and interest rate policy
• Stephen Roach: Americans’ abandonment of overconsumption is a good thing
• UK consumers don’t save

As a follow-up to my post on debt and it’s exclusion as a subject of merit amongst several schools of economic thought, I wanted to bring a New York Times article from 1988 to your attention. This article by Peter Kilborn, a Washington, D.C. based and long-time former correspondent for the New York Times, is timeless.

It reads like an article right out of 2008 or 2009 and highlights how little has been decided in the debate about the economic effect, size and role of government. Many of the key players – Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, and Robert Lucas to name a few – are the same. At issue is the divide between freshwater and saltwater economists that has been raging for at least a generation now. Kilborn says:

To tinker or not to tinker? For decades most politicians and professors of economics have taken it for granted that the Government must adjust the engines of the economy to avoid recessions and create jobs. But lately, a long-belittled school of skeptics who think the Government usually just gums things up is gaining attention and influence.

The skeptics are known as ”fresh water” economists, less for the purity of their thought than for their origins at universities along the shores of the Great Lakes.

The school’s views are filtering into such lofty citadels of mainstream ‘’salt water” economics as Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Princeton and Stanford. Its theories also appeal to economists who are advising the Presidential election campaign of George Bush, and, to a lesser extent, those working for Michael S. Dukakis.

The fresh-water people build their case for minimal intervention on the view that workers, consumers, business executives and investors anticipate changes in the economy faster than the Government and can adjust to them better on their own.

On some level, one could say this divide is manifest in how the political fault lines in the U.S. are forming. Larry Summers, President Obama’s chief economic advisor, is a saltwater type with definite freshwater sympathies. 

On the other side of the political spectrum are those who want small government, a view championed by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Republicans are drawn to this positioning because it invokes the Reagan presidency, which was a high point for the post-Nixonian Republican Party. 

You will have noticed my post earlier today on Sarah Palin walking in the small government, Libertarian mantle as she crafts a strategy to take control of the party.

In the article, Krugman sums up the crux of the divide nicely, with Robert Lucas taking the other side:

”The basic distinction,” he said, ”is do you think recessions present a problem? And do you think the Government can do something to avert them? The fresh-water people say that recessions either are nothing to worry about or that in any case, the Government can’t do anything about them.”

Robert E. Lucas, the undisputed dean of the fresh-water school and chairman of the economics department at the University of Chicago, said, ”What we’re turning against is the idea that you can fine-tune the economy with any policy at all.” The university has long been the home of monetarist economics, which maintains that steady, noninflationary growth results from steady growth of the money supply and of which the newer theory is an offshoot.

So, if you are wondering where all of the back and forth is coming from on economic theory and why it has failed us, take a step back in time to the late 1980s. The debate is pretty much the same today.

Source

‘Fresh Water’ Economists Gain – NY Times

Related posts:

• Links: 2009-01-18
• The Fed wants inflation
• Why the personal consumption data is important to the stock market
• A brief philosophical argument about the role of government, stimulus and recession
• The Fed is on the easy money trip

Let’s say I run a company. For the sake of argument, we’ll call it a shoe store in New York City. I am making $100,000 net per year now. But, I look around me and see huge opportunity for growth. So I go to my bank and ask for a loan to expand my business.  I invest the money in expanding the store, and over the next five years I increase my earnings to $140,000.  Not bad!

Is this a well-run business?

GDP is not enough

Well, if your first instinct is to say, “you didn’t give me enough information,” I would have to agree. But, this is the way GDP statistics are used to measure the success of an economy.

Clearly then, GDP is an inadequate measure for understanding how healthy an economy is.  Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz brought this issue into the public domain last week when he spoke in Paris, calling the focus on GDP a ‘fetish’ and favoring a broader measure of economic health.

Stiglitz was responding to reporters after a study on alternative measures of economic growth commissioned by French president Nicholas Sarkozy was released. At the time, Bloomberg reported Stiglitz saying:

GDP has increasingly become used as a measure of societal well-being and changes in the structure of the economy and our society have made it increasingly poor one…

So many things that are important to individuals are not included in GDP. There needs to be an array of numbers but we need to understand the role of each number. We may not be able to aggregate everything together.

Stiglitz is talking about the social costs of growth here.  Think about pollution, infant mortality rate, healthcare, life expectancy, or rates of obesity to name a few.  And his views are echoed in an article which prompted this tirade from me called “Emphasis on Growth Is Called Misguided“ by Peter Goodman in today’s New York Times.  Read it.

However, in this post, I want to focus on one narrow issue: debt.

The income statement vs. the balance sheet

In the shoe store example I gave, I borrowed money to fund growth.  In assessing how successful my growth strategy is, the obvious question is: how much did I borrow? It’s the debt, stupid.

What if I borrowed $1,000,000 at 7% interest? $40,000 is a return of 4% on that money, less than the cost of debt. In that case, the growth strategy is a loser.

We need to see the balance sheet as well as the income statement to know what is happening. GDP gives us no insight into the balance sheet of an economy, and is therefore incomplete as a measure of economic health. (I’ll leave the cash flow statement for another day!)

There is 4% growth sustained only through a rise in debt, growth that would have been 2% without an increase in relative indebtedness. And there is 4% growth fuelled by a positive return on that debt.

I am sure you have seen the graphs I published last October at the height of the panic in my post “Charts of the day: US macro disequilibria.” What should be clear from those charts is that the U.S. has been living in a period fuelled more by increases in debt and a concomitant increase in asset prices than in a world of sustainable growth.

The economics profession focus on the income sheet only

I suspect the GDP fetishism owes a lot to the models currently in use in the economics field, which focus exclusively on an economy’s income statement.

When I studied economics, in our introductory course, we used a book called “Economics – Principles and Policy” by two Princeton-affiliated professors William Baumol and Alan Blinder, a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve (Yes, I still have the book from over twenty years ago).  The only mention of debt comes in Chapter 15 on “Budget Deficits and the National Debt” and it is basically a discussion of trade-offs between budget deficits and inflation.

Nowhere are aggregate debt levels in the private sector mentioned.  Now, I could be wrong because it is not in the index and I couldn’t find it in the book. I see this is reflective of the absence of debt as a topic in economic theory taught in universities.

In fact, the Chapter just before is called “Money and the National Economy: The Keynesian-Monetarist Debate.” I think the title says it all. Baumol and Blinder are Keynesians and they released a book to teach Economics in the Keynesian tradition.  To the degree they discuss any other economic models, it is only to weave the monetarist view into their own framework.  In the introduction of Chapter 14, the book states:

Then we turn to a very old and very simple macroeconomic model – the quantity theory of money, and its modern reincarnation, monetarism – for an alternative view of the effects of money on the economy. Although the monetarist and Keynesian theories seem to be two contradictory views of how monetary and fiscal policy work, we will see that the conflict is more apparent than real.

Now that crisis has hit, there is no inter-weaving of theories. Those two worlds, the monetarists (freshwater economists as Krugman calls them) and the Keynesians (saltwater economists in Krugman’s parlance), are at war over economic theory’s contribution to the global economic meltdown.  The Economist laments:

Economic writers will continue to try and describe the arguments wracking the field for an audience which wants to know about them, but economists need to figure out how to resolve some of these questions on their terms. If the best the dismal science can do in establishing the merit of one position versus another is make a play for the hearts and minds of lay-people, then economics is in more trouble than we all thought.

More noteworthy for me is how the salt- and freshwater types completely disregard debt, an issue central to the Austrian and Minskyian schools of thought. Paul Krugman wrote 6,000 words focused only on the income statement. There was no mention of the huge rise in debt in the U.S. and other economies like the U.K., Spain, Ireland, Iceland or Latvia. All of these countries have one common feature: asset price booms underpinned by rising debt levels.

Let’s hope we start seeing more discussion about the balance sheet in future.

Related posts:

• The Tribune files for bankruptcy
• Why the personal consumption data is important to the stock market
• Household debt as an indicator of secular bull and bear markets
• Steve Keen and the spectre of terminal debt
• Chart of the day: household debt vs. savings

Last week, I highlighted some of the ideas of Australian economist Steve Keen in my post, “Politics and reform: Say I’m a politician….”  Keen is of the Minsky camp and he believes that an unsustainable debt bubble has build up in the industrialized world which can only be brought to heel through a ‘debt jubilee.’

Below is a video clip of Keen telling Max Keiser a bit more about how he sees things.  Central to his ideas is the concept that demand for credit creates loans which create reserves, which is the opposite causality of what one sees in neoclassical economics.  This would mean that, absent a pickup in demand for credit, inflation is unlikely to reappear – irrespective of what central banks do. I will have more on this subject in later posts.

Related posts:

• Chart of the day: Excess Reserves
• Steve Keen and the spectre of terminal debt
• Steve Keen: Debt and the economy – how do we pay for all of this?
• Is quantitative easing really inflationary?
• Connecting Fed cuts with credit writedowns and quantitative easing

In a BBC Two interview, former Fed chief Alan Greenspan waxed fatalistic, saying that another financial crisis is inevitable due to animal spirits.  In his view, booms and busts are endogenous to the capitalist system, crises being the outcome of long periods of prosperity. I agree with this assessment. But, it is surprising to hear coming from Greenspan as he sounds almost like Hyman Minsky, suggesting that economic stability leads to instability.

However, lest you thought he had given up his free-market ideology, he concludes warning that increased regulation would only make matters worse.

In order to prevent the situation arising again financiers and governments should look to clamp down on fraud and increase capital requirements for banks, the former central banker said.

Greenspan view on global economy

Regulations targeting the latter would mean banks would be forced to hold enough money to cover their normal operations and honour withdrawals.

However despite his belief in a brighter future, the former Fed chief did warn that the path to recovery should steer clear of protectionism as applying strict regulations could hamper recent developments that have opened up global trade.

"The most recent endeavour to re-regulate is a reaction to the crisis. The extraordinary impact of these global markets is making a lot of financial people feeling they have lost control.

"The problem is you cannot have free global trade with highly restrictive, regulated domestic markets."

On the whole, Greenspan’s analysis makes sense. However, his conclusions are flawed.  Greenspan, in his ideological fervour, has forgotten that his role as a central banker was antithetical to the concept of free markets.

Last night in the links, I ran a story from the Sydney Morning-Herald which is more to the point. There is no such thing as a free market.  There is more restrictive regulation, where we seem to be headed. And there is less restrictive regulation, which I prefer. But markets are never completely free. The zeal shown by Greenspan is deregulation as crony capitalism and makes the inevitable busts of which Sir Alan speaks that much more destabilising.

Source

Market crisis ‘will happen again’ – BBC News (nice video included)

Related posts:

• Greenspan: “If they’re too big to fail, they’re too big”
• Ms. Watkins, why does Charlie have lit dynamite?
• Ted Forstmann: the credit crisis will get worse
• Nouriel Roubini: Bloomberg Interview on Banking Crisis Plan
• Frontline – The Warning: Who Knew About the Looming Financial Crisis?

Below is a video released by the Kauffman Foundation about bloggers in the econ and finance space.  The video shows that our space is really catching on and garnering ever more readership and credibility.

This clip runs about 20 minutes and features Tyler Cowen and Mark Thoma, two well-known academics who also have top economic blogs. Two other favorite bloggers of mine, Paul Kedrosky and Yves Smith, are also featured.  Take a look.

Hat tip Real Time Economics.

Related posts:

• Twitter founder Evan Williams on Charlie Rose
• News round-up: 15 Aug 2008 – blog edition
• Community banks getting no love in this crisis
• Fred Hickey: Gold starts secular bull, tech ends secular bear
• A conversation with Robert Caro on Charlie Rose

This post is going to be a bit wonkish.  I apologize for those of you who are not economics geeks.  Hopefully, you will find it interesting nonetheless.

At the urging of my good friend Marshall Auerback, I have been looking into the Minskyian twist to the neoclassical view of the world.  Economists who follow Hyman Minsky believe that the basic traditional identity of Private Savings – Investment = (Government Outlays – Taxes) + (Exports – Imports) has it all wrong – not wrong literally, but rather in terms of stress.

The problem here is that setting up the identity this way makes one believe there is something called ‘national savings’ that in a post-gold standard world of fiat money doesn’t really exist.  Scott Fullwiler puts it best (emphasis added):

The right-hand side of equation 2 [the neoclassical identity I presented above] is usually referred to as “national saving” by neoclassical economists, and more “national saving” is thereby thought necessary to raise more business investment that in order to raise the economy’s long run capacity to produce goods and services. This interpretation is nearly ubiquitous in the profession.

However, this interpretation is inapplicable except for a fixed exchange rate monetary system operating under a gold-standard or currency-board type of regime in which there is in fact a “fixed” quantity of savings that exists or can be created. But in our flexible-exchange rate monetary system, saving does not finance spending; indeed, banks create loans without any prior deposits or reserves being necessary, as I have explained in previous posts to this blog.

Those of us employing the framework of J. M. Keynes, Hyman Minsky, Wynne Godley, and others mentioned by Rob [Parenteau], instead use the above equation to understand the financial status of the various sectors of the economy. That is, instead of saving to finance capital investment (which is not actually what happens), we have “private sector net saving,” which is the addition/subtraction to net financial wealth for the private sector in a given period. If the private sector is net borrowing, then its balance will be negative; if it is net saving, then its balance will be positive.

Most importantly, the economy’s financial flows are a closed system, so one sector’s deficit is another’s surplus, and vice versa. There is no way around it, just as it is impossible for every country in the world to have a trade surplus—at least one country must have a trade deficit for the others to have surpluses. Thus, “national saving” as defined in the textbooks (private saving + government surplus + foreign saving) is a misleading concept in our monetary system, since if the government is “saving” some other sector (or combination of them) must not be, by definition.

This leads then to the identity: Private Sector Net Saving = Government Deficit + Current Account Balance. I mention this because, in my last article, I had said the following, which I believe to be consistent with both neo-classical thinking and the Minsky sector financial balances view:

The reason that the Federal Government is deficit spending to begin with has to do with the loss of consumption in the private sector due to increased deleveraging and savings.  In the U.S., we have seen the savings rate rise from negative territory (i.e. saving nothing and spending even more by drawing down accumulated wealth) to almost 7% in a few years’ time.  This behavorial change is a positive for America as it is a recognition of the excess consumption that an asset-based economy created. It puts America in a much better position on its current account and helps to reduce debt from unsustainable levels.

In the Minsky world, the increase in net savings in the private sector and reduction of the current account deficit is axiomatic when the government is increasing deficits.  The point is that the private sector net saving and current account deficit must equal the government deficit.  So, when the combined private savings and current account deficit increases, the government’s financial balance must become more negative.

What this implies is this (diagram from Paul Krugman’s post with the unfortunate title “Deficits saved the world”):

To make the graph easier to follow we start with sector balances at zero i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both the private sector including the current account deficit and for the government sector. And just to be clear, points above the line show private sector savings or public sector deficit.

1. We start where the red circle is.
2. When an economic shock hits which precipitates a massive deleveraging, the entire demand curve shifts to the left to a new lower GDP level, everything else being equal. Thus, deleveraging equals recession. And we now see the private sector curve hitting the public sector curve where the blue circle is. The private sector is now saving and the public sector is in deficit. That is where we are today.
3. However, to bring things back to neutral i.e. where sector surplus/deficit equals zero for both sectors, one could cut government spending dramatically.  That shifts the entire government curve to the red line on the left, leaving us where the green circle is: in a deep, deep depression. Krugman calls this the Great Depression outcome.

I am still coming to grips with the Minsky view of things – so I may have a few things wrong here.  But, I would say this: under the Minsky model, cuts in government spending would lead to the green circle outcome and its attendant deflationary impact. In such an environment corporate profits would be much lower, implying much lower stock prices as well.

As I do more research on this framework, I will keep you informed.

Sources

The Sector Financial Balances Model of Aggregate Demand – Scott Fullwiler

Coherently Confronting US Macro Challenges – Rob Parenteau

Employing Krugman’s Cross: Farewell, Mr. Hicks? – Rob Parenteau

Related posts:

• The choice is between increasing or decreasing aggregate demand
• Barack Obama: “if we keep on adding to the debt… that could actually lead to a double-dip”
• The G20 Summit: Hijacked by neo-liberalism
• Japan does not demonstrate the failure of stimulus
• The inflation-deflation debate

On numerous occasions you will have heard me use the term ‘monetizing debt’ to describe what happens when the central bank creates money out of thin air in order to increase reserves in the banking system. The central bank is certainly increasing the monetary base in this regard, but are they really monetizing the debt being issued by the federal government?  Let’s examine the issue to find out.

Fiscal and Monetary Authority

The crux of the issue here is whether the US or the UK central governments can deficit spend to their hearts’ content in order to prop up their respective domestic economies and whether this spending will be financed by printing money at the central bank.

In both cases, a small budget deficit in good times has turned into monstrous deficit reaching double digits in percentage terms. Moreover, the two countries have a monetary authority (the central bank) and a fiscal authority/backer of legal tender (central government) which is at the same level.  This is not true in, say, Spain, where the ECB and the Spanish central government are at different levels.

So what happens then?

Printing money

Let’s first turn to the central bank.  The central bank, looking to increase bank reserves in the system, buys assets (usually federal government debt) with previously non-existent money that it electronically prints out of thin air. This money printing is known as quantitative easing or QE. QE increases bank reserves in the system when the seller of the assets deposits the new funds at her bank and the bank then holds some of these funds in reserve at the central bank as it is mandated to do.

The hope is that the seller’s bank will then go out and lend the non-mandated funds, thus increasing credit in the system.  However, what has generally happened is that the bank has deposited these funds at the central bank as excess reserves without lending it out, receiving only the base rate of interest for doing so – almost zero.

The reason excess reserves are piling up in the UK and the US has as much to do with the demand for credit as it does with the impairment of banks’ balance sheets.  Banks are under-capitalized on a mark-to-market basis, and are, therefore fearful of making new loans when they need to increase their capital base.  But, companies and individual, fearful of their enormous debt burdens in a world of asset price deflation, show no demand for credit.  The lack of credit and the build-up of excess reserves is, therefore, due to constraints on both the supply and demand sides of the credit process.

But, this is a situation which cannot continue ad infinitum because those reserves are assets on the bank’s balance sheet earning near zero interest.  That means the bank’s profitability is lower than it would be had it lent out those funds or purchased assets with those reserves.  Right now, that is acceptable because banks are earning a lot of cash due to high interest spreads, but eventually, these excess reserves are going to become painfully unprofitable.

So, eventually, the bank will be forced to buy some treasuries in order to increase profitability. Obviously, treasuries would be the asset class of choice for financial institutions fearful of making loans while their capital base is impaired. This makes those lenders wiling buyers of federal government debt and financiers of the burgeoning supply of the government’s spending spree.  In essence, the central bank has caused the private sector to prefer bonds over reserves by pushing the overnight rate to zero. That is what is meant by monetizing debt.

Whether the seller is domestic or foreign, the net effect is the same in increasing reserves unless a foreign seller converts the money into a foreign currency without eventual re-conversion back into the domestic currency.  In this case, QE has actually increased reserves in the foreign baking system instead.

By the way, monetizing debt is a central issue in the debate over Federal Reserve independence.  Because the Federal Reserve has been acting in concert with the executive branch since the credit crisis began, many are beginning to question its quasi-fiscal role in supporting the wider financial system with bailouts, subsidized borrowing, guarantees and liquidity. Add in the QE and a ballooning Fed balance sheet as the central government deficit spends and you have an organization that seems to be acting on behalf of the executive branch.

Is this inflationary?

It all depends on net private savings as to whether this stokes inflation in the short-term. The reason that the Federal Government is deficit spending to begin with has to do with the loss of consumption in the private sector due to increased deleveraging and savings.  In the U.S., we have seen the savings rate rise from negative territory (i.e. saving nothing and spending even more by drawing down accumulated wealth) to almost 7% in a few years’ time.  This behavorial change is a positive for America as it is a recognition of the excess consumption that an asset-based economy created. It puts America in a much better position on its current account and helps to reduce debt from unsustainable levels.

But, it is also responsible for much of the decline in the US economy.  So, to prevent a deflationary spiral, the federal government has stepped in to fill the void.  But, if the increase in net government spending (with the improvement in the current account balance) is less than the increase in net private consumption (both via individuals through lower consumption and companies through reduced capital spending), then the net effect of the spending will not be inflationary.  In that case, the net consumption of individuals, businesses and government (C + I + G +(EX-IM) for you economics fans) is lower than it was before the negative consumption shock.

Over the longer-term, the money printing is problematic.  When demand for borrowing is restored, the extra reserves in the system will be lent out. Moreover, the excess reserves can always be invested in higher yielding assets by the banks in order to increase profitability. Therefore, this sequence will engender rises in either asset or consumer prices, depending on how much excess capacity is in the system.  This is why it is imperative that the Fed outline how it plans to withdraw all of the excess liquidity it created when it expanded its balance sheet by twofold.

And since capacity utilization is incredibly low right now, my bet is on asset price inflation rather than consumer price inflation. So when Marc Faber says don’t underestimate the power of printing money, this is what he means.  That is how and why an asset bubble can inflate even in the face of poor fundamentals and why the present bear market rally can sustain itself longer than one might think.  Eventually, all of this comes to an end and the fundamentals re-assert themselves. When that is, is the $23.7 trillion question.

Related posts:

• Connecting Fed cuts with credit writedowns and quantitative easing
• Quantitative easing: printing money like mad to ward off deflation
• Chart of the day: Excess Reserves
• China warns that the west’s quantitative easing is inflationary
• Don’t underestimate the power of printing money, part 2

The bloggers at bloggers at UMKC’s economics blog have been making the case that California’s IOUs are a currency.  Randy Wray’s entry last Monday was particularly provocative because he suggests a movement to loosen national government power is supporting similar moves in other jurisdictions. Wray writes:

Some commentators have argued that the proposed California "warrants" are similar to local currencies (see, e.g., Mark Thoma). In this piece I discuss experiments with local currencies and continue my argument that if California were to accept its own "warrants" in payment to itself, it could turn these into a functioning currency free of the defects of local currencies.

Interest in local currencies has soared in recent years, with nearly 100 U.S. communities experimenting with them. While proponents offer a variety of arguments in favor of local currencies, they share three common themes. First, there is concern that the use of a national, monopoly, currency creates a variety of economic, social, and environmental problems. Second, local currencies are said to improve regional communities, again across several dimensions including economic, social, political and environmental spheres. Third, many proponents want to reduce the power of national government, recognizing a relation between the monopoly of currency issue and centralization. They believe that decentralized money would shift power back to the communities.

However, previous adventures in local currencies have failed miserably as Wray later attests:

As discussed, most local currencies have failed (of the 82 created between 1991 and 2004, only 17 remained by 2004). Those that succeeded shared some combination of the following characteristics: an exchange rate pegged to a strong national currency by a trusted institution; substantial supplies of unemployed or underemployed workers; businesses operating below capacity; and a strong community spirit, led by liberal, middle class residents. These characteristics are not always easy to replicate nor are they necessarily desirable. If the goal is to displace the national monopoly currency, linking the local currency to it appears inconsistent—especially if one fears national government policy is inflating away the value of the nation’s currency.

So I have another idea, which I got from a knowledgeable reader nicknamed aitrader.  How about a Gold-backed IOU system.  In response to a recent post I wrote on the similarities in the troubles in California and Ireland, he wrote:

Now here’s a curve ball for ya: what would happen if a state or even a private bank were to issue currency redeemable in gold or silver? What would the implications be for the US Federal Reserve? This was the situation for many years in the US. Private banks often issued their own paper currency redeemable in gold and silver. There is nothing illegal about this, though one would assume a new law would be crafted and passed to prevent this from occurring. On that note here is what happened recently to a private currency issuer, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Dollar#Fed….
Interesting times…

So, let me explore his idea using Ireland instead of California.  I want to use Ireland as the example here because, in discussing my California-Ireland post, the Economist pointed out that Ireland is the place where true problems lie. The Economist says:

There is a problem with Mr Harrison’s thesis in the fiscal policy department, however. California has faced credit downgrades, but only because it is legally prevented from running deficits—it must default if it cannot make all its payments out of pocket. But California has a relatively small debt load, so far as nations go. If the state were allowed to run annual deficits, it seems highly unlikely that it would face pressure to balance its budget amid recession.

Ireland, on the other hand, is confronted by actual market pressures to prove that it can meet its obligations; it’s in trouble in an absolute sense. Ironically, both have fiscal difficulties that are not rooted in their federal status; Irish borrowing is limited by markets while California’s borrowing is constrained by the state constitution.

Point taken. So Let’s solve this problem.

Say Brian Lenihan is dispatched to consider how to prevent the government from sacking tens of thousands of workers in order to prevent the Irish from defaulting on its debt. 

He suggests that California’s IOUs are a model for Ireland, but he goes one step further adding a redemption in 5 years at a 40% premium to the present spot price for gold, which represents a 7% annual return.  Today, spot gold is trading at $950 an ounce. So, a 40% premium is about $1330 an ounce for gold.  Lenihan would offer this deal to any and all creditors of the State in lieu of cash.  The IOUs would be tradable in standardized amounts of 20, 50, 100, 1000, 10,000 and 1000,000 euros in order to facilitate a secondary market.

I got this idea from the high yield market where often bonds are issued with an embedded option to convert to equity at a premium or with PIK preferred shares thrown in as a kicker.  The point of these options is to provide a sweetener to investors in order to get the deal done.  These are the same kinds of deals that Warren Buffett did with General Electric and Goldman Sachs in 2008, and that he has previously done with USAir (now US Airways) and Salomon Brothers (now a part of Citigroup). If the embedded option increases in value significantly, the debtholder can make a lot of extra money.  For Buffett’s options in Goldman, this has already occurred.

Here’s what the ‘investor’ gets in the case of the Irish IOUs:

1. Bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the State paying a rate of interest that I suggest be a slight premium to the official 5-year bond.
2. A 5-year out of the money European option to buy gold for the full face value of the bond at today’s price.  Obviously,if you think gold is going up you would be willing to pay a lot for this option.
3. An IOU that is not just backed by the full faith and credit of the sovereign like most currencies, but that has a tangible link to a real asset, gold.

What does the sovereign get?

1. Ireland conserves cash without having to issue bonds.  Ostensibly this would mean interest rates on Irish bonds could remain lower. That’s a huge deal, especially since these IOUs would not be considered legal tender.
2. Ireland removes the restriction imposed by the Maastricht treaty as the IOUs are not cash and reduce the budget deficit.  In effect, the government is free to add fiscal stimulus without those restrictions.

Obviously, the Irish government would have to hedge their gold commitment by buying Gold futures. But, the Irish could then legitimately claim that its IOUs were more than just a piece of paper.  And, they would remove some of the constraints now impose upon it by foregoing their own currency.

Related posts:

• Pre-payments are reducing value of mortgage-backed securities
• Ireland: government blew the boom
• Gold hits all-time record high
• Spain and Ireland ‘thrown to the wolves’ after ECB move
• Ireland gets deflation

Below is a very good hour-long interview I spied earlier today with Janet Tavakoli, the author of a new book ”Dear Mr. Buffett.”  Hat tip Zero Hedge.

I also linked out earlier today to a piece she wrote over at CNN on “What Wall Street owes you.”  Take a look.

Source

C-Span Q&A, 19 April 2009 Transcript

Related posts:

• Janet Tavakoli on fraud, derivatives, and bankruptcy
• Paul Krugman on the global economy
• Stephen Roach and Jim Grant: Video of credit crisis thoughts
• World Economic Forum: Experts voice their views on the economy
• George Soros: the credit crisis of 2008